Samuel Fullhart
Biographic Data
| ID | 5911094 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Samuel Fullhart |
| GIVEN NAMES | Samuel |
| FAMILY NAME | Fullhart |
| SIGNATURE | FULLHART S |
| AFFILIATIONS | Princeton University Princeton New Jersey USA |
| ORCID | 0000-0001-5452-4772 |
| VERIFIED | Yes |
| TOTAL WORKS | 2 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 1 |
| AUTHOR COUNT | 2 |
| EDITOR COUNT | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2023 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2024 |
| H-INDEX | 1 |
Coherence as Joint Satisfiability
According to many philosophers, rationality is, at least in part, a matter of one’s attitudes cohering with one another. Theorists who endorse this idea have devoted much attention to formulating various coherence requirements. Surprisingly, they have said very little about what it takes for a set of attitudes to be coherent in general. We articulate and defend a general account on which a set of attitudes is coherent (roughly) just in case and b…
Embracing self‐defeat in normative theory
Some normative theories are self‐defeating. They tell us to respond to our situations in ways that bring about outcomes that are bad, given the aims of the theories, and which could have been avoided. Across a wide range of debates in ethics, decision theory, political philosophy, and formal epistemology, many philosophers treat the fact that a normative theory is self‐defeating as sufficient grounds for rejecting it. I argue that this widespread…
Embracing self‐defeat in normative theory
Some normative theories are self‐defeating. They tell us to respond to our situations in ways that bring about outcomes that are bad, given the aims of the theories, and which could have been avoided. Across a wide range of debates in ethics, decision theory, political philosophy, and formal epistemology, many philosophers treat the fact that a normative theory is self‐defeating as sufficient grounds for rejecting it. I argue that this widespread…
Embracing self‐defeat in normative theory
Some normative theories are self‐defeating. They tell us to respond to our situations in ways that bring about outcomes that are bad, given the aims of the theories, and which could have been avoided. Across a wide range of debates in ethics, decision theory, political philosophy, and formal epistemology, many philosophers treat the fact that a normative theory is self‐defeating as sufficient grounds for rejecting it. I argue that this widespread…
Coherence as Joint Satisfiability
According to many philosophers, rationality is, at least in part, a matter of one’s attitudes cohering with one another. Theorists who endorse this idea have devoted much attention to formulating various coherence requirements. Surprisingly, they have said very little about what it takes for a set of attitudes to be coherent in general. We articulate and defend a general account on which a set of attitudes is coherent (roughly) just in case and b…
Epistemology (2 works) · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics (2 works) · Free Will and Agency (2 works) · Law (2 works) · Philosophy (2 works) · Political science (2 works) · Action (physics (1 works) · Adjudication (1 works) · Algorithm (1 works) · Coherence (philosophical gambling strategy) (1 works)