Edward Wilson Averill
Biographic Data
| ID | 5911432 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Edward Wilson Averill |
| GIVEN NAMES | Edward Wilson |
| FAMILY NAME | Averill |
| SIGNATURE | AVERILL E W |
| AFFILIATIONS | Texas Tech University |
| VERIFIED | No |
| TOTAL WORKS | 12 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 12 |
| AUTHOR COUNT | 12 |
| EDITOR COUNT | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 1978 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2024 |
| H-INDEX | 2 |
The possible worlds theory of visual experience
When we watch movies, or are tricked by a trompe-l'oeil painting, we seem to be visually representing possible worlds; often non-actual possible worlds. This suggests that we really can visually represent possible worlds. The suggested claim is refined and developed here into a theory of visual experience that holds that all visual experiences, both veridical and non-veridical, represent possible worlds, many of which are non-actual
A Problem For Relational Theories of Color
The Problem of Consciousness: Essays Toward a Resolution
The Relational Nature of Color
property accounts of color, as understood in this paper, hold a thesis of the following form: necessarily, all and only yellow objects have such-and-such a property, and the word 'yellow' rigidly designates this property.' On some such accounts yellowness is a disjunction of microphysical structures. On others it is a natural kind.2 On still others yellowness is a dispositional property such that ascriptions of yellowness to x imply the following…
Color for Philosophers: Unweaving the Rainbow
Are Physical Properties Dispositions
Several prominent philosophers have held that physical properties are dispositions. The aim of this paper is to establish the following conjunction: if the thesis that physical properties are dispositions is unsupplemented by controversial assumptions about dispositions, it entails a contradiction; and if it is so supplemented the resulting theory has the consequence that either many worlds which seem to be possible worlds are not possible worlds…
The Subjective View: Secondary Qualities and Indexical Thoughts
This book investigates subjective and objective representations of the world. Analogies between secondary qualities and indexical thoughts are developed, and subjective representations are argued to be ineliminable
The Primary-Secondary Quality Distinction
Discussion des differentes formulations possibles de la distinction entre qualites premieres et qualites secondes. La theorie de la dependance: les qualites secondes dependent de la nature du systeme perceptuel| la theorie de la cecite: la possibilite d'imaginer une personne dont le systeme perceptuel est aveugle a certaines distinctions entre qualites ne peut etre envisagee pour les qualites dites premieres| la theorie de la disposition: une qua…
Essence and Scientific Discovery in Kripke and Putnam
Hilary Putnam has made a similar claim about water being H20 [Putnam, I977, p. I30; I979, p. 233]. Both Kripke and Putnam agree that if scientists have discovered the true atomic structure of gold (or the true molecular makeup of water), then they have discovered the essence or nature of gold (or water). In part one I will show that (i) is not true. In part two I will take up Kripke's defense of (i) and show why that defense does not meet the arg…
Why are Colour Terms Primarily used as Adjectives
Journal Article Why are Colour Terms Primarily Used as Adjectives? Get access Edward Aveeill Edward Aveeill West Virginia Wesleyan College Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar The Philosophical Quarterly, Volume 30, Issue 118, January 1980, Pages 19–33, https://doi.org/10.2307/2219378 Published: 01 January 1980
Explaining the Privacy of Afterimages and Pains
Memory and Mind
The Relational Nature of Color
property accounts of color, as understood in this paper, hold a thesis of the following form: necessarily, all and only yellow objects have such-and-such a property, and the word 'yellow' rigidly designates this property.' On some such accounts yellowness is a disjunction of microphysical structures. On others it is a natural kind.2 On still others yellowness is a dispositional property such that ascriptions of yellowness to x imply the following…
Memory and Mind
A Problem For Relational Theories of Color
Are Physical Properties Dispositions
Several prominent philosophers have held that physical properties are dispositions. The aim of this paper is to establish the following conjunction: if the thesis that physical properties are dispositions is unsupplemented by controversial assumptions about dispositions, it entails a contradiction; and if it is so supplemented the resulting theory has the consequence that either many worlds which seem to be possible worlds are not possible worlds…
Essence and Scientific Discovery in Kripke and Putnam
Hilary Putnam has made a similar claim about water being H20 [Putnam, I977, p. I30; I979, p. 233]. Both Kripke and Putnam agree that if scientists have discovered the true atomic structure of gold (or the true molecular makeup of water), then they have discovered the essence or nature of gold (or water). In part one I will show that (i) is not true. In part two I will take up Kripke's defense of (i) and show why that defense does not meet the arg…
Explaining the Privacy of Afterimages and Pains
Memory and Mind
Why are Colour Terms Primarily used as Adjectives
Journal Article Why are Colour Terms Primarily Used as Adjectives? Get access Edward Aveeill Edward Aveeill West Virginia Wesleyan College Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar The Philosophical Quarterly, Volume 30, Issue 118, January 1980, Pages 19–33, https://doi.org/10.2307/2219378 Published: 01 January 1980
The Primary-Secondary Quality Distinction
Discussion des differentes formulations possibles de la distinction entre qualites premieres et qualites secondes. La theorie de la dependance: les qualites secondes dependent de la nature du systeme perceptuel| la theorie de la cecite: la possibilite d'imaginer une personne dont le systeme perceptuel est aveugle a certaines distinctions entre qualites ne peut etre envisagee pour les qualites dites premieres| la theorie de la disposition: une qua…
Essence and Scientific Discovery in Kripke and Putnam
Hilary Putnam has made a similar claim about water being H20 [Putnam, I977, p. I30; I979, p. 233]. Both Kripke and Putnam agree that if scientists have discovered the true atomic structure of gold (or the true molecular makeup of water), then they have discovered the essence or nature of gold (or water). In part one I will show that (i) is not true. In part two I will take up Kripke's defense of (i) and show why that defense does not meet the arg…
The Subjective View: Secondary Qualities and Indexical Thoughts
This book investigates subjective and objective representations of the world. Analogies between secondary qualities and indexical thoughts are developed, and subjective representations are argued to be ineliminable
Are Physical Properties Dispositions
Several prominent philosophers have held that physical properties are dispositions. The aim of this paper is to establish the following conjunction: if the thesis that physical properties are dispositions is unsupplemented by controversial assumptions about dispositions, it entails a contradiction; and if it is so supplemented the resulting theory has the consequence that either many worlds which seem to be possible worlds are not possible worlds…
Color for Philosophers: Unweaving the Rainbow
The Problem of Consciousness: Essays Toward a Resolution
The Relational Nature of Color
property accounts of color, as understood in this paper, hold a thesis of the following form: necessarily, all and only yellow objects have such-and-such a property, and the word 'yellow' rigidly designates this property.' On some such accounts yellowness is a disjunction of microphysical structures. On others it is a natural kind.2 On still others yellowness is a dispositional property such that ascriptions of yellowness to x imply the following…
A Problem For Relational Theories of Color
The possible worlds theory of visual experience
When we watch movies, or are tricked by a trompe-l'oeil painting, we seem to be visually representing possible worlds; often non-actual possible worlds. This suggests that we really can visually represent possible worlds. The suggested claim is refined and developed here into a theory of visual experience that holds that all visual experiences, both veridical and non-veridical, represent possible worlds, many of which are non-actual
Philosophy (10 works) · Epistemology (9 works) · Psychology (5 works) · Analytic philosophy (4 works) · Computer Science (4 works) · Contemporary philosophy (4 works) · Philosophy and Theoretical Science (4 works) · Artificial Intelligence (3 works) · Philosophy (3 works) · Physics (3 works)