Deborah Haas‐Wilson
Biographic Data
| ID | 5869282 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Deborah Haas‐Wilson |
| GIVEN NAMES | Deborah |
| FAMILY NAME | Haas‐Wilson |
| SIGNATURE | WILSON D H |
| AFFILIATIONS | Smith College |
| VERIFIED | No |
| TOTAL WORKS | 5 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 21 |
| AUTHOR COUNT | 5 |
| EDITOR COUNT | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 1987 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2000 |
| H-INDEX | 2 |
Are Invisible Hands Good Hands? Moral Hazard, Competition, and the Second‐Best in Health Care Markets
The nature and normative properties of competition in health care markets have long been the subject of much debate. In this paper we consider what the optimal benchmark is in the presence of moral hazard effects on consumption due to health insurance. Intuitively, it seems that imperfect competition in the health care market may constrain this moral hazard by increasing prices. We show that this intuition cannot be correct if insurance markets a…
Change, Consolidation, and Competition in Health Care Markets
In this paper, the authors summarize the nature of the changes in the structure of the health-care industry. They focus on the markets for health insurance, hospital services, and physician services. They discuss the potential implications of the restructuring of the health care industry for competition, efficiency, and public policy. As will become apparent, this area offers a number of intriguing questions
The Relationships Between the Dimensions of Health Care Quality and Price
Address correspondence to: Deborah Haas-Wilson, Associate Professor, Department of Economics, Smith College, Northampton, MA 01063. t Also some hospitals and public and private health insurers use information on physician quality to decide which physicians are given privilege to either perform a particular medical procedure or to be paid for performing a particular medical procedure. Some businesses even use patient's evaluations of quality to de…
The Economic Impact of State Restrictions on Abortion
State-legislative support for liberalized abortion policies, the availability of abortion providers, and actual abortion rates vary widely across states. This article uses national data to examine the impact of the following three major, enforceable state abortion restrictions as of 1988 on the access to and use of abortion services: state restrictions on Medicaid financing of abortions for low-income women (36 states), state requirements for par…
Tying Requirements in Markets with Many Sellers
The asymmetric information characterizing markets for professional services has been used to justify tying requirements and other restrictions on the business practices of professionals. In this paper the prices and quality effects of state restrictions that prohibit the fitting of contact lenses by independent opticians and thereby tie the sale of contact lenses to the services of ophthalmologists and optometrists are estimated. The results sugg…
The Economic Impact of State Restrictions on Abortion
State-legislative support for liberalized abortion policies, the availability of abortion providers, and actual abortion rates vary widely across states. This article uses national data to examine the impact of the following three major, enforceable state abortion restrictions as of 1988 on the access to and use of abortion services: state restrictions on Medicaid financing of abortions for low-income women (36 states), state requirements for par…
Change, Consolidation, and Competition in Health Care Markets
In this paper, the authors summarize the nature of the changes in the structure of the health-care industry. They focus on the markets for health insurance, hospital services, and physician services. They discuss the potential implications of the restructuring of the health care industry for competition, efficiency, and public policy. As will become apparent, this area offers a number of intriguing questions
Are Invisible Hands Good Hands? Moral Hazard, Competition, and the Second‐Best in Health Care Markets
The nature and normative properties of competition in health care markets have long been the subject of much debate. In this paper we consider what the optimal benchmark is in the presence of moral hazard effects on consumption due to health insurance. Intuitively, it seems that imperfect competition in the health care market may constrain this moral hazard by increasing prices. We show that this intuition cannot be correct if insurance markets a…
Tying Requirements in Markets with Many Sellers
The asymmetric information characterizing markets for professional services has been used to justify tying requirements and other restrictions on the business practices of professionals. In this paper the prices and quality effects of state restrictions that prohibit the fitting of contact lenses by independent opticians and thereby tie the sale of contact lenses to the services of ophthalmologists and optometrists are estimated. The results sugg…
The Economic Impact of State Restrictions on Abortion
State-legislative support for liberalized abortion policies, the availability of abortion providers, and actual abortion rates vary widely across states. This article uses national data to examine the impact of the following three major, enforceable state abortion restrictions as of 1988 on the access to and use of abortion services: state restrictions on Medicaid financing of abortions for low-income women (36 states), state requirements for par…
The Relationships Between the Dimensions of Health Care Quality and Price
Address correspondence to: Deborah Haas-Wilson, Associate Professor, Department of Economics, Smith College, Northampton, MA 01063. t Also some hospitals and public and private health insurers use information on physician quality to decide which physicians are given privilege to either perform a particular medical procedure or to be paid for performing a particular medical procedure. Some businesses even use patient's evaluations of quality to de…
Change, Consolidation, and Competition in Health Care Markets
In this paper, the authors summarize the nature of the changes in the structure of the health-care industry. They focus on the markets for health insurance, hospital services, and physician services. They discuss the potential implications of the restructuring of the health care industry for competition, efficiency, and public policy. As will become apparent, this area offers a number of intriguing questions
Are Invisible Hands Good Hands? Moral Hazard, Competition, and the Second‐Best in Health Care Markets
The nature and normative properties of competition in health care markets have long been the subject of much debate. In this paper we consider what the optimal benchmark is in the presence of moral hazard effects on consumption due to health insurance. Intuitively, it seems that imperfect competition in the health care market may constrain this moral hazard by increasing prices. We show that this intuition cannot be correct if insurance markets a…
Business (4 works) · Economics (4 works) · Health care (4 works) · Healthcare Policy and Management (3 works) · Law (3 works) · Political science (3 works) · Law (2 works) · Medicine (2 works) · Microeconomics (2 works) · Psychology (2 works)