Frédérique de Vignemont
Biographic Data
| ID | 5911108 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Frédérique de Vignemont |
| GIVEN NAMES | Frédérique |
| FAMILY NAME | de Vignemont |
| SIGNATURE | DE VIGNEMONT F |
| AFFILIATIONS | Institut Jean Nicod |
| ORCID | 0009-0006-1354-1553 |
| VERIFIED | Yes |
| TOTAL WORKS | 29 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 10 |
| AUTHOR COUNT | 27 |
| EDITOR COUNT | 2 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2000 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2025 |
| H-INDEX | 1 |
A future orientation for visual experiences
When we see the motion of a ball looming toward us, is there a sense in which we might be said to be visually aware of the impending collision? One may be immediately tempted to reply negatively if one assumes that we can visually experience only what is visible and what is happening now. Yet, I shall propose here that we can be visually aware of the close future qua the future. To do so, I will first argue that when one sees an object looming, o…
Fear beyond danger
Many agree that the more we feel that we can handle a given situation, the less afraid we are. But why? Is the situation no longer dangerous or is fear a response to more than danger? Here I analyze situations in which one reacts in cold blood to danger and argue that the formal object of fear is not the dangerous, but the unsafe. The unsafe indicates not only how the world is, but also how it can be handled. Safety, and its negative counterpart,…
Comparative effects of hypnotic suggestion and imagery instruction on bodily awareness
Expecting pain
The World at Our Fingertips
Where do you end and the external world begin? This might seem to be a straightforward, binary question: your skin is the boundary, with the self on one side and the rest of the world on the other. Peripersonal space shows that the division is not that simple. The boundary is blurrier than you might have thought. Our ability to monitor the space near the body appears to be deeply ingrained. Our evolutionary history has equipped our brains with a …
A Minimal Sense of Here-ness
In this paper, I give an account of a hitherto neglected kind of ‘here’, which does not work as an intentional indexical. Instead, it automatically refers to the immediate perceptual environment of the subject’s body, which is known as peripersonal space. In between the self and the external world, there is something like a buffer zone, a place in which objects and events have a unique immediate significance for the subject because they may soon …
Fifty Shades of Affective Colouring of Perception
Recent evidence in cognitive neuroscience indicates that the visual system is influenced by the outcome of an early appraisal mechanism that automatically evaluates what is seen as being harmful or beneficial for the organism. This indicates that there could be valence in perception. But what could it mean for one to see something positively or negatively? Although most theories of emotions accept that valence involves being related to values, th…
Peripersonal perception in action
What Phenomenal Contrast for Bodily Ownership
In a 1962 article, ‘On Sensations of Position’, G. E. M. Anscombe claimed that we do not feel our legs crossed; we simply know that they are that way. What about the sense of bodily ownership? Do we directly know that this body is our own, or do we know it because we feel this body that way? One may claim, for instance, that we are we aware that this is our own body thanks to our bodily experiences that ascribe the property of myness to the body …
The Extended Body Hypothesis
According to the extended mind hypothesis, “There is nothing sacred about skull and skin” for our cognitive abilities (Clark and Chalmers 1998). Is this also true for bodily awareness? In this chapter I consider several versions of what we can call the extended body hypothesis. According to a weak version, bodily awareness is not limited by the biological boundaries of our body. In light of tool embodiment, I highlight the malleability of embodim…
How do the body schema and the body image interact
The Subject's Matter
Scientists have long questioned the origin of the exquisite human mastery of tools.How do we manage controlling a tool in the skillful way humans typically do, that is, as a body-part?Influential theories proposed that efficient tool use relies on the incorporation of the tool into body representations.Therefore, we critically review several tool use paradigms used to identify critical features responsible for incorporating tools in two body repr…
Beyond differences between the body schema and the body image
Beyond Empathy for Pain
