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Amanda Pallais

Biographic Data

ID5867840
NAMEAmanda Pallais
GIVEN NAMESAmanda
FAMILY NAMEPallais
SIGNATUREPALLAIS A
AFFILIATIONSDepartment of Economics, Harvard University, Littauer Center, Cambridge, MA 02138, and NBER (email: )
VERIFIEDNo
TOTAL WORKS3
TOTAL CITATIONS12
WORKS AS AUTHOR3
WORKS AS EDITOR0
FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR2016
LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR2017
H-INDEX1
  • ‘Acting Wife’

    Leonardo Bursztyn, Thomas Fujiwara et al.•ARTICLE•American Economic Review•2017

    Do single women avoid career-enhancing actions because these actions signal undesirable traits, like ambition, to the marriage market? While married and unmarried female MBA students perform similarly when their performance is unobserved by classmates (on exams and problem sets), unmarried women have lower participation grades. In a field experiment, single female students reported lower desired salaries and willingness to travel and work long ho…

  • Valuing Alternative Work Arrangements

    Alexandre Mas, Amanda Pallais•ARTICLE•American Economic Review•2017

    We employ a discrete choice experiment in the employment process for a national call center to estimate the willingness to pay distribution for alternative work arrangements relative to traditional office positions. Most workers are not willing to pay for scheduling flexibility, though a tail of workers with high valuations allows for sizable compensating differentials. The average worker is willing to give up 20 percent of wages to avoid a sched…

  • Why the Referential Treatment? Evidence from Field Experiments on Referrals

    Amanda Pallais, Emily Glassberg Sands•ARTICLE•Journal of Political Economy•2016•Cited by: 12•References: 2

    Referred workers are more likely than nonreferred workers to be hired, all else equal. In three field experiments in an online labor market, we examine why. We find that referrals contain positive information about worker performance and persistence that is not contained in workers’ observable characteristics. We also find that referrals perform particularly well when working directly with their referrers. However, we do not find evidence that re…

  • Why the Referential Treatment? Evidence from Field Experiments on Referrals

    Amanda Pallais, Emily Glassberg Sands•ARTICLE•Journal of Political Economy•2016•Cited by: 12•References: 2

    Referred workers are more likely than nonreferred workers to be hired, all else equal. In three field experiments in an online labor market, we examine why. We find that referrals contain positive information about worker performance and persistence that is not contained in workers’ observable characteristics. We also find that referrals perform particularly well when working directly with their referrers. However, we do not find evidence that re…

  • Why the Referential Treatment? Evidence from Field Experiments on Referrals

    Amanda Pallais, Emily Glassberg Sands•ARTICLE•Journal of Political Economy•2016•Cited by: 12•References: 2

    Referred workers are more likely than nonreferred workers to be hired, all else equal. In three field experiments in an online labor market, we examine why. We find that referrals contain positive information about worker performance and persistence that is not contained in workers’ observable characteristics. We also find that referrals perform particularly well when working directly with their referrers. However, we do not find evidence that re…

  • ‘Acting Wife’

    Leonardo Bursztyn, Thomas Fujiwara et al.•ARTICLE•American Economic Review•2017

    Do single women avoid career-enhancing actions because these actions signal undesirable traits, like ambition, to the marriage market? While married and unmarried female MBA students perform similarly when their performance is unobserved by classmates (on exams and problem sets), unmarried women have lower participation grades. In a field experiment, single female students reported lower desired salaries and willingness to travel and work long ho…

  • Valuing Alternative Work Arrangements

    Alexandre Mas, Amanda Pallais•ARTICLE•American Economic Review•2017

    We employ a discrete choice experiment in the employment process for a national call center to estimate the willingness to pay distribution for alternative work arrangements relative to traditional office positions. Most workers are not willing to pay for scheduling flexibility, though a tail of workers with high valuations allows for sizable compensating differentials. The average worker is willing to give up 20 percent of wages to avoid a sched…

Economics (2 works) · Engineering (2 works) · Experimental Behavioral Economics Studies (2 works) · Gender, Labor, and Family Dynamics (2 works) · Labour economics (2 works) · Mathematics (2 works) · Microeconomics (2 works) · Work (physics) (2 works) · Actuarial science (1 work) · Affect (linguistics (1 work)

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