Jessica Moss
Biographic Data
| ID | 5911463 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Jessica Moss |
| GIVEN NAMES | Jessica |
| FAMILY NAME | Moss |
| SIGNATURE | MOSS J |
| AFFILIATIONS | Duquesne University |
| VERIFIED | No |
| TOTAL WORKS | 19 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 21 |
| AUTHOR COUNT | 19 |
| EDITOR COUNT | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2006 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2021 |
| H-INDEX | 3 |
Plato's Epistemology
This book argues that Plato’s epistemology is radically different from our own. Unlike knowledge and belief as nowadays conceived, the central players in his epistemology are each essentially to be understood as cognition of a certain kind of object. Epistêmê is cognition of what Is—where this turns out to mean that it is a deep grasp of ultimate reality. Doxa is cognition of what seems—where this turns out to mean that it is atheoretical thought…
Is Plato’s Epistemology about Knowledge?
Plato’s epistemology centres around something that he calls epistêmê, often translated as ‘knowledge’. Is Plato really talking about knowledge, or something quite different? This chapter proposes that we answer the question by looking to what Plato takes to be axiomatic and uncontroversial about epistêmê – that it is unerring cognition of what is – and suggests that the differences between his views about epistêmê and modern views about knowledge…
The Birth of Belief
It is widely accepted that doxa, which plays a major role in Plato's and Aristotle's epistemologies, is the Ancient counterpart of belief. We argue against this consensus: doxa is not generic taking-to-be-true, but instead something closer to mere opinion. We then show that Plato shows little sign of interest in the generic notion of belief; it is Aristotle who systematically develops that notion, under the rubric of hupolêpsis (usually translate…
Aristotle’s Ethical Psychology
A summary is not available for this content so a preview has been provided. Please use the Get access link above for information on how to access this content.
Hedonism and the Divided Soul in Plato’s Protagoras
Why is the
Was Aristotle a Humean? A Partisan Guide to the Debate
A summary is not available for this content so a preview has been provided. Please use the Get access link above for information on how to access this content.
X-Plato's Appearance-Assent Account of Belief
Stoics and Sceptics distinguish belief (doxa) from a representationally and functionally similar but sub-doxastic state: passive yielding to appearance. Belief requires active assent to appearances, that is, affirmation of the appearances as true. I trace the roots of this view to Plato's accounts of doxa in the Republic and Theaetetus. In the Republic, eikasia and pistis (imaging and conviction) are distinguished by their objects, appearances ve…
The Cambridge Companion to Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics
Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics is the first and arguably most important treatise on ethics in Western philosophy. It remains to this day a compelling reflection on the best sort of human life and continues to inspire contemporary thought and debate. This Cambridge Companion includes twenty essays by leading scholars of Aristotle and ancient philosophy that cover the major issues of this text. The essays in this volume shed light on Aristotle's ri…
Right Reason in Plato and Aristotle
Something Aristotle calls ‘right logos ’ plays a crucial role in his theory of virtue. But the meaning of ‘ logos ’ in this context is notoriously contested. I argue against the standard translation ‘reason’, and—drawing on parallels with Plato’s work, especially the Laws— in favor of its being used to denote what transforms an inferior epistemic state into a superior one: an explanatory account. Thus Aristotelian phronēsis , like his and Plato’s…
Soul‐Leading
The Phaedrus claims that good logoi must be “put together like a living creature”, with parts that suit one another and the whole; but the dialogue itself seems to be a misshapen jumble. It begins as a series of elegant rhetorical speeches about love, and ends as a dry philosophical discussion of rhetoric. What makes it hang together? This essay argues for a new reading: the Phaedrus is a treatise on the kind of persuasion that Plato calls soul-l…
Aristotle on the Apparent Good
Aristotle holds that we desire things because they appear good to us - a view still dominant in philosophy now. But what is it for something to appear good? This text argues that the notion of the apparent good is crucial to understanding both Aristotle's psychological theory and his ethics.
