Alessandro Pavan
Biographic Data
| ID | 5868381 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Alessandro Pavan |
| GIVEN NAMES | Alessandro |
| FAMILY NAME | Pavan |
| SIGNATURE | PAVAN A |
| AFFILIATIONS | Northwestern University |
| ORCID | 0000-0002-6577-8919 |
| VERIFIED | Yes |
| TOTAL WORKS | 5 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 16 |
| WORKS AS AUTHOR | 5 |
| WORKS AS EDITOR | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2006 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2023 |
| H-INDEX | 1 |
Adversarial Coordination and Public Information Design
Taxation under Learning by Doing
We study optimal income taxation when workers’ productivity is stochastic and evolves endogenously because of learning-by-doing. Learning-by-doing calls for higher wedges, and alters the relation between wedges and tax rates. In a calibrated model, we find that reforming the US tax code brings significant welfare gains and that a simple tax code invariant to past incomes is approximately optimal. We isolate the role of learning-by-doing by compar…
Shallow geophysics of the Asinara Island Marine Reserve Area (NW Sardinia, Italy)
We present a high-resolution swath bathymetric and backscatter map of the entire sector of the Marine Reserve Area (MRA) of the Asinara Island, along with a geological and sediment thickness map derived from the interpretation of a large set of high-resolution seismic profiles, and an airborne-derived hyperspectral image of the Asinara Island. Acquired data show that most of the eastern marine sector of the Asinara Island is characterized by quit…
Managerial Turnover in a Changing World
We characterize a firm's profit-maximizing turnover policy in an environment where managerial productivity changes stochastically over time and is the managers' private information. Our key positive result shows that the productivity level that the firm requires for retention declines with the managers' tenure in the firm. Our key normative result shows that, compared to what is efficient, the profit-maximizing policy either induces excessive ret…
Signaling in a Global Game
This paper introduces signaling in a global game so as to examine the informational role of policy in coordination environments such as currency crises and bank runs. While exogenous asymmetric information has been shown to select a unique equilibrium, we show that the endogenous information generated by policy interventions leads to multiple equilibria. The policy maker is thus trapped into a position in which self-fulfilling expectations dictat…
Signaling in a Global Game
This paper introduces signaling in a global game so as to examine the informational role of policy in coordination environments such as currency crises and bank runs. While exogenous asymmetric information has been shown to select a unique equilibrium, we show that the endogenous information generated by policy interventions leads to multiple equilibria. The policy maker is thus trapped into a position in which self-fulfilling expectations dictat…
Taxation under Learning by Doing
We study optimal income taxation when workers’ productivity is stochastic and evolves endogenously because of learning-by-doing. Learning-by-doing calls for higher wedges, and alters the relation between wedges and tax rates. In a calibrated model, we find that reforming the US tax code brings significant welfare gains and that a simple tax code invariant to past incomes is approximately optimal. We isolate the role of learning-by-doing by compar…
Signaling in a Global Game
This paper introduces signaling in a global game so as to examine the informational role of policy in coordination environments such as currency crises and bank runs. While exogenous asymmetric information has been shown to select a unique equilibrium, we show that the endogenous information generated by policy interventions leads to multiple equilibria. The policy maker is thus trapped into a position in which self-fulfilling expectations dictat…
Managerial Turnover in a Changing World
We characterize a firm's profit-maximizing turnover policy in an environment where managerial productivity changes stochastically over time and is the managers' private information. Our key positive result shows that the productivity level that the firm requires for retention declines with the managers' tenure in the firm. Our key normative result shows that, compared to what is efficient, the profit-maximizing policy either induces excessive ret…
Shallow geophysics of the Asinara Island Marine Reserve Area (NW Sardinia, Italy)
We present a high-resolution swath bathymetric and backscatter map of the entire sector of the Marine Reserve Area (MRA) of the Asinara Island, along with a geological and sediment thickness map derived from the interpretation of a large set of high-resolution seismic profiles, and an airborne-derived hyperspectral image of the Asinara Island. Acquired data show that most of the eastern marine sector of the Asinara Island is characterized by quit…
Taxation under Learning by Doing
We study optimal income taxation when workers’ productivity is stochastic and evolves endogenously because of learning-by-doing. Learning-by-doing calls for higher wedges, and alters the relation between wedges and tax rates. In a calibrated model, we find that reforming the US tax code brings significant welfare gains and that a simple tax code invariant to past incomes is approximately optimal. We isolate the role of learning-by-doing by compar…
Adversarial Coordination and Public Information Design
Economics (3 works) · Microeconomics (3 works) · Business (2 works) · Computer Science (2 works) · Economic Policies and Impacts (2 works) · Economic theories and models (2 works) · Game Theory and Applications (2 works) · Macroeconomics (2 works) · Productivity (2 works) · Public economics (2 works)