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Gregory D Hess

Biographic Data

ID5868854
NAMEGregory D Hess
GIVEN NAMESGregory D
FAMILY NAMEHess
SIGNATUREHESS G D
AFFILIATIONSClaremont McKenna College
VERIFIEDNo
TOTAL WORKS12
TOTAL CITATIONS84
AUTHOR COUNT12
EDITOR COUNT0
FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR1993
LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR2011
H-INDEX4
  • Terrorism and the economics of trust

    Open Access•Brock Blomberg, S Brock Blomberg et al.•ARTICLE•Journal of Peace Research•2011•Cited by: 4•References: 29

    Previous research has shown that trust is an important component that encourages investment and capital formation which, in turn, enhances economic performance. This article investigates the effect of terrorism on income, including its indirect role through lowering trust. We consider terrorism as a factor that can increase the cost of investing in technology and capital formation due to its ability to diminish trust in an economy. We then develo…

  • Where have all the heroes gone? A rational-choice perspective on heroism

    Open Access•S Brock Blomberg, Gregory D Hess et al.•ARTICLE•Public Choice•2009•Cited by: 2•References: 11

  • How Much Does Violence Tax Trade

    S Brock Blomberg, Gregory D Hess•ARTICLE•The Review of Economics and…•2006

    We investigate the empirical effect of violence, as compared to other trade impediments, on trade flows. Our analysis is based on a panel data set with annual observations on 177 countries from 1968 to 1999, which brings together information from the Rose data set, the iterate data set for terrorist events, and data sets of external and internal conflict. We explore these data with traditional and theoretical gravity models. We calculate that, fo…

  • Economic conditions and terrorism

    Open Access•S Brock Blomberg, Gregory D Hess et al.•ARTICLE•European Journal of Political…•2004

  • The macroeconomic consequences of terrorism

    Open Access•S Brock Blomberg, Gregory D Hess et al.•ARTICLE•Journal of Monetary Economics•2004

  • An Economic Model of Terrorism

    Open Access•S Brock Blomberg, Gregory D Hess et al.•ARTICLE•Conflict Management and Peace…•2004•Cited by: 10•References: 11

    We develop an economic model of terrorism. Groups undertake violent activities to change the status quo when they are unable to bring about drastic political change in the face of limited access to economic opportunity. Furthermore, these groups are more likely to resort to terrorist activity when they face powerful policy-making elites who can't be uprooted easily, by legitimate means or otherwise. If, on the other hand, the elite groups current…

  • Marriage and Consumption Insurance

    Gregory D Hess•ARTICLE•Journal of Political Economy•2004•Cited by: 11•References: 4

    When markets are incomplete, individuals may choose to marry to diversify their labor income risk. Love, however, can complicate the picture. If love is fleeting or the resolution of agents' income uncertainty occurs predominantly later in life, then marriages with good economic matches last longer. In contrast, if love is persistent and the resolution of uncertainty to agents' income occurs early, then marriages with good economic matches are mo…

  • The Temporal Links between Conflict and Economic Activity

    Open Access•Brock Blomberg, S Brock Blomberg et al.•ARTICLE•Journal of Conflict Resolution•2002•Cited by: 38•References: 19

    Data from 152 countries from 1950 to 1992 are used to estimate the joint determination of external conflict, internal conflict, and the business cycle. Results show that the occurrence of a recession alone will significantly increase the probability of internal conflict, and when combined with the occurrence of an external conflict, recessions will further increase the probability of internal conflict. These results are obtained from estimates of…

  • War and Democracy

    Gregory D Hess, Athanasios Orphanides•ARTICLE•Journal of Political Economy•2001•Cited by: 19•References: 24

    We present a general equilibrium model of conflict to investigate whether the prevalence of democracy is sufficient to foster the perpetual peace hypothesized by Immanuel Kant and whether the world would necessarily become more peaceful as more countries adopt democratic institutions. Our exploration suggests that neither hypothesis is true. The desire of incumbent leaders with unfavorable economic performance to hold on to power generates an inc…

  • Measuring and Comparing Business-Cycle Features

    Gregory D Hess, Shigeru Iwata•ARTICLE•Journal of Business and Economic…•1997

    Since the extensive work by Burns and Mitchell, many economists have interpreted economic fluctuations in terms of business-cycle phases. Given this, the authors argue that, in addition to usual model-selection criteria currently used in the profession, the adequacy of a univariate macroeconomic time series model should be based on its ability to replicate two important business-cycle features of the U.S. data-duration and amplitude. The authors …

  • Are Higher Levels of Inflation Less Predictable? A State-Dependent Conditional Heteroscedasticity Approach

