Olivier Tercieux
Biographic Data
| ID | 5867911 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Olivier Tercieux |
| GIVEN NAMES | Olivier |
| FAMILY NAME | Tercieux |
| SIGNATURE | TERCIEUX O |
| AFFILIATIONS | Paris School of Economics |
| VERIFIED | No |
| TOTAL WORKS | 21 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 3 |
| WORKS AS AUTHOR | 21 |
| WORKS AS EDITOR | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2005 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2025 |
| H-INDEX | 1 |
Dynamic assignment without money
We study a large market model of dynamic matching with no monetary transfers and a continuum of agents who have to be assigned items at each date. When the social planner can only elicit ordinal agents' preferences, we prove that under a mild regularity assumption, incentive compatible and ordinally efficient allocation rules coincide with spot mechanisms. The latter specify “virtual prices” for items at each date and, for each agent, randomly se…
Unpaired Kidney Exchange
For an incompatible patient–donor pair, kidney exchanges often forbid receipt-before-donation (the patient receives a kidney before the donor donates) and donation-before-receipt, causing a double-coincidence-of-wants problem. We study an algorithm, the Unpaired kidney exchange algorithm, which eliminates this problem. In a dynamic matching model, we show that the waiting time of patients under Unpaired is close to optimal and substantially short…
The Design of Teacher Assignment
To assign teachers to schools, a modified version of the well-known deferred acceptance mechanism has been proposed in the literature and is used in practice. We show that this mechanism fails to be fair and efficient for both teachers and schools. We identify a class of strategy-proof mechanisms that cannot be improved upon in terms of both efficiency and fairness. Using a rich dataset on teachers’ applications in France, we estimate teachers pr…
Unpaired Kidney Exchange
For an incompatible patient-donor pair, kidney exchanges often forbid receipt-before-donation (the patient receives a kidney before the donor donates) and donation-before-receipt, causing a double-coincidence-of-wants problem. Our proposed algorithm, the Unpaired kidney exchange algorithm, uses "memory" as a medium of exchange to eliminate these timing constraints. In a dynamic matching model, we prove that Unpaired delivers a waiting time of pat…
Robust equilibrium outcomes in sequential games under almost common certainty of payoffs
Améliorer la mobilité des enseignants sans pénaliser les académies les moins attractives
Payoff equivalence of efficient mechanisms in large matching markets
We study Pareto efficient mechanisms in matching markets when the number of agents is large and individual preferences are randomly drawn from a class of distributions, allowing for both common and idiosyncratic shocks. We provide a broad set of circumstances under which, as the market grows large, all Pareto efficient mechanisms—including top trading cycles (with an arbitrary ownership structure), serial dictatorship (with an arbitrary serial or…
Efficiency and Stability in Large Matching Markets
We study efficient and stable mechanisms in matching markets when the number of agents is large and individuals’ preferences and priorities are drawn randomly. When agents’ preferences are uncorrelated, then both efficiency and stability can be achieved in an asymptotic sense via standard mechanisms such as deferred acceptance and top trading cycles. When agents’ preferences are correlated over objects, however, these mechanisms are either ineffi…
Minimizing Justified Envy in School Choice
In 2012, New Orleans Recovery School District (RSD) became the first U.S. district to unify charter and traditional public school admissions in a single-offer assignment mechanism known as OneApp. The RSD also became the first district to use a mechanism based on Top Trading Cycles (TTC) in a real-life allocation problem. Since TTC was originally devised for settings in which agents have endowments, there is no formal rationale for TTC in school …
Sampling best response dynamics and deterministic equilibrium selection
We consider a model of evolution in games in which a revising agent observes the actions of a random number of randomly sampled opponents and then chooses a best response to the distribution of actions in the sample. We provide a condition on the distribution of sample sizes under which an iterated p-dominant equilibrium is almost globally asymptotically stable under these dynamics. We show under an additional condition on the sample size distrib…
Choix d'écoles en France
Dans cet article, nous analysons, à l’aune de la théorie de l’appariement, la procédure d’affectation des élèves dans les lycées utilisée en France : la procédure Affelnet. Nous montrons que cette dernière correspond à la procédure d’acceptation différée école-proposant, définie par Gale et Shapley [1962]. Nous en déduisons un certain nombre de propriétés de la procédure Affelnet. En particulier, elle est stable et difficile à manipuler. En revan…
Simple mechanisms and preferences for honesty
Implementation with evidence
We generalize the canonical problem of Nash implementation by allowing agents to voluntarily provide discriminatory signals, i.e., evidence. Evidence can either take the form of hard information or, more generally, have differential but nonprohibitive costs in different states. In such environments, social choice functions that are not Maskin-monotonic can be implemented. We formulate a more general property, evidence monotonicity, and show that …
Log-linear dynamics and local potential
Subgame-Perfect Implementation Under Information Perturbations
We consider the robustness of extensive form mechanisms to deviations from common knowledge about the state of nature, which we refer to as information perturbations . First, we show that even under arbitrarily small information perturbations the Moore-Repullo mechanism does not yield (even approximately) truthful revelation and that in addition the mechanism has sequential equilibria with undesirable outcomes. More generally, we prove that any e…
Adaptive learning and p-best response sets
Rationalizable implementation
Robust Equilibria under Non-Common Priors
Iterated potential and robustness of equilibria
A characterization of stochastically stable networks
Best response set
Choix d'écoles en France
Dans cet article, nous analysons, à l’aune de la théorie de l’appariement, la procédure d’affectation des élèves dans les lycées utilisée en France : la procédure Affelnet. Nous montrons que cette dernière correspond à la procédure d’acceptation différée école-proposant, définie par Gale et Shapley [1962]. Nous en déduisons un certain nombre de propriétés de la procédure Affelnet. En particulier, elle est stable et difficile à manipuler. En revan…
