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John A Weinberg

Biographic Data

ID5868405
NAMEJohn A Weinberg
GIVEN NAMESJohn A
FAMILY NAMEWeinberg
SIGNATUREWEINBERG J A
ORCID0000-0003-4516-9849
VERIFIEDYes
TOTAL WORKS1
TOTAL CITATIONS6
WORKS AS AUTHOR1
WORKS AS EDITOR0
FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR1989
LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR1989
H-INDEX1
  • Optimal Contracts under Costly State Falsification

    Jeffrey M Lacker, John A Weinberg•ARTICLE•Journal of Political Economy•1989•Cited by: 6•References: 1

    We examine an exchange economy with two agents: one risk neutral with a certain endowment and a second risk averse with a random endowment. The realization of the endowment is public but can be falsified by the second agent at a cost. For a broad class of falsification cost functions the optimal no-falsification contract is noncontingent on a left-hand interval and strictly increasing with a slope strictly less than one on a right-hand interval. …

  • Optimal Contracts under Costly State Falsification

    Jeffrey M Lacker, John A Weinberg•ARTICLE•Journal of Political Economy•1989•Cited by: 6•References: 1

    We examine an exchange economy with two agents: one risk neutral with a certain endowment and a second risk averse with a random endowment. The realization of the endowment is public but can be falsified by the second agent at a cost. For a broad class of falsification cost functions the optimal no-falsification contract is noncontingent on a left-hand interval and strictly increasing with a slope strictly less than one on a right-hand interval. …

  • Optimal Contracts under Costly State Falsification

    Jeffrey M Lacker, John A Weinberg•ARTICLE•Journal of Political Economy•1989•Cited by: 6•References: 1

    We examine an exchange economy with two agents: one risk neutral with a certain endowment and a second risk averse with a random endowment. The realization of the endowment is public but can be falsified by the second agent at a cost. For a broad class of falsification cost functions the optimal no-falsification contract is noncontingent on a left-hand interval and strictly increasing with a slope strictly less than one on a right-hand interval. …

Algorithm (1 work) · Banking stability, regulation, efficiency (1 work) · Computer Science (1 work) · Economic theories and models (1 work) · Economics (1 work) · Law, Economics, and Judicial Systems (1 work) · Mathematical economics (1 work) · Microeconomics (1 work) · State (computer science (1 work)

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