    Allan D Brunner, Gregory D Hess•ARTICLE•Journal of Business and Economic…•1993

    Milton Friedman (1977) proposed that there is a positive relationship between inflation and inflation uncertainty. Using state-dependent models of conditional moments, the authors find strong statistical evidence that higher levels of inflation are less predictable, although innovations in inflation are somewhat bet ter predictors of future volatility than actual inflation. The authors' results are robust to different sample periods and to assump…

  • A Test of the Theory of Optimal Taxation for the United States, 1869-1989

    Gregory D Hess•ARTICLE•The Review of Economics and…•1993

    A popular theory of optimal tax policies suggests that tax rates should follow a random walk. This paper extends the existing empirical literature in three ways. First, the impact on the marginal utility of consumption when the government chooses a tax plan to smooth the distorting impact of taxes is considered. Second, exogenous changes in the real rate of interest are incorporated into the government's optimal tax plan. Finally, the tax elastic…

  • The Temporal Links between Conflict and Economic Activity

    Open Access•Brock Blomberg, S Brock Blomberg et al.•ARTICLE•Journal of Conflict Resolution•2002•Cited by: 38•References: 19

    Data from 152 countries from 1950 to 1992 are used to estimate the joint determination of external conflict, internal conflict, and the business cycle. Results show that the occurrence of a recession alone will significantly increase the probability of internal conflict, and when combined with the occurrence of an external conflict, recessions will further increase the probability of internal conflict. These results are obtained from estimates of…

  • War and Democracy

    Gregory D Hess, Athanasios Orphanides•ARTICLE•Journal of Political Economy•2001•Cited by: 19•References: 24

    We present a general equilibrium model of conflict to investigate whether the prevalence of democracy is sufficient to foster the perpetual peace hypothesized by Immanuel Kant and whether the world would necessarily become more peaceful as more countries adopt democratic institutions. Our exploration suggests that neither hypothesis is true. The desire of incumbent leaders with unfavorable economic performance to hold on to power generates an inc…

  • Marriage and Consumption Insurance

    Gregory D Hess•ARTICLE•Journal of Political Economy•2004•Cited by: 11•References: 4

    When markets are incomplete, individuals may choose to marry to diversify their labor income risk. Love, however, can complicate the picture. If love is fleeting or the resolution of agents' income uncertainty occurs predominantly later in life, then marriages with good economic matches last longer. In contrast, if love is persistent and the resolution of uncertainty to agents' income occurs early, then marriages with good economic matches are mo…

  • An Economic Model of Terrorism

    Open Access•S Brock Blomberg, Gregory D Hess et al.•ARTICLE•Conflict Management and Peace…•2004•Cited by: 10•References: 11

    We develop an economic model of terrorism. Groups undertake violent activities to change the status quo when they are unable to bring about drastic political change in the face of limited access to economic opportunity. Furthermore, these groups are more likely to resort to terrorist activity when they face powerful policy-making elites who can't be uprooted easily, by legitimate means or otherwise. If, on the other hand, the elite groups current…

  • Terrorism and the economics of trust

    Open Access•Brock Blomberg, S Brock Blomberg et al.•ARTICLE•Journal of Peace Research•2011•Cited by: 4•References: 29

    Previous research has shown that trust is an important component that encourages investment and capital formation which, in turn, enhances economic performance. This article investigates the effect of terrorism on income, including its indirect role through lowering trust. We consider terrorism as a factor that can increase the cost of investing in technology and capital formation due to its ability to diminish trust in an economy. We then develo…

  • Where have all the heroes gone? A rational-choice perspective on heroism

    Open Access•S Brock Blomberg, Gregory D Hess et al.•ARTICLE•Public Choice•2009•Cited by: 2•References: 11

  • Are Higher Levels of Inflation Less Predictable? A State-Dependent Conditional Heteroscedasticity Approach

    Allan D Brunner, Gregory D Hess•ARTICLE•Journal of Business and Economic…•1993

    Milton Friedman (1977) proposed that there is a positive relationship between inflation and inflation uncertainty. Using state-dependent models of conditional moments, the authors find strong statistical evidence that higher levels of inflation are less predictable, although innovations in inflation are somewhat bet ter predictors of future volatility than actual inflation. The authors' results are robust to different sample periods and to assump…

  • A Test of the Theory of Optimal Taxation for the United States, 1869-1989

    Gregory D Hess•ARTICLE•The Review of Economics and…•1993

    A popular theory of optimal tax policies suggests that tax rates should follow a random walk. This paper extends the existing empirical literature in three ways. First, the impact on the marginal utility of consumption when the government chooses a tax plan to smooth the distorting impact of taxes is considered. Second, exogenous changes in the real rate of interest are incorporated into the government's optimal tax plan. Finally, the tax elastic…

