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Jasper V Stokman

Biographic Data

ID5859009
NAMEJasper V Stokman
GIVEN NAMESJasper V
FAMILY NAMEStokman
SIGNATURESTOKMAN J V
AFFILIATIONSUniversity of Amsterdam
ORCID0000-0003-4751-4431
VERIFIEDYes
TOTAL WORKS1
TOTAL CITATIONS5
AUTHOR COUNT1
EDITOR COUNT0
FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR1995
LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR1995
H-INDEX1
  • Strategic control and interests, its effects on decision outcomes

    Frans N Stokman, Jasper V Stokman•ARTICLE•Journal of Mathematical Sociology•1995•Cited by: 5•References: 17

    Application of the model to artificial data shows that actors with strong preferences in the center have more possibilities to realize good outcomes than other actors. On the basis of an empirical application it is shown that a Nash equilibrium does not always arise after a large number of iterations unless actors have learning capabilities or are severely restricted in their strategic behavior. In political systems and large organizations, ultim…

  • Strategic control and interests, its effects on decision outcomes

    Frans N Stokman, Jasper V Stokman•ARTICLE•Journal of Mathematical Sociology•1995•Cited by: 5•References: 17

    Application of the model to artificial data shows that actors with strong preferences in the center have more possibilities to realize good outcomes than other actors. On the basis of an empirical application it is shown that a Nash equilibrium does not always arise after a large number of iterations unless actors have learning capabilities or are severely restricted in their strategic behavior. In political systems and large organizations, ultim…

  • Strategic control and interests, its effects on decision outcomes

    Frans N Stokman, Jasper V Stokman•ARTICLE•Journal of Mathematical Sociology•1995•Cited by: 5•References: 17

    Application of the model to artificial data shows that actors with strong preferences in the center have more possibilities to realize good outcomes than other actors. On the basis of an empirical application it is shown that a Nash equilibrium does not always arise after a large number of iterations unless actors have learning capabilities or are severely restricted in their strategic behavior. In political systems and large organizations, ultim…

Artificial Intelligence (1 works) · Artificial Intelligence (1 works) · Business (1 works) · Computer Science (1 works) · Economics (1 works) · Game Theory and Applications (1 works) · Game Theory and Voting Systems (1 works) · Knowledge management (1 works) · Leverage (statistics (1 works) · Management science (1 works)

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