Guillermo Ordóñez
Biographic Data
| ID | 5867358 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Guillermo Ordóñez |
| GIVEN NAMES | Guillermo |
| FAMILY NAME | Ordóñez |
| SIGNATURE | ORDOÑEZ G |
| AFFILIATIONS | National Bureau of Economic Research |
| ORCID | 0009-0001-3549-3939 |
| VERIFIED | Yes |
| TOTAL WORKS | 3 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 8 |
| WORKS AS AUTHOR | 3 |
| WORKS AS EDITOR | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2013 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2022 |
| H-INDEX | 2 |
Asymmetric Information and Sovereign Debt
Using bid-level data from discriminatory auctions for Mexican government bonds, we demonstrate that asymmetric information about default risk is a key friction in sovereign bond markets. We document that large bidders achieve higher bid-acceptance rates than other bidders despite paying no more for executed bids. We then propose a new model of primary markets in which investors may differ in wealth, risk aversion, market power, and information. O…
Political Booms, Financial Crises
Political booms, measured by the rise in governments’ popularity, predict financial crises above and beyond better-known early warning indicators, such as credit booms. This predictive power, however, only holds in emerging economies. We argue that governments in developing countries have stronger incentives to “ride” unsound credit booms in order to boost their popularity, rather than implementing corrective policies that could prevent crises bu…
The Asymmetric Effects of Financial Frictions
Economic variables move asymmetrically over the business cycle: quickly during crises but slowly during recoveries. I show that this asymmetry is stronger in countries with less developed financial systems and greater financial frictions. Then I explain this fact using a learning model with endogenous information about economic conditions. Financial frictions, which I capture by higher bankruptcy costs, magnify the reaction of lending rates and e…
Political Booms, Financial Crises
Political booms, measured by the rise in governments’ popularity, predict financial crises above and beyond better-known early warning indicators, such as credit booms. This predictive power, however, only holds in emerging economies. We argue that governments in developing countries have stronger incentives to “ride” unsound credit booms in order to boost their popularity, rather than implementing corrective policies that could prevent crises bu…
The Asymmetric Effects of Financial Frictions
Economic variables move asymmetrically over the business cycle: quickly during crises but slowly during recoveries. I show that this asymmetry is stronger in countries with less developed financial systems and greater financial frictions. Then I explain this fact using a learning model with endogenous information about economic conditions. Financial frictions, which I capture by higher bankruptcy costs, magnify the reaction of lending rates and e…
The Asymmetric Effects of Financial Frictions
Economic variables move asymmetrically over the business cycle: quickly during crises but slowly during recoveries. I show that this asymmetry is stronger in countries with less developed financial systems and greater financial frictions. Then I explain this fact using a learning model with endogenous information about economic conditions. Financial frictions, which I capture by higher bankruptcy costs, magnify the reaction of lending rates and e…
Political Booms, Financial Crises
Political booms, measured by the rise in governments’ popularity, predict financial crises above and beyond better-known early warning indicators, such as credit booms. This predictive power, however, only holds in emerging economies. We argue that governments in developing countries have stronger incentives to “ride” unsound credit booms in order to boost their popularity, rather than implementing corrective policies that could prevent crises bu…
Asymmetric Information and Sovereign Debt
Using bid-level data from discriminatory auctions for Mexican government bonds, we demonstrate that asymmetric information about default risk is a key friction in sovereign bond markets. We document that large bidders achieve higher bid-acceptance rates than other bidders despite paying no more for executed bids. We then propose a new model of primary markets in which investors may differ in wealth, risk aversion, market power, and information. O…
Economics (3 works) · Finance (3 works) · Finance (3 works) · Monetary economics (3 works) · Financial crisis (2 works) · Global Financial Crisis and Policies (2 works) · Information asymmetry (2 works) · Macroeconomics (2 works) · Politics (2 works) · Auction Theory and Applications (1 work)