Luigi Bocola
Biographic Data
| ID | 5869209 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Luigi Bocola |
| GIVEN NAMES | Luigi |
| FAMILY NAME | Bocola |
| SIGNATURE | BOCOLA L |
| AFFILIATIONS | National Bureau of Economic Research |
| VERIFIED | No |
| TOTAL WORKS | 2 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 3 |
| AUTHOR COUNT | 2 |
| EDITOR COUNT | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2016 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2022 |
| H-INDEX | 1 |
Risk-Sharing Externalities
Financial crises typically occur because firms and financial institutions are highly exposed to aggregate shocks. We propose a theory to explain these exposures. We study a model where entrepreneurs can issue state-contingent claims to consumers. Even though entrepreneurs can use these instruments to hedge negative shocks, they do not necessarily do so because insuring against these shocks is expensive, as consumers are also harmed by them. This …
The Pass-Through of Sovereign Risk
This paper examines the macroeconomic implications of sovereign risk in a model in which banks hold domestic government debt. News of a future sovereign default hampers financial intermediation. First, it tightens the funding constraints of banks, reducing their resources to finance firms (liquidity channel). Second, it generates a precautionary motive to deleverage (risk channel). I estimate the model using Italian data, finding that sovereign r…
The Pass-Through of Sovereign Risk
This paper examines the macroeconomic implications of sovereign risk in a model in which banks hold domestic government debt. News of a future sovereign default hampers financial intermediation. First, it tightens the funding constraints of banks, reducing their resources to finance firms (liquidity channel). Second, it generates a precautionary motive to deleverage (risk channel). I estimate the model using Italian data, finding that sovereign r…
The Pass-Through of Sovereign Risk
This paper examines the macroeconomic implications of sovereign risk in a model in which banks hold domestic government debt. News of a future sovereign default hampers financial intermediation. First, it tightens the funding constraints of banks, reducing their resources to finance firms (liquidity channel). Second, it generates a precautionary motive to deleverage (risk channel). I estimate the model using Italian data, finding that sovereign r…
Risk-Sharing Externalities
Financial crises typically occur because firms and financial institutions are highly exposed to aggregate shocks. We propose a theory to explain these exposures. We study a model where entrepreneurs can issue state-contingent claims to consumers. Even though entrepreneurs can use these instruments to hedge negative shocks, they do not necessarily do so because insuring against these shocks is expensive, as consumers are also harmed by them. This …
Banking stability, regulation, efficiency (2 works) · Economics (2 works) · Finance (2 works) · Finance (2 works) · Monetary economics (2 works) · Balance sheet (1 works) · Business (1 works) · Credit risk (1 works) · Debt (1 works) · Economic theories and models (1 works)