David Lucking‐Reiley
Biographic Data
| ID | 5867953 |
|---|---|
| NAME | David Lucking‐Reiley |
| GIVEN NAMES | David |
| FAMILY NAME | Lucking‐Reiley |
| SIGNATURE | REILEY D L |
| AFFILIATIONS | Vanderbilt University |
| VERIFIED | No |
| TOTAL WORKS | 2 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 41 |
| AUTHOR COUNT | 2 |
| EDITOR COUNT | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2000 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2002 |
| H-INDEX | 2 |
The Effects of Seed Money and Refunds on Charitable Giving
We design a field experiment to test two theories of fund-raising for threshold public goods: Andreoni predicts that publicly announced "seed money" will increase charitable donations, whereas Bagnoli and Lipman predict a similar increase for a refund policy. Experimentally manipulating a solicitation of 3,000 households for a university capital campaign produced data confirming both predictions. Increasing seed money from 10 percent to 67 percen…
Vickrey Auctions in Practice
William Vickrey (1961) proposed an auction mechanism in which bidders submit sealed bids, and the highest bidder wins the good in return for payment of the second-highest bid amount. For decades, economists have credited Vickrey with inventing this auction format, and have believed that the Vickrey auction is rarely used in practice. This paper presents evidence that Vickrey auctions have long been the predominant auction format for mail sales of…
The Effects of Seed Money and Refunds on Charitable Giving
We design a field experiment to test two theories of fund-raising for threshold public goods: Andreoni predicts that publicly announced "seed money" will increase charitable donations, whereas Bagnoli and Lipman predict a similar increase for a refund policy. Experimentally manipulating a solicitation of 3,000 households for a university capital campaign produced data confirming both predictions. Increasing seed money from 10 percent to 67 percen…
Vickrey Auctions in Practice
William Vickrey (1961) proposed an auction mechanism in which bidders submit sealed bids, and the highest bidder wins the good in return for payment of the second-highest bid amount. For decades, economists have credited Vickrey with inventing this auction format, and have believed that the Vickrey auction is rarely used in practice. This paper presents evidence that Vickrey auctions have long been the predominant auction format for mail sales of…
Vickrey Auctions in Practice
William Vickrey (1961) proposed an auction mechanism in which bidders submit sealed bids, and the highest bidder wins the good in return for payment of the second-highest bid amount. For decades, economists have credited Vickrey with inventing this auction format, and have believed that the Vickrey auction is rarely used in practice. This paper presents evidence that Vickrey auctions have long been the predominant auction format for mail sales of…
The Effects of Seed Money and Refunds on Charitable Giving
We design a field experiment to test two theories of fund-raising for threshold public goods: Andreoni predicts that publicly announced "seed money" will increase charitable donations, whereas Bagnoli and Lipman predict a similar increase for a refund policy. Experimentally manipulating a solicitation of 3,000 households for a university capital campaign produced data confirming both predictions. Increasing seed money from 10 percent to 67 percen…
Economics (2 works) · Finance (2 works) · Microeconomics (2 works) · Art History and Market Analysis (1 works) · Auction theory (1 works) · Auction Theory and Applications (1 works) · Biology (1 works) · Capital (architecture (1 works) · Collectable (1 works) · Common value auction (1 works)