Petra Persson
Biographic Data
| ID | 5868826 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Petra Persson |
| GIVEN NAMES | Petra |
| FAMILY NAME | Persson |
| SIGNATURE | PERSSON P |
| AFFILIATIONS | Stanford University |
| VERIFIED | No |
| TOTAL WORKS | 7 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 7 |
| AUTHOR COUNT | 7 |
| EDITOR COUNT | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2011 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2025 |
| H-INDEX | 2 |
Maternal and Infant Health Inequality
We use linked administrative data on the universe of California births to provide novel evidence on economic inequality in infant and maternal health. Infants and mothers at the top of the income distribution have worse birth and morbidity outcomes than their lowest-income counterparts, but are nevertheless the least likely to die in the year following birth. Racial disparities swamp these income disparities, with no racial convergence in health …
Targeting Precision Medicine
Previous articleNext article No AccessTargeting Precision Medicine: Evidence from Prenatal ScreeningPeter Conner, Liran Einav, Amy Finkelstein, and Petra PerssonPeter Conner, Liran Einav, Amy Finkelstein, and Petra PerssonPDFPDF PLUS Add to favoritesDownload CitationTrack CitationsPermissionsReprints Share onFacebookxLinkedInRedditEmailPrint SectionsMoreDetailsFiguresReferencesCited by Journal of Political Economy Just Accepted Article DOIhttps:/…
Social Insurance and the Marriage Market
Social insurance is often linked to marriage. Existing evidence suggests small marital responses to financial incentives and stems from settings where benefits are realized in the near future. I analyze how linking survivors insurance to marriage affects the marriage market. Exploiting Sweden's elimination of survivors insurance, I demonstrate that severing this link (1) affected entry into marriage up to 50 years before expected payout, (2) rais…
Attention manipulation and information overload
Limits on consumer attention give firms incentives to manipulate prospective buyers’ allocation of attention. This paper models such attention manipulation and shows that it limits the ability of disclosure regulation to improve consumer welfare. Competitive information supply from firms competing for attention can reduce consumers’ knowledge by causing information overload. A single firm subjected to a disclosure mandate may deliberately induce …
Violence and Entry in Prostitution Markets
This chapter explores three issues in prostitution markets and their implications for prostitution law: bargaining, coercion, and entry. The discussion is organized around three different views on violence: prostitution as a product of violence, voluntary entry into prostitution markets, and transactional coercion. The chapter pays special attention to transactional coercion, which acknowledges the fact that violence against prostitutes is not re…
The Limits of Career Concerns in Federalism
Performance-based promotion schemes in administrative hierarchies have limitations. Chinese provincial leaders, despite facing strong career concerns, make different policy decisions depending on their career backgrounds. Provincial party secretaries who rose from low to high positions within the province they govern (“locals”) spend a higher share of budgetary resources on education and health care and invest less in construction infrastructure …
Elite Capture in the Absence of Democracy
Social Insurance and the Marriage Market
Social insurance is often linked to marriage. Existing evidence suggests small marital responses to financial incentives and stems from settings where benefits are realized in the near future. I analyze how linking survivors insurance to marriage affects the marriage market. Exploiting Sweden's elimination of survivors insurance, I demonstrate that severing this link (1) affected entry into marriage up to 50 years before expected payout, (2) rais…
Attention manipulation and information overload
Limits on consumer attention give firms incentives to manipulate prospective buyers’ allocation of attention. This paper models such attention manipulation and shows that it limits the ability of disclosure regulation to improve consumer welfare. Competitive information supply from firms competing for attention can reduce consumers’ knowledge by causing information overload. A single firm subjected to a disclosure mandate may deliberately induce …
Targeting Precision Medicine
Previous articleNext article No AccessTargeting Precision Medicine: Evidence from Prenatal ScreeningPeter Conner, Liran Einav, Amy Finkelstein, and Petra PerssonPeter Conner, Liran Einav, Amy Finkelstein, and Petra PerssonPDFPDF PLUS Add to favoritesDownload CitationTrack CitationsPermissionsReprints Share onFacebookxLinkedInRedditEmailPrint SectionsMoreDetailsFiguresReferencesCited by Journal of Political Economy Just Accepted Article DOIhttps:/…
Elite Capture in the Absence of Democracy
The Limits of Career Concerns in Federalism
Performance-based promotion schemes in administrative hierarchies have limitations. Chinese provincial leaders, despite facing strong career concerns, make different policy decisions depending on their career backgrounds. Provincial party secretaries who rose from low to high positions within the province they govern (“locals”) spend a higher share of budgetary resources on education and health care and invest less in construction infrastructure …
Violence and Entry in Prostitution Markets
This chapter explores three issues in prostitution markets and their implications for prostitution law: bargaining, coercion, and entry. The discussion is organized around three different views on violence: prostitution as a product of violence, voluntary entry into prostitution markets, and transactional coercion. The chapter pays special attention to transactional coercion, which acknowledges the fact that violence against prostitutes is not re…
Attention manipulation and information overload
Limits on consumer attention give firms incentives to manipulate prospective buyers’ allocation of attention. This paper models such attention manipulation and shows that it limits the ability of disclosure regulation to improve consumer welfare. Competitive information supply from firms competing for attention can reduce consumers’ knowledge by causing information overload. A single firm subjected to a disclosure mandate may deliberately induce …
Social Insurance and the Marriage Market
Social insurance is often linked to marriage. Existing evidence suggests small marital responses to financial incentives and stems from settings where benefits are realized in the near future. I analyze how linking survivors insurance to marriage affects the marriage market. Exploiting Sweden's elimination of survivors insurance, I demonstrate that severing this link (1) affected entry into marriage up to 50 years before expected payout, (2) rais…
Targeting Precision Medicine
Previous articleNext article No AccessTargeting Precision Medicine: Evidence from Prenatal ScreeningPeter Conner, Liran Einav, Amy Finkelstein, and Petra PerssonPeter Conner, Liran Einav, Amy Finkelstein, and Petra PerssonPDFPDF PLUS Add to favoritesDownload CitationTrack CitationsPermissionsReprints Share onFacebookxLinkedInRedditEmailPrint SectionsMoreDetailsFiguresReferencesCited by Journal of Political Economy Just Accepted Article DOIhttps:/…
Maternal and Infant Health Inequality
We use linked administrative data on the universe of California births to provide novel evidence on economic inequality in infant and maternal health. Infants and mothers at the top of the income distribution have worse birth and morbidity outcomes than their lowest-income counterparts, but are nevertheless the least likely to die in the year following birth. Racial disparities swamp these income disparities, with no racial convergence in health …
Business (4 works) · Economics (4 works) · Political science (3 works) · China's Socioeconomic Reforms and Governance (2 works) · Economic growth (2 works) · Incentive (2 works) · Law (2 works) · Local Government Finance and Decentralization (2 works) · Medicine (2 works) · Microeconomics (2 works)