Mark A Satterthwaite
Biographic Data
| ID | 5869060 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Mark A Satterthwaite |
| GIVEN NAMES | Mark A |
| FAMILY NAME | Satterthwaite |
| SIGNATURE | SATTERTHWAITE M A |
| AFFILIATIONS | Northwestern University |
| VERIFIED | No |
| TOTAL WORKS | 5 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 35 |
| WORKS AS AUTHOR | 5 |
| WORKS AS EDITOR | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 1976 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2019 |
| H-INDEX | 4 |
Internal versus External Growth in Industries with Scale Economies
We study merger policy in a dynamic computational model in which firms can reduce costs through investment or through mergers. Firms invest or propose mergers according to the profitability of these strategies. An antitrust authority can block mergers at some cost. We examine the optimal policy for an antitrust authority that cannot commit to its future policy and approves mergers as they are proposed. We find that the optimal policy can differ s…
Is More Information Better? The Effects of “Report Cards” on Health Care Providers
Health care report cards - public disclosure of patient health outcomes at the level of the individual physician and/or hospital - may address important informational asymmetries in markets for health care, but they may also give doctors and hospitals incentives to decline to treat more difficult, severely ill patients. Whether report cards are good for patients and for society depends on whether their financial and health benefits outweigh their…
Sectoral growth patterns at the metropolitan level
Social welfare functions when preferences are convex, strictly monotonic, and continuous
Strategy-proofness and single-peakedness
Is More Information Better? The Effects of “Report Cards” on Health Care Providers
Health care report cards - public disclosure of patient health outcomes at the level of the individual physician and/or hospital - may address important informational asymmetries in markets for health care, but they may also give doctors and hospitals incentives to decline to treat more difficult, severely ill patients. Whether report cards are good for patients and for society depends on whether their financial and health benefits outweigh their…
Sectoral growth patterns at the metropolitan level
Social welfare functions when preferences are convex, strictly monotonic, and continuous
Strategy-proofness and single-peakedness
Internal versus External Growth in Industries with Scale Economies
We study merger policy in a dynamic computational model in which firms can reduce costs through investment or through mergers. Firms invest or propose mergers according to the profitability of these strategies. An antitrust authority can block mergers at some cost. We examine the optimal policy for an antitrust authority that cannot commit to its future policy and approves mergers as they are proposed. We find that the optimal policy can differ s…
Strategy-proofness and single-peakedness
Social welfare functions when preferences are convex, strictly monotonic, and continuous
Sectoral growth patterns at the metropolitan level
Is More Information Better? The Effects of “Report Cards” on Health Care Providers
Health care report cards - public disclosure of patient health outcomes at the level of the individual physician and/or hospital - may address important informational asymmetries in markets for health care, but they may also give doctors and hospitals incentives to decline to treat more difficult, severely ill patients. Whether report cards are good for patients and for society depends on whether their financial and health benefits outweigh their…
Internal versus External Growth in Industries with Scale Economies
We study merger policy in a dynamic computational model in which firms can reduce costs through investment or through mergers. Firms invest or propose mergers according to the profitability of these strategies. An antitrust authority can block mergers at some cost. We examine the optimal policy for an antitrust authority that cannot commit to its future policy and approves mergers as they are proposed. We find that the optimal policy can differ s…
Economics (5 works) · Business (3 works) · Incentive (3 works) · Microeconomics (3 works) · Welfare (3 works) · Game Theory and Voting Systems (2 works) · Market economy (2 works) · Public finance (2 works) · Actuarial science (1 work) · Arrow (1 work)