Pictures and passions in the Timaeus and Philebus
The chapter argues that Plato's psychology represents our motivations as themselves person-like with the aim of showing us the lineaments of philosophic virtue and of the self-transformation required for its development. It examines the way one ordinarily uses personification to think about our own motivations. The chapter highlights that Plato uses personification in a similar way with respect to the development of philosophic virtue. Parallels …
Virtue Makes the Goal Right
Aristotle repeatedly claims that character-virtue “makes the goal right”, while Phronesis is responsible for working out how to achieve the goal. Many argue that these claims are misleading: it must be intellect that tells us what ends to pursue. I argue that Aristotle means just what he seems to say: despite putative textual evidence to the contrary, virtue is (a) a wholly non-intellectual state, and (b) responsible for literally supplying the c…
Aristotle’s Non-Trivial, Non-Insane View that Everyone Always Desires Things under the Guise of the Good
Aristotle's Non-Trivial, Non-Insane View That Everyone Always Desires Things under the Guise of the Good, Jessica Moss Aristotle appears to hold the most extreme possible version of the view that all desire is for things qua good: He makes this claim not only of the desires characteristic of rational, deliberated human action but also of appetites (epithumiai), paradigmatically nonrational desires for pleasure. This entails that animals, infants,…
Akrasia and Perceptual Illusion
de Anima III.10 characterizes akrasia as a conflict between phantasia ("imagination") on one side and rational cognition on the other: the akratic agent is torn between an appetite for what appears good to her phantasia and a rational desire for what her intellect believes good. This entails that akrasia is parallel to certain cases of perceptual illusion. Drawing on Aristotle's discussion of such cases in the de Anima and de Insomniis, I use thi…
Appearances and Calculations
Why does Plato divide up the soul in just the way he does? The question is complicated by the fact that it is not quite clear how he does divide it. Republic 4 famously uses cases of motivational conflict to show that the soulhas three parts: the rational part, which desires truth and the overall good of the soul, the spirited part, source of anger and ambition, and the appetitive part, which desires food, drink, sex, and other pleasures. In book…
What Is Imitative Poetry and Why Is It Bad?
Plato's argument against poetry in Republic 10 is perplexing. He condemns not all poetry, but only "however much of it is imitative [hosē mimētikē]" (595a). A metaphysical charge against certain works of poetry - that they are forms of imitation, "at a third remove from the truth" - is thus used to justify an ethical charge: that these works cripple our thought and corrupt our souls. Unfortunately, it is not at all clear how to understand the con…
The Cambridge Companion to Plato's Republic
This Companion provides a comprehensive account of this outstanding work, which remains among the most frequently read works of Greek philosophy, indeed of Classical antiquity in general. The sixteen essays, by authors who represent various academic disciplines, bring a spectrum of interpretive approaches to bear in order to aid the understanding of a wide-ranging audience, from first-time readers of the Republic who require guidance, to more exp…
Pleasure and Illusion in Plato
Plato links pleasure with illusion, and this link explains his rejection of the view that all desires are rational desires for the good. The Protagoras and Gorgias show connections between pleasure and illusion; the Republic develops these into a psychological theory. One part of the soul is not only prone to illusions, but also incapable of the kind of reasoning that can dispel them. Pleasure appears good; therefore this part of the soul (the ap…
Virtue Makes the Goal Right
Aristotle repeatedly claims that character-virtue “makes the goal right”, while Phronesis is responsible for working out how to achieve the goal. Many argue that these claims are misleading: it must be intellect that tells us what ends to pursue. I argue that Aristotle means just what he seems to say: despite putative textual evidence to the contrary, virtue is (a) a wholly non-intellectual state, and (b) responsible for literally supplying the c…
Right Reason in Plato and Aristotle
Something Aristotle calls ‘right logos ’ plays a crucial role in his theory of virtue. But the meaning of ‘ logos ’ in this context is notoriously contested. I argue against the standard translation ‘reason’, and—drawing on parallels with Plato’s work, especially the Laws— in favor of its being used to denote what transforms an inferior epistemic state into a superior one: an explanatory account. Thus Aristotelian phronēsis , like his and Plato’s…
Pleasure and Illusion in Plato
Plato links pleasure with illusion, and this link explains his rejection of the view that all desires are rational desires for the good. The Protagoras and Gorgias show connections between pleasure and illusion; the Republic develops these into a psychological theory. One part of the soul is not only prone to illusions, but also incapable of the kind of reasoning that can dispel them. Pleasure appears good; therefore this part of the soul (the ap…
Pleasure and Illusion in Plato
Plato links pleasure with illusion, and this link explains his rejection of the view that all desires are rational desires for the good. The Protagoras and Gorgias show connections between pleasure and illusion; the Republic develops these into a psychological theory. One part of the soul is not only prone to illusions, but also incapable of the kind of reasoning that can dispel them. Pleasure appears good; therefore this part of the soul (the ap…
What Is Imitative Poetry and Why Is It Bad?