  • Measuring and Comparing Business-Cycle Features

    Gregory D Hess, Shigeru Iwata•ARTICLE•Journal of Business and Economic…•1997

    Since the extensive work by Burns and Mitchell, many economists have interpreted economic fluctuations in terms of business-cycle phases. Given this, the authors argue that, in addition to usual model-selection criteria currently used in the profession, the adequacy of a univariate macroeconomic time series model should be based on its ability to replicate two important business-cycle features of the U.S. data-duration and amplitude. The authors …

  • War and Democracy

    Gregory D Hess, Athanasios Orphanides•ARTICLE•Journal of Political Economy•2001•Cited by: 19•References: 24

    We present a general equilibrium model of conflict to investigate whether the prevalence of democracy is sufficient to foster the perpetual peace hypothesized by Immanuel Kant and whether the world would necessarily become more peaceful as more countries adopt democratic institutions. Our exploration suggests that neither hypothesis is true. The desire of incumbent leaders with unfavorable economic performance to hold on to power generates an inc…

  • The Temporal Links between Conflict and Economic Activity

    Open Access•Brock Blomberg, S Brock Blomberg et al.•ARTICLE•Journal of Conflict Resolution•2002•Cited by: 38•References: 19

    Data from 152 countries from 1950 to 1992 are used to estimate the joint determination of external conflict, internal conflict, and the business cycle. Results show that the occurrence of a recession alone will significantly increase the probability of internal conflict, and when combined with the occurrence of an external conflict, recessions will further increase the probability of internal conflict. These results are obtained from estimates of…

  • Economic conditions and terrorism

    Open Access•S Brock Blomberg, Gregory D Hess et al.•ARTICLE•European Journal of Political…•2004

  • The macroeconomic consequences of terrorism

    Open Access•S Brock Blomberg, Gregory D Hess et al.•ARTICLE•Journal of Monetary Economics•2004

  • An Economic Model of Terrorism

    Open Access•S Brock Blomberg, Gregory D Hess et al.•ARTICLE•Conflict Management and Peace…•2004•Cited by: 10•References: 11

    We develop an economic model of terrorism. Groups undertake violent activities to change the status quo when they are unable to bring about drastic political change in the face of limited access to economic opportunity. Furthermore, these groups are more likely to resort to terrorist activity when they face powerful policy-making elites who can't be uprooted easily, by legitimate means or otherwise. If, on the other hand, the elite groups current…

  • Marriage and Consumption Insurance

    Gregory D Hess•ARTICLE•Journal of Political Economy•2004•Cited by: 11•References: 4

    When markets are incomplete, individuals may choose to marry to diversify their labor income risk. Love, however, can complicate the picture. If love is fleeting or the resolution of agents' income uncertainty occurs predominantly later in life, then marriages with good economic matches last longer. In contrast, if love is persistent and the resolution of uncertainty to agents' income occurs early, then marriages with good economic matches are mo…

  • How Much Does Violence Tax Trade

    S Brock Blomberg, Gregory D Hess•ARTICLE•The Review of Economics and…•2006

    We investigate the empirical effect of violence, as compared to other trade impediments, on trade flows. Our analysis is based on a panel data set with annual observations on 177 countries from 1968 to 1999, which brings together information from the Rose data set, the iterate data set for terrorist events, and data sets of external and internal conflict. We explore these data with traditional and theoretical gravity models. We calculate that, fo…

  • Where have all the heroes gone? A rational-choice perspective on heroism

    Open Access•S Brock Blomberg, Gregory D Hess et al.•ARTICLE•Public Choice•2009•Cited by: 2•References: 11

  • Terrorism and the economics of trust

    Open Access•Brock Blomberg, S Brock Blomberg et al.•ARTICLE•Journal of Peace Research•2011•Cited by: 4•References: 29

    Previous research has shown that trust is an important component that encourages investment and capital formation which, in turn, enhances economic performance. This article investigates the effect of terrorism on income, including its indirect role through lowering trust. We consider terrorism as a factor that can increase the cost of investing in technology and capital formation due to its ability to diminish trust in an economy. We then develo…

Economics (12 works) · Political science (8 works) · Politics (7 works) · Econometrics (6 works) · Terrorism (5 works) · Development economics (4 works) · Law (4 works) · Political economy (4 works) · Terrorism, Counterterrorism, and Political Violence (4 works) · Computer Science (3 works)

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