Thomas‐Durell Young
Biographic Data
| ID | 5907737 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Thomas‐Durell Young |
| GIVEN NAMES | Thomas‐Durell |
| FAMILY NAME | Young |
| SIGNATURE | YOUNG T D |
| AFFILIATIONS | United States Army War College |
| VERIFIED | No |
| TOTAL WORKS | 20 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 8 |
| AUTHOR COUNT | 20 |
| EDITOR COUNT | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 1988 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2021 |
| H-INDEX | 2 |
How to Defend Romania
Developments in the Black Sea region since 2014 have combined to transform Romania into the Western alliance’s linchpin in southeastern Europe. Regrettably, successive Romanian governments have underfunded defense and the modernization of the armed forces, leaving them with incoherent capabilities. This essay examines the Romanian defense institution on four levels. First, outputs of the armed forces are examined in a critical light. Second, key …
Questioning the “Sanctity” of long-term defense planning as practiced in Central and Eastern Europe
It is an article of faith amongst many defense officials that long-term defense planning constitutes the gold standard in the development and management of modern armed forces. That such a method has become central to the U.S. and other countries’ defense planning systems it is surprising that there is so little questioning of its contemporary relevance, let alone an understanding of its provenance, original intent, and its highly nuanced nature.…
American sea power in the contemporary security environment
This article assesses the relevance of US seapower in the contemporary security environment. This paper builds upon a rich literature on sea power, strategy, and maritime operations to assess recent factors and emerging geostrategic dynamics that are likely to affect American maritime strategy, while keeping sight of the principles that will endure regardless of shifting domestic and international politics. It places the application of sea power …
Can Nato's “new” allies and key partners exercise national-level command in crisis and war
This article posits that most postcommunist members of NATO and key partners continue the practice of using communist concepts of command at the national level of governance. These concepts include the hyper-centralization of decision making, collective decision making, and of most concern, unclear chains of command and alignment of authority with responsibility. Combined, these concepts have the potential for inhibiting the timely and clear comm…
The failure of defense planning in European Post-Communist Defense Institutions
By any objective measure, defense institutions in Central and Eastern Europe have all but universally been incapable of producing viable defense plans that are based on objective costing and operational planning data. This situation exists in spite the provision of considerable Western advice and assistance, let alone reporting to and receiving assessments by NATO’s International Staff under Partnership for Peace, as well as via the integrated de…
Legacy Concepts
Elements of the Communist concept of command continue to ramify throughout Central and Eastern European armed forces. They inhibit the orderly delegation of command, the consistent creation of defense capabilities, and the professional development of commanders and managers; they also impede these armed services from adopting the concepts of authority, accountability, and responsibility-concepts taken for granted in Western defense institutions
Impediments to Reform in European Post-Communist Defense Institutions
This article argues two key points. First, that Western democratic and communist defense and military concepts are antithetical and includes an explanation of why this is the case. Second, evidence is provided to demonstrate that legacy concepts are very much both actively and passively evident in European post-communist defense institutions. Consequently, it is argued that absent systematic efforts to expose and challenges the legitimacy of exis…
When Programming Trumps Policy and Plans
Traditionally, policy and planning have been institutionally weak in the Naval Staff (Office of the Chief of Naval Operations – OPNAV). In their place, the N8 (Programming) has dominated resource decision-making, and, by default, decisions relating to policy and planning. Recent uncertainty over defense authorization and appropriations has resulted in calls for a greater role to be played by the N3/5, Policy and Plans Directorate. The article arg…
German National Command Structures after Unification
The Bundeswehr was intentionally created in 1955 without the capability to exercise centralized operational control above the Army Corps, or at the joint, level. The reason for this situation was German and Allied anxiety over the recreation of a 'Generalstab.' With unification, Germany now requires the ability to employ the Bundeswehr in less than war operations, which, therefore, requires a modest national capability to direct operations outsid…
Capabilities-Based Defense Planning
Obliged by regional political and security developments, Australia has been forced to experiment with a capabilities-based defense planning for over 20 years. The ultimate success of the planning methodology is validated by the fact that the Australian Defence Force is now capable of executing a larger number of nationally determined tasks than was possible in the past. Australian experience demonstrates that greater jointness can be developed, b…
Prospects for future Australian‐United States defence cooperation
Assessing Australia ́s Southeast Asian Strategy
Australia is fundamentally altering its foreign and defence pol icies towards Southeast Asia, so as to ameliorate its diplomatic position and overall security posture in the region. These efforts, while perhaps ignored outside the immediate region, constitute a significant reorientation in Australia's external affairs. In addi tion to acknowledging that Canberra must be prepared to defend itself without allied assistance, this diplomatic initiati…
Australia's defence planning after the cold war
Conventional arms control and disarmament
This article argues that the overwhelming historical evidence leads to the conclusion that past efforts at arms control and forced disarmament have been unsuccessful. When ignoring the underlying political disputes of relations between states, arms control and disarmament efforts have tended to be short‐lived, e.g., the interwar period. The authors argue that where these efforts have been successful (e.g., the disarmament regime established by th…