Here we address four objections raised by Julien Deonna, John Michael, and Francesca Fardo against a recent account of empathy for pain (by Frédérique de Vignemont and Tania Singer and Vignemont and Pierre Jacob). First, to what extent must the empathizer share her target’s affective state? Second, how can one interpret neuroscientific findings on vicarious pain in light of recent results challenging the notion of a pain matrix? Third, can one of…
Pain and Bodily Care
Pain is unpleasant. It is something that one avoids as much as possible. One might then claim that one wants to avoid pain because one cares about one's body. On this view, individuals who do not experience pain as unpleasant and to be avoided, like patients with pain asymbolia, do not care about their body. This conception of pain has been recently defended by Bain [2014 Bain, D. 2014. Pains That Don't Hurt, Australasian Journal of Philosophy 92…
The Rubber Hand Illusion
Embodying the Mind and Representing the Body
What Is It like to Feel Another's Pain
We offer an account of empathetic pain that preserves the distinctions among standard pain, contagious pain, empathetic pain, sympathy for pain, and standard pain ascription. Vicarious experiences of both contagious and empathetic pain resemble to some extent experiences of standard pain. But there are also crucial dissimilarities. As neuroscientific results show, standard pain involves a sensorimotor and an affective component. According to our …
Embodiment, ownership and disownership
Body schema and body image—Pros and cons
Knowing Other People’s Mental States as if They Were One’s Own
Drawing the boundary between low-level and high-level mindreading
Segmenting the Body into Parts
How do we individuate body parts? Here, we investigated the effect of body segmentation between hand and arm in tactile and visual perception. In a first experiment, we showed that two tactile stimuli felt farther away when they were applied across the wrist than when they were applied within a single body part (palm or forearm), indicating a “category boundary effect”. In the following experiments, we excluded two hypotheses, which attributed ta…
Habeas Corpus
What grounds my experience of my body as my own? The body that one experiences is always one’s own, but it does not follow that one always experiences it as one’s own. One might even feel that a body part does not belong to oneself despite feeling sensations in it, like in asomatognosia. The article aims at understanding the link between bodily sensations and the sense of ownership by investigating the role played by the body schema
The empathic brain
What Is It like to Feel Another's Pain
We offer an account of empathetic pain that preserves the distinctions among standard pain, contagious pain, empathetic pain, sympathy for pain, and standard pain ascription. Vicarious experiences of both contagious and empathetic pain resemble to some extent experiences of standard pain. But there are also crucial dissimilarities. As neuroscientific results show, standard pain involves a sensorimotor and an affective component. According to our …
Peripersonal perception in action
Conscience et monitoring de la source. Apport de la neuropsychologie et de la psychopathologie
Dans cet essai, nous défendons l'hypothèse selon laquelle les propriétés phénoménales de l'expérience consciente jouent un rôle fonctionnel dans la cognition. Plus précisément, leur fonction est d'informer les systèmes cognitifs de prise de décision et de monitoring de l'action sur la nature et l'origine de l'information traitée. De nombreuses recherches en psychologie expérimentale, en neuropsychologie et en psychopathologie portent sur l'étude …
The sense of agency
Egocentrism, allocentrism, and Asperger syndrome
The empathic brain
Mental rotation in schizophrenia
Habeas Corpus
What grounds my experience of my body as my own? The body that one experiences is always one’s own, but it does not follow that one always experiences it as one’s own. One might even feel that a body part does not belong to oneself despite feeling sensations in it, like in asomatognosia. The article aims at understanding the link between bodily sensations and the sense of ownership by investigating the role played by the body schema
Segmenting the Body into Parts
How do we individuate body parts? Here, we investigated the effect of body segmentation between hand and arm in tactile and visual perception. In a first experiment, we showed that two tactile stimuli felt farther away when they were applied across the wrist than when they were applied within a single body part (palm or forearm), indicating a “category boundary effect”. In the following experiments, we excluded two hypotheses, which attributed ta…
Drawing the boundary between low-level and high-level mindreading
Body schema and body image—Pros and cons
Knowing Other People’s Mental States as if They Were One’s Own
Embodiment, ownership and disownership
