Eddy Nahmias
Biographic Data
| ID | 5911278 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Eddy Nahmias |
| GIVEN NAMES | Eddy |
| FAMILY NAME | Nahmias |
| SIGNATURE | NAHMIAS E |
| AFFILIATIONS | Georgia State University |
| ORCID | 0000-0003-0987-0160 |
| VERIFIED | Yes |
| TOTAL WORKS | 9 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 30 |
| WORKS AS AUTHOR | 9 |
| WORKS AS EDITOR | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2005 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2023 |
| H-INDEX | 2 |
Why the manipulation argument fails
The free will inventory
Intuitions about Free Will, Determinism, and Bypassing
This article draws on experimental studies of folk intuitions about free will and moral responsibility conducted in the past decade. It questions the claims of many philosophers that most ordinary persons have incompatibilist intuitions about free will and moral responsibility. In the studies, various deterministic scenarios are presented to undergraduate students who have not studied philosophy. In these scenarios, studies found that, although s…
Explaining Away Incompatibilist Intuitions
The debate between compatibilists and incompatibilists depends in large part on what ordinary people mean by 'free will', a matter on which previous experimental philosophy studies have yielded conflicting results. In Nahmias, Morris, Nadelhoffer, and Turner (2005, 2006), most participants judged that agents in deterministic scenarios could have free will and be morally responsible. Nichols and Knobe (2007), though, suggest that these apparent co…
Temperament and intuition
Folk Fears about Freedom and Responsibility
will and moral responsibility was designed primarily to test a common claim in the philosophical debates: that ordinary people see an obvious conflict between determinism and both free will and moral responsibility, and hence, the burden is on compatibilists to motivate their theory in a way that explains away or overcomes this intuitive support for incompatibilism. The evidence, if any, offered by philosophers to support the claim that incompati…
Is Incompatibilism Intuitive
Incompatibilists believe free will is impossible if determinism is true, and they often claim that this view is supported by ordinary intuitions. We challenge the claim that incompatibilism is intuitive to most laypersons and discuss the significance of this challenge to the free will debate. After explaining why incompatibilists should want their view to accord with pretheoretical intuitions, we suggest that determining whether incompatibilism i…
Surveying Freedom
Philosophers working in the nascent field of ‘experimental philosophy’ have begun using methods borrowed from psychology to collect data about folk intuitions concerning debates ranging from action theory to ethics to epistemology. In this paper we present the results of our attempts to apply this approach to the free will debate, in which philosophers on opposing sides claim that their view best accounts for and accords with folk intuitions. Aft…
Agency, authorship, and illusion
Is Incompatibilism Intuitive
Incompatibilists believe free will is impossible if determinism is true, and they often claim that this view is supported by ordinary intuitions. We challenge the claim that incompatibilism is intuitive to most laypersons and discuss the significance of this challenge to the free will debate. After explaining why incompatibilists should want their view to accord with pretheoretical intuitions, we suggest that determining whether incompatibilism i…
Explaining Away Incompatibilist Intuitions
The debate between compatibilists and incompatibilists depends in large part on what ordinary people mean by 'free will', a matter on which previous experimental philosophy studies have yielded conflicting results. In Nahmias, Morris, Nadelhoffer, and Turner (2005, 2006), most participants judged that agents in deterministic scenarios could have free will and be morally responsible. Nichols and Knobe (2007), though, suggest that these apparent co…
Folk Fears about Freedom and Responsibility
will and moral responsibility was designed primarily to test a common claim in the philosophical debates: that ordinary people see an obvious conflict between determinism and both free will and moral responsibility, and hence, the burden is on compatibilists to motivate their theory in a way that explains away or overcomes this intuitive support for incompatibilism. The evidence, if any, offered by philosophers to support the claim that incompati…
Surveying Freedom
Philosophers working in the nascent field of ‘experimental philosophy’ have begun using methods borrowed from psychology to collect data about folk intuitions concerning debates ranging from action theory to ethics to epistemology. In this paper we present the results of our attempts to apply this approach to the free will debate, in which philosophers on opposing sides claim that their view best accounts for and accords with folk intuitions. Aft…
Agency, authorship, and illusion
Folk Fears about Freedom and Responsibility
will and moral responsibility was designed primarily to test a common claim in the philosophical debates: that ordinary people see an obvious conflict between determinism and both free will and moral responsibility, and hence, the burden is on compatibilists to motivate their theory in a way that explains away or overcomes this intuitive support for incompatibilism. The evidence, if any, offered by philosophers to support the claim that incompati…
Is Incompatibilism Intuitive
Incompatibilists believe free will is impossible if determinism is true, and they often claim that this view is supported by ordinary intuitions. We challenge the claim that incompatibilism is intuitive to most laypersons and discuss the significance of this challenge to the free will debate. After explaining why incompatibilists should want their view to accord with pretheoretical intuitions, we suggest that determining whether incompatibilism i…
Temperament and intuition
Intuitions about Free Will, Determinism, and Bypassing
This article draws on experimental studies of folk intuitions about free will and moral responsibility conducted in the past decade. It questions the claims of many philosophers that most ordinary persons have incompatibilist intuitions about free will and moral responsibility. In the studies, various deterministic scenarios are presented to undergraduate students who have not studied philosophy. In these scenarios, studies found that, although s…
Explaining Away Incompatibilist Intuitions
The debate between compatibilists and incompatibilists depends in large part on what ordinary people mean by 'free will', a matter on which previous experimental philosophy studies have yielded conflicting results. In Nahmias, Morris, Nadelhoffer, and Turner (2005, 2006), most participants judged that agents in deterministic scenarios could have free will and be morally responsible. Nichols and Knobe (2007), though, suggest that these apparent co…
The free will inventory
Why the manipulation argument fails
Epistemology (8 works) · Free Will and Agency (8 works) · Philosophy (7 works) · Compatibilism (6 works) · Free will (6 works) · Psychology (6 works) · Determinism (5 works) · Incompatibilism (5 works) · Psychology of Moral and Emotional Judgment (5 works) · Experimental philosophy (4 works)