Alexander Frankel
Biographic Data
| ID | 5867377 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Alexander Frankel |
| GIVEN NAMES | Alexander |
| FAMILY NAME | Frankel |
| SIGNATURE | FRANKEL A |
| AFFILIATIONS | University of Chicago |
| ORCID | 0009-0007-6738-2911 |
| VERIFIED | Yes |
| TOTAL WORKS | 2 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 23 |
| WORKS AS AUTHOR | 2 |
| WORKS AS EDITOR | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2015 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2018 |
| H-INDEX | 2 |
Muddled Information
We study a model of signaling in which agents are heterogeneous on two dimensions. An agent's natural action is the action taken in the absence of signaling concerns. Her gaming ability parameterizes the cost of increasing the action. Equilibrium behavior muddles information across dimensions. As incentives to take higher actions increase—due to higher stakes or more manipulable signaling technology—more information is revealed about gaming abili…
Suspense and Surprise
We model demand for noninstrumental information, drawing on the idea that people derive entertainment utility from suspense and surprise. A period has more suspense if the variance of the next period’s beliefs is greater. A period has more surprise if the current belief is further from the last period’s belief. Under these definitions, we analyze the optimal way to reveal information over time so as to maximize expected suspense or surprise exper…
Suspense and Surprise
We model demand for noninstrumental information, drawing on the idea that people derive entertainment utility from suspense and surprise. A period has more suspense if the variance of the next period’s beliefs is greater. A period has more surprise if the current belief is further from the last period’s belief. Under these definitions, we analyze the optimal way to reveal information over time so as to maximize expected suspense or surprise exper…
Muddled Information
We study a model of signaling in which agents are heterogeneous on two dimensions. An agent's natural action is the action taken in the absence of signaling concerns. Her gaming ability parameterizes the cost of increasing the action. Equilibrium behavior muddles information across dimensions. As incentives to take higher actions increase—due to higher stakes or more manipulable signaling technology—more information is revealed about gaming abili…
Suspense and Surprise
We model demand for noninstrumental information, drawing on the idea that people derive entertainment utility from suspense and surprise. A period has more suspense if the variance of the next period’s beliefs is greater. A period has more surprise if the current belief is further from the last period’s belief. Under these definitions, we analyze the optimal way to reveal information over time so as to maximize expected suspense or surprise exper…
Muddled Information
We study a model of signaling in which agents are heterogeneous on two dimensions. An agent's natural action is the action taken in the absence of signaling concerns. Her gaming ability parameterizes the cost of increasing the action. Equilibrium behavior muddles information across dimensions. As incentives to take higher actions increase—due to higher stakes or more manipulable signaling technology—more information is revealed about gaming abili…
Business (2 works) · Economics (2 works) · Experimental Behavioral Economics Studies (2 works) · Game Theory and Applications (2 works) · Microeconomics (2 works) · Action (physics (1 work) · Advertising (1 work) · Aesthetics (1 work) · Common value auction (1 work) · Computer Science (1 work)