Dirk Bergemann
Biographic Data
| ID | 5867755 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Dirk Bergemann |
| GIVEN NAMES | Dirk |
| FAMILY NAME | Bergemann |
| SIGNATURE | BERGEMANN D |
| AFFILIATIONS | Yale University |
| ORCID | 0000-0002-2759-6962 |
| VERIFIED | Yes |
| TOTAL WORKS | 5 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 5 |
| AUTHOR COUNT | 5 |
| EDITOR COUNT | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2006 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2025 |
| H-INDEX | 1 |
Screening with Persuasion
Search, Information, and Prices
Consider a market with identical firms offering a homogeneous good. For any given ex ante distribution of the price count (the number of firms from which a consumer obtains a quote), we derive a tight upper bound on the equilibrium distribution of sales prices. The bound holds across all models of firms’ common-prior higher-order beliefs about the price count, including the extreme cases of full information and no information. One implication of …
Information and Interaction
Rationalizable implementation
Dynamic Pricing of New Experience Goods
We develop a dynamic model of experience goods pricing with independent private valuations. We show that the optimal paths of sales and prices can be described in terms of a simple dichotomy. In a mass market, prices are declining over time. In a niche market, the optimal prices are initially low followed by higher prices that extract surplus from the buyers with a high willingness to pay. We consider extensions of the model to integrate elements…
Dynamic Pricing of New Experience Goods
We develop a dynamic model of experience goods pricing with independent private valuations. We show that the optimal paths of sales and prices can be described in terms of a simple dichotomy. In a mass market, prices are declining over time. In a niche market, the optimal prices are initially low followed by higher prices that extract surplus from the buyers with a high willingness to pay. We consider extensions of the model to integrate elements…
Dynamic Pricing of New Experience Goods
We develop a dynamic model of experience goods pricing with independent private valuations. We show that the optimal paths of sales and prices can be described in terms of a simple dichotomy. In a mass market, prices are declining over time. In a niche market, the optimal prices are initially low followed by higher prices that extract surplus from the buyers with a high willingness to pay. We consider extensions of the model to integrate elements…
Rationalizable implementation
Information and Interaction
Search, Information, and Prices
Consider a market with identical firms offering a homogeneous good. For any given ex ante distribution of the price count (the number of firms from which a consumer obtains a quote), we derive a tight upper bound on the equilibrium distribution of sales prices. The bound holds across all models of firms’ common-prior higher-order beliefs about the price count, including the extreme cases of full information and no information. One implication of …
Screening with Persuasion
Auction Theory and Applications (3 works) · Consumer Market Behavior and Pricing (3 works) · Economics (3 works) · Game Theory and Applications (3 works) · Computer Science (2 works) · Mathematics (2 works) · Microeconomics (2 works) · Business (1 works) · Chemistry (1 works) · Choice function (1 works)