Dennis W Stampe
Biographic Data
| ID | 5911414 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Dennis W Stampe |
| GIVEN NAMES | Dennis W |
| FAMILY NAME | Stampe |
| SIGNATURE | STAMPE D W |
| AFFILIATIONS | University of Wisconsin System |
| VERIFIED | No |
| TOTAL WORKS | 8 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 18 |
| WORKS AS AUTHOR | 8 |
| WORKS AS EDITOR | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 1968 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 1992 |
| H-INDEX | 2 |
Of One's Own Free Will
Looking down the barrel of a gun, you are not merely willing to surrender your wallet, you may do it quite willingly, offering the gunman your watch for good measure. This is not to say that you gave him your wallet of your own free will. That requires more than willingness to comply. Nor is it enough that what you did was the rational thing to do. Even then, you did not do it of your own free will. What more is required? Locke describes a man wh…
Representation and the Freedom of the Will
"Desires as Reasons--Discussion Notes on Fred Dretske's "Explaining Behavior
The Authority of Desire
A ristotle said that the intellect itself moves nothing; not even I the thinker himself is moved by thought alone. But thinking which . . . aims at an end and is does issue in and rational motion. Such practical thought originates in the appetite, and such motions, therefore, begin in desire. (Hence choice is desiderative reason or ratiocinative desire . . . N.E. 1139b). But how is it possible for practical reasoning to begin in desire? That is p…
Verificationism and a causal account of meaning
Toward a Causal Theory of Linguistic Representation
Meaning and Truth in the Theory of Speech Acts
Toward a Grammar of Meaning
THE concept of is as dismayingly complex as any concept which suffers attentions of philosophy. So diverse and apparently miscellaneous are senses, uses, and meanings of words mean and that very integrity of the concept of meaning is subject to doubt. Yet we will surely not understand concept of meaning, or any concept, until we understand how its parts hang together, as it were, to extent that they do; until we have an analysis of concept which …
The Authority of Desire
A ristotle said that the intellect itself moves nothing; not even I the thinker himself is moved by thought alone. But thinking which . . . aims at an end and is does issue in and rational motion. Such practical thought originates in the appetite, and such motions, therefore, begin in desire. (Hence choice is desiderative reason or ratiocinative desire . . . N.E. 1139b). But how is it possible for practical reasoning to begin in desire? That is p…
Verificationism and a causal account of meaning
Toward a Grammar of Meaning
THE concept of is as dismayingly complex as any concept which suffers attentions of philosophy. So diverse and apparently miscellaneous are senses, uses, and meanings of words mean and that very integrity of the concept of meaning is subject to doubt. Yet we will surely not understand concept of meaning, or any concept, until we understand how its parts hang together, as it were, to extent that they do; until we have an analysis of concept which …
Toward a Grammar of Meaning
THE concept of is as dismayingly complex as any concept which suffers attentions of philosophy. So diverse and apparently miscellaneous are senses, uses, and meanings of words mean and that very integrity of the concept of meaning is subject to doubt. Yet we will surely not understand concept of meaning, or any concept, until we understand how its parts hang together, as it were, to extent that they do; until we have an analysis of concept which …
Meaning and Truth in the Theory of Speech Acts
Toward a Causal Theory of Linguistic Representation
Verificationism and a causal account of meaning
The Authority of Desire
A ristotle said that the intellect itself moves nothing; not even I the thinker himself is moved by thought alone. But thinking which . . . aims at an end and is does issue in and rational motion. Such practical thought originates in the appetite, and such motions, therefore, begin in desire. (Hence choice is desiderative reason or ratiocinative desire . . . N.E. 1139b). But how is it possible for practical reasoning to begin in desire? That is p…
Representation and the Freedom of the Will
"Desires as Reasons--Discussion Notes on Fred Dretske's "Explaining Behavior
Of One's Own Free Will
Looking down the barrel of a gun, you are not merely willing to surrender your wallet, you may do it quite willingly, offering the gunman your watch for good measure. This is not to say that you gave him your wallet of your own free will. That requires more than willingness to comply. Nor is it enough that what you did was the rational thing to do. Even then, you did not do it of your own free will. What more is required? Locke describes a man wh…
Philosophy (8 works) · Epistemology (7 works) · Linguistics (4 works) · Classical Philosophy and Thought (3 works) · Contemporary philosophy (3 works) · Meaning (existential) (3 works) · Analytic philosophy (2 works) · General interest (2 works) · Linguistic research and analysis (2 works) · Metaphysics (2 works)