The Rubber Hand Illusion
Embodying the Mind and Representing the Body
What Is It like to Feel Another's Pain
We offer an account of empathetic pain that preserves the distinctions among standard pain, contagious pain, empathetic pain, sympathy for pain, and standard pain ascription. Vicarious experiences of both contagious and empathetic pain resemble to some extent experiences of standard pain. But there are also crucial dissimilarities. As neuroscientific results show, standard pain involves a sensorimotor and an affective component. According to our …
Pain and Bodily Care
Pain is unpleasant. It is something that one avoids as much as possible. One might then claim that one wants to avoid pain because one cares about one's body. On this view, individuals who do not experience pain as unpleasant and to be avoided, like patients with pain asymbolia, do not care about their body. This conception of pain has been recently defended by Bain [2014 Bain, D. 2014. Pains That Don't Hurt, Australasian Journal of Philosophy 92…
Beyond Empathy for Pain
Here we address four objections raised by Julien Deonna, John Michael, and Francesca Fardo against a recent account of empathy for pain (by Frédérique de Vignemont and Tania Singer and Vignemont and Pierre Jacob). First, to what extent must the empathizer share her target’s affective state? Second, how can one interpret neuroscientific findings on vicarious pain in light of recent results challenging the notion of a pain matrix? Third, can one of…
The Subject's Matter
Scientists have long questioned the origin of the exquisite human mastery of tools.How do we manage controlling a tool in the skillful way humans typically do, that is, as a body-part?Influential theories proposed that efficient tool use relies on the incorporation of the tool into body representations.Therefore, we critically review several tool use paradigms used to identify critical features responsible for incorporating tools in two body repr…
Beyond differences between the body schema and the body image
The Extended Body Hypothesis
According to the extended mind hypothesis, “There is nothing sacred about skull and skin” for our cognitive abilities (Clark and Chalmers 1998). Is this also true for bodily awareness? In this chapter I consider several versions of what we can call the extended body hypothesis. According to a weak version, bodily awareness is not limited by the biological boundaries of our body. In light of tool embodiment, I highlight the malleability of embodim…
How do the body schema and the body image interact
What Phenomenal Contrast for Bodily Ownership
In a 1962 article, ‘On Sensations of Position’, G. E. M. Anscombe claimed that we do not feel our legs crossed; we simply know that they are that way. What about the sense of bodily ownership? Do we directly know that this body is our own, or do we know it because we feel this body that way? One may claim, for instance, that we are we aware that this is our own body thanks to our bodily experiences that ascribe the property of myness to the body …
The World at Our Fingertips
Where do you end and the external world begin? This might seem to be a straightforward, binary question: your skin is the boundary, with the self on one side and the rest of the world on the other. Peripersonal space shows that the division is not that simple. The boundary is blurrier than you might have thought. Our ability to monitor the space near the body appears to be deeply ingrained. Our evolutionary history has equipped our brains with a …
A Minimal Sense of Here-ness
In this paper, I give an account of a hitherto neglected kind of ‘here’, which does not work as an intentional indexical. Instead, it automatically refers to the immediate perceptual environment of the subject’s body, which is known as peripersonal space. In between the self and the external world, there is something like a buffer zone, a place in which objects and events have a unique immediate significance for the subject because they may soon …
Fifty Shades of Affective Colouring of Perception
Recent evidence in cognitive neuroscience indicates that the visual system is influenced by the outcome of an early appraisal mechanism that automatically evaluates what is seen as being harmful or beneficial for the organism. This indicates that there could be valence in perception. But what could it mean for one to see something positively or negatively? Although most theories of emotions accept that valence involves being related to values, th…
Peripersonal perception in action
Psychology (29 works) · Cognitive psychology (22 works) · Action Observation and Synchronization (16 works) · Philosophy (15 works) · Computer Science (14 works) · Epistemology (13 works) · Social Psychology (13 works) · Cognitive science (12 works) · Perception (12 works) · Cognition (11 works)