Whither Future U.S. lliance Strategy? The Abca Cue
This article describes and analyzes the little-known, but extensive, defense cooperative relationship that exists among the armed forces of the United States, Britain, Canada, Australia, and New Zealand. While perhaps arguably a relatively esoteric subject prior to 1989, given the recent changes that have taken place in the Soviet Union, U.S. alliance strategy is now on the threshold of a new era—an era in which the Soviet threat is seen by many …
Multinational corps in Nato
Germany, France, and the Future of Western European Security
Recent events in central Europe and the Soviet Union have brought to the fore once again the need to address the question. Doing so has become increasingly complex because it now concerns both the issue of German reunification and a trend in Germany to explore building a European defense system in cooperation with France. The specter of a reunified Germany has caused the leaders of some Western democracies, the Soviet Union, and Poland to express…
The Australian‐United States strategic relationship
Since the early 1960s, the bilateral Australian‐United States security relationship has included cooperation at the strategic level by virtue of the Joint Facilities located in Australia. The Joint Facilities apparently play an integral role in, inter alia, U.S. strategic reconnaissance and surveillance of the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China. These stations have come under political fire in Australia since their establishment over…
Problems in Australia ́s “Defence Revolution”
government's objectives. First, it is clear that there are insufficient funds available for both the large capital acquisition programme and ongoing personnel/operational costs. This in itself has the potential for having long-term negative effects on- the Australian Defence Force. Secondly, recent events show that the government apparently did not take into account the potentially serious security problems for Australia posed by instability in t…
U.S. Policy and the South and Southwest Pacific
Research Article| July 01 1988 U.S. Policy and the South and Southwest Pacific Thomas-Durell Young Thomas-Durell Young Search for other works by this author on: This Site PubMed Google Scholar Far Eastern Survey (1959) 28 (7): 775–788. https://doi.org/10.2307/2644700 Views Icon Views Article contents Figures & tables Video Audio Supplementary Data Peer Review Share Icon Share Twitter LinkedIn Tools Icon Tools Get Permissions Cite Icon Cite Search…
Australia's defence planning after the cold war
Impediments to Reform in European Post-Communist Defense Institutions
This article argues two key points. First, that Western democratic and communist defense and military concepts are antithetical and includes an explanation of why this is the case. Second, evidence is provided to demonstrate that legacy concepts are very much both actively and passively evident in European post-communist defense institutions. Consequently, it is argued that absent systematic efforts to expose and challenges the legitimacy of exis…
The failure of defense planning in European Post-Communist Defense Institutions
By any objective measure, defense institutions in Central and Eastern Europe have all but universally been incapable of producing viable defense plans that are based on objective costing and operational planning data. This situation exists in spite the provision of considerable Western advice and assistance, let alone reporting to and receiving assessments by NATO’s International Staff under Partnership for Peace, as well as via the integrated de…
Prospects for future Australian‐United States defence cooperation
Problems in Australia ́s “Defence Revolution”
government's objectives. First, it is clear that there are insufficient funds available for both the large capital acquisition programme and ongoing personnel/operational costs. This in itself has the potential for having long-term negative effects on- the Australian Defence Force. Secondly, recent events show that the government apparently did not take into account the potentially serious security problems for Australia posed by instability in t…
U.S. Policy and the South and Southwest Pacific
Research Article| July 01 1988 U.S. Policy and the South and Southwest Pacific Thomas-Durell Young Thomas-Durell Young Search for other works by this author on: This Site PubMed Google Scholar Far Eastern Survey (1959) 28 (7): 775–788. https://doi.org/10.2307/2644700 Views Icon Views Article contents Figures & tables Video Audio Supplementary Data Peer Review Share Icon Share Twitter LinkedIn Tools Icon Tools Get Permissions Cite Icon Cite Search…
The Australian‐United States strategic relationship
Since the early 1960s, the bilateral Australian‐United States security relationship has included cooperation at the strategic level by virtue of the Joint Facilities located in Australia. The Joint Facilities apparently play an integral role in, inter alia, U.S. strategic reconnaissance and surveillance of the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China. These stations have come under political fire in Australia since their establishment over…
Problems in Australia ́s “Defence Revolution”
government's objectives. First, it is clear that there are insufficient funds available for both the large capital acquisition programme and ongoing personnel/operational costs. This in itself has the potential for having long-term negative effects on- the Australian Defence Force. Secondly, recent events show that the government apparently did not take into account the potentially serious security problems for Australia posed by instability in t…
Germany, France, and the Future of Western European Security
Recent events in central Europe and the Soviet Union have brought to the fore once again the need to address the question. Doing so has become increasingly complex because it now concerns both the issue of German reunification and a trend in Germany to explore building a European defense system in cooperation with France. The specter of a reunified Germany has caused the leaders of some Western democracies, the Soviet Union, and Poland to express…
Australia's defence planning after the cold war
Conventional arms control and disarmament
This article argues that the overwhelming historical evidence leads to the conclusion that past efforts at arms control and forced disarmament have been unsuccessful. When ignoring the underlying political disputes of relations between states, arms control and disarmament efforts have tended to be short‐lived, e.g., the interwar period. The authors argue that where these efforts have been successful (e.g., the disarmament regime established by th…
