Florian Ederer
Biographic Data
| ID | 5868093 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Florian Ederer |
| GIVEN NAMES | Florian |
| FAMILY NAME | Ederer |
| SIGNATURE | EDERER F |
| AFFILIATIONS | National Bureau of Economic Research |
| ORCID | 0000-0002-3018-7908 |
| VERIFIED | Yes |
| TOTAL WORKS | 3 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 25 |
| AUTHOR COUNT | 3 |
| EDITOR COUNT | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2020 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2022 |
| H-INDEX | 2 |
Bayesian Persuasion with Lie Detection
Common Ownership, Competition, and Top Management Incentives
We present a mechanism based on managerial incentives through which common ownership affects product market outcomes. Firm-level variation in common ownership causes variation in managerial incentives and productivity across firms, which leads to intraindustry and intrafirm cross-market variation in prices, output, markups, and market shares that is consistent with empirical evidence. The organizational structure of multiproduct firms and the pas…
Killer Acquisitions
This paper argues that incumbent firms may acquire innovative targets solely to discontinue the target’s innovation projects and preempt future competition. We call such acquisitions “killer acquisitions.” We develop a model illustrating this phenomenon. Using pharmaceutical industry data, we show that acquired drug projects are less likely to be developed when they overlap with the acquirer’s existing product portfolio, especially when the acqui…
Killer Acquisitions
This paper argues that incumbent firms may acquire innovative targets solely to discontinue the target’s innovation projects and preempt future competition. We call such acquisitions “killer acquisitions.” We develop a model illustrating this phenomenon. Using pharmaceutical industry data, we show that acquired drug projects are less likely to be developed when they overlap with the acquirer’s existing product portfolio, especially when the acqui…
Common Ownership, Competition, and Top Management Incentives
We present a mechanism based on managerial incentives through which common ownership affects product market outcomes. Firm-level variation in common ownership causes variation in managerial incentives and productivity across firms, which leads to intraindustry and intrafirm cross-market variation in prices, output, markups, and market shares that is consistent with empirical evidence. The organizational structure of multiproduct firms and the pas…
Killer Acquisitions
This paper argues that incumbent firms may acquire innovative targets solely to discontinue the target’s innovation projects and preempt future competition. We call such acquisitions “killer acquisitions.” We develop a model illustrating this phenomenon. Using pharmaceutical industry data, we show that acquired drug projects are less likely to be developed when they overlap with the acquirer’s existing product portfolio, especially when the acqui…
Bayesian Persuasion with Lie Detection
Common Ownership, Competition, and Top Management Incentives
We present a mechanism based on managerial incentives through which common ownership affects product market outcomes. Firm-level variation in common ownership causes variation in managerial incentives and productivity across firms, which leads to intraindustry and intrafirm cross-market variation in prices, output, markups, and market shares that is consistent with empirical evidence. The organizational structure of multiproduct firms and the pas…
Business (2 works) · Economics (2 works) · Artificial Intelligence (1 works) · Bayesian probability (1 works) · Common ownership (1 works) · Competition (biology (1 works) · Computer Science (1 works) · Corporate Finance and Governance (1 works) · Deception (1 works) · Econometrics (1 works)