Ethan Jerzak
Biographic Data
| ID | 5911268 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Ethan Jerzak |
| GIVEN NAMES | Ethan |
| FAMILY NAME | Jerzak |
| SIGNATURE | JERZAK E |
| AFFILIATIONS | National University of Singapore |
| ORCID | 0000-0003-1366-655X |
| VERIFIED | Yes |
| TOTAL WORKS | 3 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 1 |
| AUTHOR COUNT | 3 |
| EDITOR COUNT | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2017 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2025 |
| H-INDEX | 1 |
Knowing what to do
Much has been written on whether practical knowledge (knowledge‐how) reduces to propositional knowledge (knowledge‐that). Less attention has been paid to what we call deliberative knowledge (knowledge‐to), i.e., knowledge ascriptions embedding other infinitival questions, like where to meet , when to leave , and what to bring . We offer an analysis of knowledge‐to and argue on its basis that, regardless of whether knowledge‐how reduces to knowled…
Narrow Content
It has seemed to many that what I think is up to me. I go about life representing the world with thoughts, and my intrinsic state fixes the content of those thoughts—fixes, that is, what they require of the world in order to be true. Call this idea internalism about mental content (henceforth, internalism). Juhani Yli-Vakkuri and John Hawthorne (henceforth, YVH) have written a book that attempts to refute internalism in all its reasonable manifes…
Non‐Classical Knowledge
The Knower paradox purports to place surprising a priori limitations on what we can know. According to orthodoxy, it shows that we need to abandon one of three plausible and widely‐held ideas: that knowledge is factive, that we can know that knowledge is factive, and that we can use logical/mathematical reasoning to extend our knowledge via very weak single‐premise closure principles. I argue that classical logic, not any of these epistemic princ…
Non‐Classical Knowledge
The Knower paradox purports to place surprising a priori limitations on what we can know. According to orthodoxy, it shows that we need to abandon one of three plausible and widely‐held ideas: that knowledge is factive, that we can know that knowledge is factive, and that we can use logical/mathematical reasoning to extend our knowledge via very weak single‐premise closure principles. I argue that classical logic, not any of these epistemic princ…
Non‐Classical Knowledge
The Knower paradox purports to place surprising a priori limitations on what we can know. According to orthodoxy, it shows that we need to abandon one of three plausible and widely‐held ideas: that knowledge is factive, that we can know that knowledge is factive, and that we can use logical/mathematical reasoning to extend our knowledge via very weak single‐premise closure principles. I argue that classical logic, not any of these epistemic princ…
Narrow Content
It has seemed to many that what I think is up to me. I go about life representing the world with thoughts, and my intrinsic state fixes the content of those thoughts—fixes, that is, what they require of the world in order to be true. Call this idea internalism about mental content (henceforth, internalism). Juhani Yli-Vakkuri and John Hawthorne (henceforth, YVH) have written a book that attempts to refute internalism in all its reasonable manifes…
Knowing what to do
Much has been written on whether practical knowledge (knowledge‐how) reduces to propositional knowledge (knowledge‐that). Less attention has been paid to what we call deliberative knowledge (knowledge‐to), i.e., knowledge ascriptions embedding other infinitival questions, like where to meet , when to leave , and what to bring . We offer an analysis of knowledge‐to and argue on its basis that, regardless of whether knowledge‐how reduces to knowled…
Epistemology (2 works) · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics (2 works) · Metaphysics (2 works) · Philosophy (2 works) · Philosophy and Theoretical Science (2 works) · Psychology (2 works) · Argument (complex analysis) (1 works) · Artificial Intelligence (1 works) · Artificial Intelligence (1 works) · Classical Philosophy and Thought (1 works)