Glauber De Bona
Biographic Data
| ID | 5911337 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Glauber De Bona |
| GIVEN NAMES | Glauber |
| FAMILY NAME | De Bona |
| SIGNATURE | DE BONA G |
| AFFILIATIONS | Universidade de São Paulo Sao Paulo São Paulo Brazil |
| ORCID | 0000-0002-6795-9887 |
| VERIFIED | Yes |
| TOTAL WORKS | 3 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 8 |
| WORKS AS AUTHOR | 3 |
| WORKS AS EDITOR | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2017 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2024 |
| H-INDEX | 1 |
An Improved Argument for Superconditionalization
Updating incoherent credences ‐ Extending the Dutch strategy argument for conditionalization
In this paper, we ask: how should an agent who has incoherent credences update when they learn new evidence? The standard Bayesian answer for coherent agents is that they should conditionalize; however, this updating rule is not defined for incoherent starting credences. We show how one of the main arguments for conditionalization, the Dutch strategy argument, can be extended to devise a target property for updating plans that can apply to them r…
Graded Incoherence for Accuracy-Firsters
This article investigates the relationship between two evaluative claims about agents’ degrees of belief: (i) that it is better to have more rather than less accurate degrees of belief and (ii) that it is better to have less rather than more probabilistically incoherent degrees of belief. We show that, for suitable combinations of inaccuracy measures and incoherence measures, both claims are compatible, although not equivalent; moreover, certain …
Graded Incoherence for Accuracy-Firsters
This article investigates the relationship between two evaluative claims about agents’ degrees of belief: (i) that it is better to have more rather than less accurate degrees of belief and (ii) that it is better to have less rather than more probabilistically incoherent degrees of belief. We show that, for suitable combinations of inaccuracy measures and incoherence measures, both claims are compatible, although not equivalent; moreover, certain …
Graded Incoherence for Accuracy-Firsters
This article investigates the relationship between two evaluative claims about agents’ degrees of belief: (i) that it is better to have more rather than less accurate degrees of belief and (ii) that it is better to have less rather than more probabilistically incoherent degrees of belief. We show that, for suitable combinations of inaccuracy measures and incoherence measures, both claims are compatible, although not equivalent; moreover, certain …
Updating incoherent credences ‐ Extending the Dutch strategy argument for conditionalization
In this paper, we ask: how should an agent who has incoherent credences update when they learn new evidence? The standard Bayesian answer for coherent agents is that they should conditionalize; however, this updating rule is not defined for incoherent starting credences. We show how one of the main arguments for conditionalization, the Dutch strategy argument, can be extended to devise a target property for updating plans that can apply to them r…
An Improved Argument for Superconditionalization
Computer Science (3 works) · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics (3 works) · Decision-Making and Behavioral Economics (2 works) · Epistemology (2 works) · Mathematics (2 works) · Philosophy (2 works) · Philosophy and History of Science (2 works) · Argument (complex analysis (1 work) · Artificial Intelligence (1 work) · Artificial Intelligence (1 work)