James B Rebitzer
Biographic Data
| ID | 5868565 |
|---|---|
| NAME | James B Rebitzer |
| GIVEN NAMES | James B |
| FAMILY NAME | Rebitzer |
| SIGNATURE | REBITZER J B |
| AFFILIATIONS | Boston University |
| ORCID | 0000-0002-5159-8204 |
| VERIFIED | Yes |
| TOTAL WORKS | 5 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 8 |
| AUTHOR COUNT | 5 |
| EDITOR COUNT | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 1987 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2008 |
| H-INDEX | 1 |
Organizational Fragmentation and Care Quality in the U.S. Healthcare System
Many goods and services can be readily provided through a series of unconnected transactions, but in health care, close coordination over time and within care episodes improves both health outcomes and efficiency. Close coordination is problematic in the U.S. healthcare system because the financing and delivery of care is distributed across a variety of distinct and often competing entities, each with its own objectives, obligations, and capabili…
Job-Hopping in Silicon Valley: Some Evidence Concerning the Microfoundations of a High-Technology Cluster
Observers of Silicon Valley's computer cluster report that employees move rapidly between competing firms, but evidence supporting this claim is scarce. Job-hopping is important in computer clusters because it facilitates the reallocation of talent and resources toward firms with superior innovations. Using new data on labor mobility, we find higher rates of job-hopping for college-educated men in Silicon Valley's computer industry than in comput…
Physician Incentives in Health Maintenance Organizations
Managed care organizations rely on incentives that encourage physicians to limit medical expenditures, but little is known about how physicians respond to these incentives. We address this issue by analyzing the physician incentive contracts in use at a health maintenance organization. By combining knowledge of the incentive contracts with internal company records, we examine how medical expenditures vary with the intensity of the incentive to cu…
Employer Size and Dual Labor Markets
Recently developed effort regulation models argue that labor markets are segmented because of differences in the technology of supervision across firms. primary jobs pay above market clearing wages because these jobs are difficult to monitor. Secondary jobs, in contrast, pose no monitoring difficulties and therefore pay a market clearing wage. If, as the literature suggests, increases in employer size make supervision more difficult, we should ob…
Unemployment, Long-Term Employment Relations, and Productivity Growth
Using an effort-regulation type of efficiency wage model, it is demonstrated that a firm may respond to slackening labor markets by acting to increase the intensity with which workers work. The magnitude of this work intensity effect depends on the structure of employment relations. Where long-term employment relations are prevalent, the effect of labor market slack on work intensity may be diminished. These propositions are tested empirically by…
Physician Incentives in Health Maintenance Organizations
Managed care organizations rely on incentives that encourage physicians to limit medical expenditures, but little is known about how physicians respond to these incentives. We address this issue by analyzing the physician incentive contracts in use at a health maintenance organization. By combining knowledge of the incentive contracts with internal company records, we examine how medical expenditures vary with the intensity of the incentive to cu…
Unemployment, Long-Term Employment Relations, and Productivity Growth
Using an effort-regulation type of efficiency wage model, it is demonstrated that a firm may respond to slackening labor markets by acting to increase the intensity with which workers work. The magnitude of this work intensity effect depends on the structure of employment relations. Where long-term employment relations are prevalent, the effect of labor market slack on work intensity may be diminished. These propositions are tested empirically by…
Employer Size and Dual Labor Markets
Recently developed effort regulation models argue that labor markets are segmented because of differences in the technology of supervision across firms. primary jobs pay above market clearing wages because these jobs are difficult to monitor. Secondary jobs, in contrast, pose no monitoring difficulties and therefore pay a market clearing wage. If, as the literature suggests, increases in employer size make supervision more difficult, we should ob…
Physician Incentives in Health Maintenance Organizations
Managed care organizations rely on incentives that encourage physicians to limit medical expenditures, but little is known about how physicians respond to these incentives. We address this issue by analyzing the physician incentive contracts in use at a health maintenance organization. By combining knowledge of the incentive contracts with internal company records, we examine how medical expenditures vary with the intensity of the incentive to cu…
Job-Hopping in Silicon Valley: Some Evidence Concerning the Microfoundations of a High-Technology Cluster
Observers of Silicon Valley's computer cluster report that employees move rapidly between competing firms, but evidence supporting this claim is scarce. Job-hopping is important in computer clusters because it facilitates the reallocation of talent and resources toward firms with superior innovations. Using new data on labor mobility, we find higher rates of job-hopping for college-educated men in Silicon Valley's computer industry than in comput…
Organizational Fragmentation and Care Quality in the U.S. Healthcare System
Many goods and services can be readily provided through a series of unconnected transactions, but in health care, close coordination over time and within care episodes improves both health outcomes and efficiency. Close coordination is problematic in the U.S. healthcare system because the financing and delivery of care is distributed across a variety of distinct and often competing entities, each with its own objectives, obligations, and capabili…
Economics (5 works) · Business (4 works) · Computer Science (3 works) · Labour economics (3 works) · Actuarial science (2 works) · Economic growth (2 works) · Firm Innovation and Growth (2 works) · Health care (2 works) · Healthcare Policy and Management (2 works) · Incentive (2 works)