Takashi Kunimoto
Biographic Data
| ID | 5869015 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Takashi Kunimoto |
| GIVEN NAMES | Takashi |
| FAMILY NAME | Kunimoto |
| SIGNATURE | KUNIMOTO T |
| AFFILIATIONS | Singapore Management University |
| ORCID | 0000-0002-7798-7435 |
| VERIFIED | Yes |
| TOTAL WORKS | 4 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 1 |
| WORKS AS AUTHOR | 4 |
| WORKS AS EDITOR | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2012 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2022 |
| H-INDEX | 1 |
Getting Dynamic Implementation to Work
We develop a new class of two-stage mechanisms, which fully implement any social choice function under initial rationalizability in complete information environments. We show theoretically that our simultaneous report (SR) mechanisms are robust to small amounts of incomplete information about the state of nature. We also highlight the robustness of the mechanisms to a wide variety of reasoning processes and behavioral assumptions. We show experim…
On incentive compatible, individually rational public good provision mechanisms
Robust virtual implementation with almost complete information
Subgame-Perfect Implementation Under Information Perturbations
We consider the robustness of extensive form mechanisms to deviations from common knowledge about the state of nature, which we refer to as information perturbations . First, we show that even under arbitrarily small information perturbations the Moore-Repullo mechanism does not yield (even approximately) truthful revelation and that in addition the mechanism has sequential equilibria with undesirable outcomes. More generally, we prove that any e…
Getting Dynamic Implementation to Work
We develop a new class of two-stage mechanisms, which fully implement any social choice function under initial rationalizability in complete information environments. We show theoretically that our simultaneous report (SR) mechanisms are robust to small amounts of incomplete information about the state of nature. We also highlight the robustness of the mechanisms to a wide variety of reasoning processes and behavioral assumptions. We show experim…
Subgame-Perfect Implementation Under Information Perturbations
We consider the robustness of extensive form mechanisms to deviations from common knowledge about the state of nature, which we refer to as information perturbations . First, we show that even under arbitrarily small information perturbations the Moore-Repullo mechanism does not yield (even approximately) truthful revelation and that in addition the mechanism has sequential equilibria with undesirable outcomes. More generally, we prove that any e…
Robust virtual implementation with almost complete information
On incentive compatible, individually rational public good provision mechanisms
Getting Dynamic Implementation to Work
We develop a new class of two-stage mechanisms, which fully implement any social choice function under initial rationalizability in complete information environments. We show theoretically that our simultaneous report (SR) mechanisms are robust to small amounts of incomplete information about the state of nature. We also highlight the robustness of the mechanisms to a wide variety of reasoning processes and behavioral assumptions. We show experim…
Auction Theory and Applications (4 works) · Computer Science (4 works) · Mathematical economics (4 works) · Mathematics (4 works) · Artificial Intelligence (3 works) · Complete information (3 works) · Economics (3 works) · Experimental Behavioral Economics Studies (3 works) · Law, Economics, and Judicial Systems (3 works) · Mechanism Design (3 works)