Martine Nida‐Rümelin
Biographic Data
| ID | 5911223 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Martine Nida‐Rümelin |
| GIVEN NAMES | Martine |
| FAMILY NAME | Nida‐Rümelin |
| SIGNATURE | RÜMELIN M N |
| AFFILIATIONS | University of Fribourg |
| ORCID | 0009-0000-9343-8535 |
| VERIFIED | Yes |
| TOTAL WORKS | 6 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 10 |
| WORKS AS AUTHOR | 6 |
| WORKS AS EDITOR | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 1998 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2018 |
| H-INDEX | 2 |
The experience property frame work
According to the experience property framework qualia are properties of experiences the subject undergoing the experience is aware of. A phenomenological argument against this framework is developed and a few mistakes invited by the framework (concerning our understanding of consciousness, self-consciousness and the relation of the two) are described. An alternative to the framework, the framework of experiential properties (where experiential pr…
The Argument for Subject Body Dualism from Transtemporal Identity Defended
In my argument for subject body dualism criticized by Ludwig I use the locution of a genuine and factual difference between two possibilities. Ludwig distinguishes three interpretations of this locution. According to his analysis the argument does not go through on any of these interpretations. In my response I agree that the argument is unsuccessful if ‘factual difference’ is understood in the first way. The second reading—according to a plausib…
Reddish Green
We discuss two modal claims about the phenomenal structure of color experiences: (i) violet experiences are necessarily experiences of a color that is for the subject on that occasion phenomenally composed of red and blue (the modal claim about violet) and (ii) no subject can possibly have an experience of a color that is for it then phenomenally composed of red and green (the modal claim about reddish green). The modal claim about reddish green …
Transparency of Experience and the Perceptual Model of Phenomenal Awareness
Intrinsic Phenomenal Properties in Color Vision Science
On Belief about Experiences. An Epistemological Distinction Applied to the Knowledge Argument against Physicalism
Transparency of Experience and the Perceptual Model of Phenomenal Awareness
The experience property frame work
According to the experience property framework qualia are properties of experiences the subject undergoing the experience is aware of. A phenomenological argument against this framework is developed and a few mistakes invited by the framework (concerning our understanding of consciousness, self-consciousness and the relation of the two) are described. An alternative to the framework, the framework of experiential properties (where experiential pr…
The Argument for Subject Body Dualism from Transtemporal Identity Defended
In my argument for subject body dualism criticized by Ludwig I use the locution of a genuine and factual difference between two possibilities. Ludwig distinguishes three interpretations of this locution. According to his analysis the argument does not go through on any of these interpretations. In my response I agree that the argument is unsuccessful if ‘factual difference’ is understood in the first way. The second reading—according to a plausib…
On Belief about Experiences. An Epistemological Distinction Applied to the Knowledge Argument against Physicalism
Reddish Green
We discuss two modal claims about the phenomenal structure of color experiences: (i) violet experiences are necessarily experiences of a color that is for the subject on that occasion phenomenally composed of red and blue (the modal claim about violet) and (ii) no subject can possibly have an experience of a color that is for it then phenomenally composed of red and green (the modal claim about reddish green). The modal claim about reddish green …
On Belief about Experiences. An Epistemological Distinction Applied to the Knowledge Argument against Physicalism
Intrinsic Phenomenal Properties in Color Vision Science
Transparency of Experience and the Perceptual Model of Phenomenal Awareness
Reddish Green
We discuss two modal claims about the phenomenal structure of color experiences: (i) violet experiences are necessarily experiences of a color that is for the subject on that occasion phenomenally composed of red and blue (the modal claim about violet) and (ii) no subject can possibly have an experience of a color that is for it then phenomenally composed of red and green (the modal claim about reddish green). The modal claim about reddish green …
The Argument for Subject Body Dualism from Transtemporal Identity Defended
In my argument for subject body dualism criticized by Ludwig I use the locution of a genuine and factual difference between two possibilities. Ludwig distinguishes three interpretations of this locution. According to his analysis the argument does not go through on any of these interpretations. In my response I agree that the argument is unsuccessful if ‘factual difference’ is understood in the first way. The second reading—according to a plausib…
The experience property frame work
According to the experience property framework qualia are properties of experiences the subject undergoing the experience is aware of. A phenomenological argument against this framework is developed and a few mistakes invited by the framework (concerning our understanding of consciousness, self-consciousness and the relation of the two) are described. An alternative to the framework, the framework of experiential properties (where experiential pr…
Epistemology (6 works) · Philosophy (6 works) · Computer Science (4 works) · Metaphysics (4 works) · Philosophy (4 works) · Philosophy and Theoretical Science (4 works) · Argument (complex analysis (3 works) · Physicalism (3 works) · Chemistry (2 works) · Consciousness (2 works)