Qianhui Ni
Biographic Data
| ID | 5885042 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Qianhui Ni |
| GIVEN NAMES | Qianhui |
| FAMILY NAME | Ni |
| SIGNATURE | NI Q |
| AFFILIATIONS | University of Southern California |
| ORCID | 0000-0003-3297-5075 |
| VERIFIED | Yes |
| TOTAL WORKS | 2 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 0 |
| WORKS AS AUTHOR | 2 |
| WORKS AS EDITOR | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2024 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2024 |
| H-INDEX | 0 |
Ontogenetic steps of understanding beliefs
In this article, we postulate that belief understanding unfolds in two steps over ontogenetic time. We propose that belief understanding begins in interactive scenarios in which infants and toddlers respond directly and second-personally to the actions of a misinformed agent. This early understanding of beliefs is practical and grounded in the capacity for perspective-taking. Practical belief understanding guarantees effective interaction and com…
The Development of Sharing Experiences
We argue that the main difference between humans and other animals lies in humans’ unique form of sociality: their shared intentionality. Instead of conceiving of shared intentionality as a special skill humans have in addition to the skills they share with nonhuman animals (the additive account), we propose to think of shared intentionality as transforming human cognition in its entirety (the transformative account, as in the thesis of Kern and …
No prominent works on this page.
Ontogenetic steps of understanding beliefs
In this article, we postulate that belief understanding unfolds in two steps over ontogenetic time. We propose that belief understanding begins in interactive scenarios in which infants and toddlers respond directly and second-personally to the actions of a misinformed agent. This early understanding of beliefs is practical and grounded in the capacity for perspective-taking. Practical belief understanding guarantees effective interaction and com…
The Development of Sharing Experiences
We argue that the main difference between humans and other animals lies in humans’ unique form of sociality: their shared intentionality. Instead of conceiving of shared intentionality as a special skill humans have in addition to the skills they share with nonhuman animals (the additive account), we propose to think of shared intentionality as transforming human cognition in its entirety (the transformative account, as in the thesis of Kern and …
Child and Animal Learning Development (2 works) · Cognitive science (2 works) · Epistemology (2 works) · Psychology (2 works) · Artificial Intelligence (1 work) · Cognition (1 work) · Cognitive psychology (1 work) · Computer Science (1 work) · Cultural Differences and Values (1 work) · Developmental psychology (1 work)