Keith J Crocker
Biographic Data
| ID | 5867831 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Keith J Crocker |
| GIVEN NAMES | Keith J |
| FAMILY NAME | Crocker |
| SIGNATURE | CROCKER K J |
| AFFILIATIONS | Risk Management Solutions (United Kingdom) |
| ORCID | 0000-0002-5919-5274 |
| VERIFIED | Yes |
| TOTAL WORKS | 3 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 8 |
| WORKS AS AUTHOR | 3 |
| WORKS AS EDITOR | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 1986 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 1998 |
| H-INDEX | 2 |
Is Honesty the Best Policy? Curtailing Insurance Fraud through Optimal Incentive Contracts
An incentive contracting approach is used to characterize optimal contracts when insured individuals possess private information about their losses and are able to misrepresent permanently their loss magnitudes by engaging in the falsification of claims. We demonstrate that efficient agreements necessarily induce some falsification but that the extent of such claims inflation is mitigated partially by an indemnification schedule that overcompensa…
Smoking, Skydiving, and Knitting
The authors analyze the efficiency and market equilibrium of endogenous categorization, where insurance companies classify risks on the basis of insureds' voluntary consumption of products that are correlated with underlying loss propensities, and they show that the use of such categorization may permit the attainment of first-best allocations as competitive Nash equilibria. The optimal insurance premium involves a trade-off between the use of ca…
The Efficiency Effects of Categorical Discrimination in the Insurance Industry
Recent public policy debate has focused concern on the equity dimensions of categorical discrimination based on sex, age, or race in insurance and similar markets. We consider the efficiency effects of such discrimination and establish that costless imperfect categorization always enhances efficiency. When categorization entails a non-negligible resource cost, however, no unambiguous efficiency ranking of informational regimes is possible. When c…
Is Honesty the Best Policy? Curtailing Insurance Fraud through Optimal Incentive Contracts
An incentive contracting approach is used to characterize optimal contracts when insured individuals possess private information about their losses and are able to misrepresent permanently their loss magnitudes by engaging in the falsification of claims. We demonstrate that efficient agreements necessarily induce some falsification but that the extent of such claims inflation is mitigated partially by an indemnification schedule that overcompensa…
The Efficiency Effects of Categorical Discrimination in the Insurance Industry
Recent public policy debate has focused concern on the equity dimensions of categorical discrimination based on sex, age, or race in insurance and similar markets. We consider the efficiency effects of such discrimination and establish that costless imperfect categorization always enhances efficiency. When categorization entails a non-negligible resource cost, however, no unambiguous efficiency ranking of informational regimes is possible. When c…
Smoking, Skydiving, and Knitting
The authors analyze the efficiency and market equilibrium of endogenous categorization, where insurance companies classify risks on the basis of insureds' voluntary consumption of products that are correlated with underlying loss propensities, and they show that the use of such categorization may permit the attainment of first-best allocations as competitive Nash equilibria. The optimal insurance premium involves a trade-off between the use of ca…
The Efficiency Effects of Categorical Discrimination in the Insurance Industry
Recent public policy debate has focused concern on the equity dimensions of categorical discrimination based on sex, age, or race in insurance and similar markets. We consider the efficiency effects of such discrimination and establish that costless imperfect categorization always enhances efficiency. When categorization entails a non-negligible resource cost, however, no unambiguous efficiency ranking of informational regimes is possible. When c…
Smoking, Skydiving, and Knitting
The authors analyze the efficiency and market equilibrium of endogenous categorization, where insurance companies classify risks on the basis of insureds' voluntary consumption of products that are correlated with underlying loss propensities, and they show that the use of such categorization may permit the attainment of first-best allocations as competitive Nash equilibria. The optimal insurance premium involves a trade-off between the use of ca…
Is Honesty the Best Policy? Curtailing Insurance Fraud through Optimal Incentive Contracts
An incentive contracting approach is used to characterize optimal contracts when insured individuals possess private information about their losses and are able to misrepresent permanently their loss magnitudes by engaging in the falsification of claims. We demonstrate that efficient agreements necessarily induce some falsification but that the extent of such claims inflation is mitigated partially by an indemnification schedule that overcompensa…
Actuarial science (3 works) · Computer Science (3 works) · Economics (3 works) · Microeconomics (3 works) · Business (2 works) · Categorization (2 works) · Fiscal Policy and Economic Growth (2 works) · Incentive (2 works) · Public economics (2 works) · Adverse selection (1 work)