Daniel Pallies
Biographic Data
| ID | 5911208 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Daniel Pallies |
| GIVEN NAMES | Daniel |
| FAMILY NAME | Pallies |
| SIGNATURE | PALLIES D |
| AFFILIATIONS | Lingnan University |
| ORCID | 0000-0002-7177-2564 |
| VERIFIED | Yes |
| TOTAL WORKS | 7 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 1 |
| WORKS AS AUTHOR | 7 |
| WORKS AS EDITOR | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2021 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2025 |
| H-INDEX | 1 |
Why Pain Matters More than Pleasure for Well-Being
A number of philosophers have argued that pleasure and pain are asymmetrical with respect to their contributions to well-being: the degree to which an episode of pain is bad for one is greater than the degree to which an equal quantity of pleasure is good for one. In this paper I defend an explanation of the asymmetry. I argue that pains, and some pleasures, are instrumentally bad for us in the short term. Notably, this is because pains and some …
A Hedonic Subjectivism
In recent years, a number of philosophers of well-being have given more attention to the topic of ill-being. In particular, increasing attention has been paid to the distinction between two kinds of attitudes: those whose objects are good for us and those whose objects are bad for us. I argue that the difference between positive and negative attitudes should be explained in terms of pleasure and displeasure. If one takes pleasure in something, th…
Pessimism and procreation
The pessimistic hypothesis is the hypothesis that life is bad for us, in the sense that we are worse off for having come into existence. Suppose this hypothesis turns out to be correct — existence turns out to be more of a burden than a gift. A natural next thought is that we should stop having children. But I contend that this is a mistake; procreation would often be permissible even if the pessimistic hypothesis turned out to be correct. Roughl…
How Do We Differ When We Differ In Taste
My partner loves the experiences she gets from eating olives. I, on the other hand, hate the experiences I get from eating olives. We differ in tastes. But how exactly do we differ? In particular: do our taste experiences differ phenomenologically—do my olive-experiences feel different than my partner’s olive-experiences? Some philosophers have assumed that the answer is “no,” and have advanced important arguments which turn on this assumption. I…
The Pleasure Problem and the Spriggean Solution
Some experiences—like the experience of eating cheesecake—are good experiences to have. But when we try to explain why they are good, we encounter a clash of intuitions. First, we have an objectivist intuition: plausibly, the experiences are good because they feel the way that they do. Second, we have a subjectivist intuition: if a person were indifferent to that kind of experience, then it might fail to be good for that person. Third, we have a …
Attraction, Aversion, and Asymmetrical Desires
I argue that, insofar as we endorse the general idea that desires play an important role in well-being, we ought to believe that their significance for well-being is derived from a pair of more fundamental attitudes: attraction and aversion. Attraction has wholly positive significance for well-being, and aversion has wholly negative significance for well-being. Desire satisfaction and frustration have significance for well-being insofar as the re…
An honest look at hybrid theories of pleasure
Pessimism and procreation
The pessimistic hypothesis is the hypothesis that life is bad for us, in the sense that we are worse off for having come into existence. Suppose this hypothesis turns out to be correct — existence turns out to be more of a burden than a gift. A natural next thought is that we should stop having children. But I contend that this is a mistake; procreation would often be permissible even if the pessimistic hypothesis turned out to be correct. Roughl…
An honest look at hybrid theories of pleasure
How Do We Differ When We Differ In Taste
My partner loves the experiences she gets from eating olives. I, on the other hand, hate the experiences I get from eating olives. We differ in tastes. But how exactly do we differ? In particular: do our taste experiences differ phenomenologically—do my olive-experiences feel different than my partner’s olive-experiences? Some philosophers have assumed that the answer is “no,” and have advanced important arguments which turn on this assumption. I…
The Pleasure Problem and the Spriggean Solution
Some experiences—like the experience of eating cheesecake—are good experiences to have. But when we try to explain why they are good, we encounter a clash of intuitions. First, we have an objectivist intuition: plausibly, the experiences are good because they feel the way that they do. Second, we have a subjectivist intuition: if a person were indifferent to that kind of experience, then it might fail to be good for that person. Third, we have a …
Attraction, Aversion, and Asymmetrical Desires
I argue that, insofar as we endorse the general idea that desires play an important role in well-being, we ought to believe that their significance for well-being is derived from a pair of more fundamental attitudes: attraction and aversion. Attraction has wholly positive significance for well-being, and aversion has wholly negative significance for well-being. Desire satisfaction and frustration have significance for well-being insofar as the re…
Pessimism and procreation
The pessimistic hypothesis is the hypothesis that life is bad for us, in the sense that we are worse off for having come into existence. Suppose this hypothesis turns out to be correct — existence turns out to be more of a burden than a gift. A natural next thought is that we should stop having children. But I contend that this is a mistake; procreation would often be permissible even if the pessimistic hypothesis turned out to be correct. Roughl…
Why Pain Matters More than Pleasure for Well-Being
A number of philosophers have argued that pleasure and pain are asymmetrical with respect to their contributions to well-being: the degree to which an episode of pain is bad for one is greater than the degree to which an equal quantity of pleasure is good for one. In this paper I defend an explanation of the asymmetry. I argue that pains, and some pleasures, are instrumentally bad for us in the short term. Notably, this is because pains and some …
A Hedonic Subjectivism
In recent years, a number of philosophers of well-being have given more attention to the topic of ill-being. In particular, increasing attention has been paid to the distinction between two kinds of attitudes: those whose objects are good for us and those whose objects are bad for us. I argue that the difference between positive and negative attitudes should be explained in terms of pleasure and displeasure. If one takes pleasure in something, th…
Philosophy (5 works) · Pleasure (5 works) · Psychology (5 works) · Epistemology (4 works) · Philosophical Ethics and Theory (4 works) · Social Psychology (4 works) · Philosophy of mind (3 works) · Psychology of Moral and Emotional Judgment (3 works) · Subjectivism (3 works) · Ethics, Aesthetics, and Art (2 works)