Lones Smith
Biographic Data
| ID | 5869063 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Lones Smith |
| GIVEN NAMES | Lones |
| FAMILY NAME | Smith |
| SIGNATURE | SMITH L |
| AFFILIATIONS | University of Michigan |
| VERIFIED | No |
| TOTAL WORKS | 3 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 8 |
| WORKS AS AUTHOR | 3 |
| WORKS AS EDITOR | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 1999 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2006 |
| H-INDEX | 1 |
The Marriage Model with Search Frictions
Consider a heterogeneous agent matching model in which the payoff of each matched individual is a fixed function of both partners' types. In a 1973 article, Becker showed that assortative matching arises in a frictionless setting simply if everyone prefers higher partners. This paper shows that if finding partners requires time-consuming search and individuals are impatient, then productive interaction matters. Matching is positively assortative—…
Pathological Outcomes of Observational Learning
This paper explores how Bayes-rational individuals learn sequentially from the discrete actions of others. Unlike earlier informational herding papers, we admit heterogeneous preferences. Not only may type-specific ‘herds’ eventually arise, but a new robust possibility emerges: confounded learning. Beliefs may converge to a limit point where history offers no decisive lessons for anyone, and each type's actions forever nontrivially split between …
Optimal job search in a changing world
The Marriage Model with Search Frictions
Consider a heterogeneous agent matching model in which the payoff of each matched individual is a fixed function of both partners' types. In a 1973 article, Becker showed that assortative matching arises in a frictionless setting simply if everyone prefers higher partners. This paper shows that if finding partners requires time-consuming search and individuals are impatient, then productive interaction matters. Matching is positively assortative—…
Optimal job search in a changing world
Pathological Outcomes of Observational Learning
This paper explores how Bayes-rational individuals learn sequentially from the discrete actions of others. Unlike earlier informational herding papers, we admit heterogeneous preferences. Not only may type-specific ‘herds’ eventually arise, but a new robust possibility emerges: confounded learning. Beliefs may converge to a limit point where history offers no decisive lessons for anyone, and each type's actions forever nontrivially split between …
The Marriage Model with Search Frictions
Consider a heterogeneous agent matching model in which the payoff of each matched individual is a fixed function of both partners' types. In a 1973 article, Becker showed that assortative matching arises in a frictionless setting simply if everyone prefers higher partners. This paper shows that if finding partners requires time-consuming search and individuals are impatient, then productive interaction matters. Matching is positively assortative—…
Computer Science (3 works) · Mathematics (3 works) · Econometrics (2 works) · Economics (2 works) · Mathematical economics (2 works) · Statistics (2 works) · Artificial Intelligence (1 work) · Asset (computer security (1 work) · Assortative mating (1 work) · Bayes' theorem (1 work)