Rhys Borchert
Biographic Data
| ID | 5910919 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Rhys Borchert |
| GIVEN NAMES | Rhys |
| FAMILY NAME | Borchert |
| SIGNATURE | BORCHERT R |
| AFFILIATIONS | Universität Greifswald |
| ORCID | 0000-0002-4588-8758 |
| VERIFIED | Yes |
| TOTAL WORKS | 3 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 0 |
| WORKS AS AUTHOR | 3 |
| WORKS AS EDITOR | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2023 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2026 |
| H-INDEX | 0 |
Reflection, fallibilism, and doublethink
A distinctive feature of Juan Comesaña's epistemological account is the possibility of an agent possessing a false proposition as evidence. Comesaña argues that there are a number of theoretical virtues of his account once we accept this possibility, however, one might expect that there are particular vices of his account as well. Littlejohn and Dutant (2021. “Even if it Might not be True, Evidence Cannot be False.” Philosophical Studies 179 (3):…
Discrimination in action
Not all actions are intentional actions. What separates merely doing something from intentionally doing something? One point of separation seems to be luck. Too much luck, or luck of a certain variety, seems to undermine the possibility of acting intentionally. This naturally leads to the idea that intentional action presupposes reliable success. I argue against this idea. Taking inspiration from Gareth Evans’ account of singular thought, I argue…
The Perils of Rejecting the Parity Argument
Many moral error theorists reject moral realism on the grounds that moral realism implies the existence of categorical normativity, yet categorical normativity does not exist. Call this the Metaphysical Argument. In response, some moral realists have emphasized a parity between moral normativity and epistemic normativity. They argue that if one kind of normativity is rejected, then both must be rejected. Therefore, one cannot be a moral error the…
No prominent works on this page.
The Perils of Rejecting the Parity Argument
Many moral error theorists reject moral realism on the grounds that moral realism implies the existence of categorical normativity, yet categorical normativity does not exist. Call this the Metaphysical Argument. In response, some moral realists have emphasized a parity between moral normativity and epistemic normativity. They argue that if one kind of normativity is rejected, then both must be rejected. Therefore, one cannot be a moral error the…
Discrimination in action
Not all actions are intentional actions. What separates merely doing something from intentionally doing something? One point of separation seems to be luck. Too much luck, or luck of a certain variety, seems to undermine the possibility of acting intentionally. This naturally leads to the idea that intentional action presupposes reliable success. I argue against this idea. Taking inspiration from Gareth Evans’ account of singular thought, I argue…
Reflection, fallibilism, and doublethink
A distinctive feature of Juan Comesaña's epistemological account is the possibility of an agent possessing a false proposition as evidence. Comesaña argues that there are a number of theoretical virtues of his account once we accept this possibility, however, one might expect that there are particular vices of his account as well. Littlejohn and Dutant (2021. “Even if it Might not be True, Evidence Cannot be False.” Philosophical Studies 179 (3):…
Epistemology (3 works) · Philosophy (3 works) · Free Will and Agency (2 works) · Physics (2 works) · Psychology of Moral and Emotional Judgment (2 works) · Action (physics (1 work) · Argument (complex analysis) (1 work) · Artificial Intelligence (1 work) · Artificial Intelligence (1 work) · Computer Science (1 work)