Plato's argument against poetry in Republic 10 is perplexing. He condemns not all poetry, but only "however much of it is imitative [hosē mimētikē]" (595a). A metaphysical charge against certain works of poetry - that they are forms of imitation, "at a third remove from the truth" - is thus used to justify an ethical charge: that these works cripple our thought and corrupt our souls. Unfortunately, it is not at all clear how to understand the con…
The Cambridge Companion to Plato's Republic
This Companion provides a comprehensive account of this outstanding work, which remains among the most frequently read works of Greek philosophy, indeed of Classical antiquity in general. The sixteen essays, by authors who represent various academic disciplines, bring a spectrum of interpretive approaches to bear in order to aid the understanding of a wide-ranging audience, from first-time readers of the Republic who require guidance, to more exp…
Appearances and Calculations
Why does Plato divide up the soul in just the way he does? The question is complicated by the fact that it is not quite clear how he does divide it. Republic 4 famously uses cases of motivational conflict to show that the soulhas three parts: the rational part, which desires truth and the overall good of the soul, the spirited part, source of anger and ambition, and the appetitive part, which desires food, drink, sex, and other pleasures. In book…
Akrasia and Perceptual Illusion
de Anima III.10 characterizes akrasia as a conflict between phantasia ("imagination") on one side and rational cognition on the other: the akratic agent is torn between an appetite for what appears good to her phantasia and a rational desire for what her intellect believes good. This entails that akrasia is parallel to certain cases of perceptual illusion. Drawing on Aristotle's discussion of such cases in the de Anima and de Insomniis, I use thi…
Aristotle’s Non-Trivial, Non-Insane View that Everyone Always Desires Things under the Guise of the Good
Aristotle's Non-Trivial, Non-Insane View That Everyone Always Desires Things under the Guise of the Good, Jessica Moss Aristotle appears to hold the most extreme possible version of the view that all desire is for things qua good: He makes this claim not only of the desires characteristic of rational, deliberated human action but also of appetites (epithumiai), paradigmatically nonrational desires for pleasure. This entails that animals, infants,…
Virtue Makes the Goal Right
Aristotle repeatedly claims that character-virtue “makes the goal right”, while Phronesis is responsible for working out how to achieve the goal. Many argue that these claims are misleading: it must be intellect that tells us what ends to pursue. I argue that Aristotle means just what he seems to say: despite putative textual evidence to the contrary, virtue is (a) a wholly non-intellectual state, and (b) responsible for literally supplying the c…
Soul‐Leading
The Phaedrus claims that good logoi must be “put together like a living creature”, with parts that suit one another and the whole; but the dialogue itself seems to be a misshapen jumble. It begins as a series of elegant rhetorical speeches about love, and ends as a dry philosophical discussion of rhetoric. What makes it hang together? This essay argues for a new reading: the Phaedrus is a treatise on the kind of persuasion that Plato calls soul-l…
Aristotle on the Apparent Good
Aristotle holds that we desire things because they appear good to us - a view still dominant in philosophy now. But what is it for something to appear good? This text argues that the notion of the apparent good is crucial to understanding both Aristotle's psychological theory and his ethics.