Efficiency and Stability in Large Matching Markets
We study efficient and stable mechanisms in matching markets when the number of agents is large and individuals’ preferences and priorities are drawn randomly. When agents’ preferences are uncorrelated, then both efficiency and stability can be achieved in an asymptotic sense via standard mechanisms such as deferred acceptance and top trading cycles. When agents’ preferences are correlated over objects, however, these mechanisms are either ineffi…
Best response set
A characterization of stochastically stable networks
Robust Equilibria under Non-Common Priors
Iterated potential and robustness of equilibria
Adaptive learning and p-best response sets
Rationalizable implementation
Implementation with evidence
We generalize the canonical problem of Nash implementation by allowing agents to voluntarily provide discriminatory signals, i.e., evidence. Evidence can either take the form of hard information or, more generally, have differential but nonprohibitive costs in different states. In such environments, social choice functions that are not Maskin-monotonic can be implemented. We formulate a more general property, evidence monotonicity, and show that …
Log-linear dynamics and local potential
Subgame-Perfect Implementation Under Information Perturbations
We consider the robustness of extensive form mechanisms to deviations from common knowledge about the state of nature, which we refer to as information perturbations . First, we show that even under arbitrarily small information perturbations the Moore-Repullo mechanism does not yield (even approximately) truthful revelation and that in addition the mechanism has sequential equilibria with undesirable outcomes. More generally, we prove that any e…
Simple mechanisms and preferences for honesty
Choix d'écoles en France
Dans cet article, nous analysons, à l’aune de la théorie de l’appariement, la procédure d’affectation des élèves dans les lycées utilisée en France : la procédure Affelnet. Nous montrons que cette dernière correspond à la procédure d’acceptation différée école-proposant, définie par Gale et Shapley [1962]. Nous en déduisons un certain nombre de propriétés de la procédure Affelnet. En particulier, elle est stable et difficile à manipuler. En revan…
Sampling best response dynamics and deterministic equilibrium selection
We consider a model of evolution in games in which a revising agent observes the actions of a random number of randomly sampled opponents and then chooses a best response to the distribution of actions in the sample. We provide a condition on the distribution of sample sizes under which an iterated p-dominant equilibrium is almost globally asymptotically stable under these dynamics. We show under an additional condition on the sample size distrib…
Minimizing Justified Envy in School Choice
In 2012, New Orleans Recovery School District (RSD) became the first U.S. district to unify charter and traditional public school admissions in a single-offer assignment mechanism known as OneApp. The RSD also became the first district to use a mechanism based on Top Trading Cycles (TTC) in a real-life allocation problem. Since TTC was originally devised for settings in which agents have endowments, there is no formal rationale for TTC in school …
Payoff equivalence of efficient mechanisms in large matching markets
We study Pareto efficient mechanisms in matching markets when the number of agents is large and individual preferences are randomly drawn from a class of distributions, allowing for both common and idiosyncratic shocks. We provide a broad set of circumstances under which, as the market grows large, all Pareto efficient mechanisms—including top trading cycles (with an arbitrary ownership structure), serial dictatorship (with an arbitrary serial or…
Efficiency and Stability in Large Matching Markets
We study efficient and stable mechanisms in matching markets when the number of agents is large and individuals’ preferences and priorities are drawn randomly. When agents’ preferences are uncorrelated, then both efficiency and stability can be achieved in an asymptotic sense via standard mechanisms such as deferred acceptance and top trading cycles. When agents’ preferences are correlated over objects, however, these mechanisms are either ineffi…
Améliorer la mobilité des enseignants sans pénaliser les académies les moins attractives
Unpaired Kidney Exchange
For an incompatible patient-donor pair, kidney exchanges often forbid receipt-before-donation (the patient receives a kidney before the donor donates) and donation-before-receipt, causing a double-coincidence-of-wants problem. Our proposed algorithm, the Unpaired kidney exchange algorithm, uses "memory" as a medium of exchange to eliminate these timing constraints. In a dynamic matching model, we prove that Unpaired delivers a waiting time of pat…
Robust equilibrium outcomes in sequential games under almost common certainty of payoffs
The Design of Teacher Assignment
To assign teachers to schools, a modified version of the well-known deferred acceptance mechanism has been proposed in the literature and is used in practice. We show that this mechanism fails to be fair and efficient for both teachers and schools. We identify a class of strategy-proof mechanisms that cannot be improved upon in terms of both efficiency and fairness. Using a rich dataset on teachers’ applications in France, we estimate teachers pr…
Unpaired Kidney Exchange
For an incompatible patient–donor pair, kidney exchanges often forbid receipt-before-donation (the patient receives a kidney before the donor donates) and donation-before-receipt, causing a double-coincidence-of-wants problem. We study an algorithm, the Unpaired kidney exchange algorithm, which eliminates this problem. In a dynamic matching model, we show that the waiting time of patients under Unpaired is close to optimal and substantially short…
Dynamic assignment without money
We study a large market model of dynamic matching with no monetary transfers and a continuum of agents who have to be assigned items at each date. When the social planner can only elicit ordinal agents' preferences, we prove that under a mild regularity assumption, incentive compatible and ordinally efficient allocation rules coincide with spot mechanisms. The latter specify “virtual prices” for items at each date and, for each agent, randomly se…
Computer Science (18 works) · Mathematics (15 works) · Mathematical economics (13 works) · Game Theory and Applications (11 works) · Mathematical optimization (11 works) · Auction Theory and Applications (9 works) · Economics (9 works) · Game Theory and Voting Systems (8 works) · Economic theories and models (7 works) · Nash equilibrium (7 works)