Whither Future U.S. lliance Strategy? The Abca Cue
This article describes and analyzes the little-known, but extensive, defense cooperative relationship that exists among the armed forces of the United States, Britain, Canada, Australia, and New Zealand. While perhaps arguably a relatively esoteric subject prior to 1989, given the recent changes that have taken place in the Soviet Union, U.S. alliance strategy is now on the threshold of a new era—an era in which the Soviet threat is seen by many …
Multinational corps in Nato
Prospects for future Australian‐United States defence cooperation
Assessing Australia ́s Southeast Asian Strategy
Australia is fundamentally altering its foreign and defence pol icies towards Southeast Asia, so as to ameliorate its diplomatic position and overall security posture in the region. These efforts, while perhaps ignored outside the immediate region, constitute a significant reorientation in Australia's external affairs. In addi tion to acknowledging that Canberra must be prepared to defend itself without allied assistance, this diplomatic initiati…
Capabilities-Based Defense Planning
Obliged by regional political and security developments, Australia has been forced to experiment with a capabilities-based defense planning for over 20 years. The ultimate success of the planning methodology is validated by the fact that the Australian Defence Force is now capable of executing a larger number of nationally determined tasks than was possible in the past. Australian experience demonstrates that greater jointness can be developed, b…
German National Command Structures after Unification
The Bundeswehr was intentionally created in 1955 without the capability to exercise centralized operational control above the Army Corps, or at the joint, level. The reason for this situation was German and Allied anxiety over the recreation of a 'Generalstab.' With unification, Germany now requires the ability to employ the Bundeswehr in less than war operations, which, therefore, requires a modest national capability to direct operations outsid…
Impediments to Reform in European Post-Communist Defense Institutions
This article argues two key points. First, that Western democratic and communist defense and military concepts are antithetical and includes an explanation of why this is the case. Second, evidence is provided to demonstrate that legacy concepts are very much both actively and passively evident in European post-communist defense institutions. Consequently, it is argued that absent systematic efforts to expose and challenges the legitimacy of exis…
When Programming Trumps Policy and Plans
Traditionally, policy and planning have been institutionally weak in the Naval Staff (Office of the Chief of Naval Operations – OPNAV). In their place, the N8 (Programming) has dominated resource decision-making, and, by default, decisions relating to policy and planning. Recent uncertainty over defense authorization and appropriations has resulted in calls for a greater role to be played by the N3/5, Policy and Plans Directorate. The article arg…
Legacy Concepts
Elements of the Communist concept of command continue to ramify throughout Central and Eastern European armed forces. They inhibit the orderly delegation of command, the consistent creation of defense capabilities, and the professional development of commanders and managers; they also impede these armed services from adopting the concepts of authority, accountability, and responsibility-concepts taken for granted in Western defense institutions
Questioning the “Sanctity” of long-term defense planning as practiced in Central and Eastern Europe
It is an article of faith amongst many defense officials that long-term defense planning constitutes the gold standard in the development and management of modern armed forces. That such a method has become central to the U.S. and other countries’ defense planning systems it is surprising that there is so little questioning of its contemporary relevance, let alone an understanding of its provenance, original intent, and its highly nuanced nature.…
American sea power in the contemporary security environment
This article assesses the relevance of US seapower in the contemporary security environment. This paper builds upon a rich literature on sea power, strategy, and maritime operations to assess recent factors and emerging geostrategic dynamics that are likely to affect American maritime strategy, while keeping sight of the principles that will endure regardless of shifting domestic and international politics. It places the application of sea power …
Can Nato's “new” allies and key partners exercise national-level command in crisis and war
This article posits that most postcommunist members of NATO and key partners continue the practice of using communist concepts of command at the national level of governance. These concepts include the hyper-centralization of decision making, collective decision making, and of most concern, unclear chains of command and alignment of authority with responsibility. Combined, these concepts have the potential for inhibiting the timely and clear comm…
The failure of defense planning in European Post-Communist Defense Institutions
By any objective measure, defense institutions in Central and Eastern Europe have all but universally been incapable of producing viable defense plans that are based on objective costing and operational planning data. This situation exists in spite the provision of considerable Western advice and assistance, let alone reporting to and receiving assessments by NATO’s International Staff under Partnership for Peace, as well as via the integrated de…
How to Defend Romania
Developments in the Black Sea region since 2014 have combined to transform Romania into the Western alliance’s linchpin in southeastern Europe. Regrettably, successive Romanian governments have underfunded defense and the modernization of the armed forces, leaving them with incoherent capabilities. This essay examines the Romanian defense institution on four levels. First, outputs of the armed forces are examined in a critical light. Second, key …
Political science (18 works) · Law (12 works) · Law (11 works) · Politics (9 works) · Military and Defense Studies (8 works) · Military History and Strategy (7 works) · Public Administration (6 works) · Sociology (6 works) · Computer Science (5 works) · Economics (5 works)