Maite Ezcurdia
Biographic Data
| ID | 5911292 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Maite Ezcurdia |
| GIVEN NAMES | Maite |
| FAMILY NAME | Ezcurdia |
| SIGNATURE | EZCURDIA M |
| AFFILIATIONS | Universidad Nacional Autonoma de Mexico |
| VERIFIED | No |
| TOTAL WORKS | 8 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 1 |
| WORKS AS AUTHOR | 8 |
| WORKS AS EDITOR | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 1995 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2023 |
| H-INDEX | 1 |
De se names
We argue that there are names with de se contents and that they are theoretically fruitful. De se names serve to challenge intuitive and otherwise plausible orthodoxies such as Stalnaker's view of communication and Bayesian views of belief update. These implications are also significant for those already sympathetic to the irreducibility of de se content
Conocimiento del lenguaje y actitudes de aceptación
En este trabajo defiendo la idea de que la competencia lingüística está constituida por lo que denomino 'actitudes de aceptación subdoxásticas'. Estas son estados mentales cognoscitivos con un contenido conceptual, pero que son inconscientes en un sentido profundo. En primer lugar, doy una caracterización de este tipo de actitudes de aceptación y explico cómo podrían figurar en explicaciones de la comprensión y la producción lingüística. En segun…
Pragmatic Attitudes and Semantic Competence
In this paper I argue against the account Soames offers in Beyond Rigidity of the semantics and pragmatics of propositional attitude reports. I defend a particular constraint for identifying semantic content of phrases based on conditions for semantic competence, and argue that failure of substitutivity is an essential component of our competence conditions with propositional attitude predicates. Given that Soames's account makes no room for this…
Scott Soames, Beyond Rigidity
Este libro tiene dos propósitos principales, uno explícito y otro implícito. El propósito explícito es completar la agenda semántica de Saul Kripke en El nombrar y la necesidad (en adelante, NN); en particular, desarrollar temas y responder a preguntas que surgen de las discusiones en NN. Dos grupos de temas le interesan a Soames. El primero concierne a los nombres propios, así como a las oraciones de identidad y a las atribuciones de actitudes p…
The Concept-Conception Distinction
1. Higginbotham1 argues in favour of a threefold distinction between possessing a concept, having a conception of the concept and having a conscious view of it. But in speaking of having a conception, one must take care to distinguish having a conception of a concept from having a conception associated with the concept which one takes to be analytic to or constitutive of that concept. In terms of Fodor's account of concepts: one thing is to have …
Eduardo Rabossi (comp.), Filosofía de la Mente y Ciencia Cognitiva
S. Neale, Descriptions
Modos de presentación y modos de determinación
In this paper I argue that, in order to make (T1) and (T2) compatible within a Fregean approach, we must reject the view that all modes of presentation are senses. (T1) There is a diversity of ways in which Venus may be presented to each subject, and which are associated with the name ‘Venus’. (T2) There is only one Fregean thought expressed by the sentence ‘Venus is a planet’. Modes of presentation are those things which are essentially psycholo…
De se names
We argue that there are names with de se contents and that they are theoretically fruitful. De se names serve to challenge intuitive and otherwise plausible orthodoxies such as Stalnaker's view of communication and Bayesian views of belief update. These implications are also significant for those already sympathetic to the irreducibility of de se content
Modos de presentación y modos de determinación
In this paper I argue that, in order to make (T1) and (T2) compatible within a Fregean approach, we must reject the view that all modes of presentation are senses. (T1) There is a diversity of ways in which Venus may be presented to each subject, and which are associated with the name ‘Venus’. (T2) There is only one Fregean thought expressed by the sentence ‘Venus is a planet’. Modes of presentation are those things which are essentially psycholo…
S. Neale, Descriptions
Eduardo Rabossi (comp.), Filosofía de la Mente y Ciencia Cognitiva
The Concept-Conception Distinction
1. Higginbotham1 argues in favour of a threefold distinction between possessing a concept, having a conception of the concept and having a conscious view of it. But in speaking of having a conception, one must take care to distinguish having a conception of a concept from having a conception associated with the concept which one takes to be analytic to or constitutive of that concept. In terms of Fodor's account of concepts: one thing is to have …
Pragmatic Attitudes and Semantic Competence
In this paper I argue against the account Soames offers in Beyond Rigidity of the semantics and pragmatics of propositional attitude reports. I defend a particular constraint for identifying semantic content of phrases based on conditions for semantic competence, and argue that failure of substitutivity is an essential component of our competence conditions with propositional attitude predicates. Given that Soames's account makes no room for this…
Scott Soames, Beyond Rigidity
Este libro tiene dos propósitos principales, uno explícito y otro implícito. El propósito explícito es completar la agenda semántica de Saul Kripke en El nombrar y la necesidad (en adelante, NN); en particular, desarrollar temas y responder a preguntas que surgen de las discusiones en NN. Dos grupos de temas le interesan a Soames. El primero concierne a los nombres propios, así como a las oraciones de identidad y a las atribuciones de actitudes p…
Conocimiento del lenguaje y actitudes de aceptación
En este trabajo defiendo la idea de que la competencia lingüística está constituida por lo que denomino 'actitudes de aceptación subdoxásticas'. Estas son estados mentales cognoscitivos con un contenido conceptual, pero que son inconscientes en un sentido profundo. En primer lugar, doy una caracterización de este tipo de actitudes de aceptación y explico cómo podrían figurar en explicaciones de la comprensión y la producción lingüística. En segun…
De se names
We argue that there are names with de se contents and that they are theoretically fruitful. De se names serve to challenge intuitive and otherwise plausible orthodoxies such as Stalnaker's view of communication and Bayesian views of belief update. These implications are also significant for those already sympathetic to the irreducibility of de se content
Philosophy (7 works) · Epistemology (4 works) · Computer Science (3 works) · Humanities (3 works) · Linguistics (3 works) · Philosophy and Theoretical Science (3 works) · Classical Philosophy and Thought (2 works) · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics (2 works) · Philosophy (2 works) · Psychology (2 works)