Pictures and passions in the Timaeus and Philebus
The chapter argues that Plato's psychology represents our motivations as themselves person-like with the aim of showing us the lineaments of philosophic virtue and of the self-transformation required for its development. It examines the way one ordinarily uses personification to think about our own motivations. The chapter highlights that Plato uses personification in a similar way with respect to the development of philosophic virtue. Parallels …
Hedonism and the Divided Soul in Plato’s Protagoras
Why is the
Was Aristotle a Humean? A Partisan Guide to the Debate
A summary is not available for this content so a preview has been provided. Please use the Get access link above for information on how to access this content.
X-Plato's Appearance-Assent Account of Belief
Stoics and Sceptics distinguish belief (doxa) from a representationally and functionally similar but sub-doxastic state: passive yielding to appearance. Belief requires active assent to appearances, that is, affirmation of the appearances as true. I trace the roots of this view to Plato's accounts of doxa in the Republic and Theaetetus. In the Republic, eikasia and pistis (imaging and conviction) are distinguished by their objects, appearances ve…
The Cambridge Companion to Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics
Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics is the first and arguably most important treatise on ethics in Western philosophy. It remains to this day a compelling reflection on the best sort of human life and continues to inspire contemporary thought and debate. This Cambridge Companion includes twenty essays by leading scholars of Aristotle and ancient philosophy that cover the major issues of this text. The essays in this volume shed light on Aristotle's ri…
Right Reason in Plato and Aristotle
Something Aristotle calls ‘right logos ’ plays a crucial role in his theory of virtue. But the meaning of ‘ logos ’ in this context is notoriously contested. I argue against the standard translation ‘reason’, and—drawing on parallels with Plato’s work, especially the Laws— in favor of its being used to denote what transforms an inferior epistemic state into a superior one: an explanatory account. Thus Aristotelian phronēsis , like his and Plato’s…
Aristotle’s Ethical Psychology
A summary is not available for this content so a preview has been provided. Please use the Get access link above for information on how to access this content.
Is Plato’s Epistemology about Knowledge?
Plato’s epistemology centres around something that he calls epistêmê, often translated as ‘knowledge’. Is Plato really talking about knowledge, or something quite different? This chapter proposes that we answer the question by looking to what Plato takes to be axiomatic and uncontroversial about epistêmê – that it is unerring cognition of what is – and suggests that the differences between his views about epistêmê and modern views about knowledge…
The Birth of Belief
It is widely accepted that doxa, which plays a major role in Plato's and Aristotle's epistemologies, is the Ancient counterpart of belief. We argue against this consensus: doxa is not generic taking-to-be-true, but instead something closer to mere opinion. We then show that Plato shows little sign of interest in the generic notion of belief; it is Aristotle who systematically develops that notion, under the rubric of hupolêpsis (usually translate…
Plato's Epistemology
This book argues that Plato’s epistemology is radically different from our own. Unlike knowledge and belief as nowadays conceived, the central players in his epistemology are each essentially to be understood as cognition of a certain kind of object. Epistêmê is cognition of what Is—where this turns out to mean that it is a deep grasp of ultimate reality. Doxa is cognition of what seems—where this turns out to mean that it is atheoretical thought…
Classical Philosophy and Thought (19 works) · Epistemology (17 works) · Philosophy (16 works) · Psychology (9 works) · Medieval and Classical Philosophy (8 works) · Classical Antiquity Studies (7 works) · Soul (6 works) · Virtue (6 works) · Philosophical Ethics and Theory (5 works) · Cognitive psychology (4 works)