Juan S Piñeros Glasscock
Biographic Data
| ID | 5911528 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Juan S Piñeros Glasscock |
| GIVEN NAMES | Juan S Piñeros |
| FAMILY NAME | Glasscock |
| SIGNATURE | GLASSCOCK J S P |
| AFFILIATIONS | Department of Philosophy Georgia State University |
| ORCID | 0000-0003-2073-2551 |
| VERIFIED | Yes |
| TOTAL WORKS | 6 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 2 |
| WORKS AS AUTHOR | 6 |
| WORKS AS EDITOR | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2019 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2024 |
| H-INDEX | 1 |
A Fitting Definition of Epistemic Emotions
Philosophers and psychologists sometimes categorize emotions like surprise and curiosity as specifically epistemic. Is there some reasonably unified and interesting class of emotions here? If so, what unifies it? This paper proposes and defends an evaluative account of epistemic emotions: What it is to be an epistemic emotion is to have fittingness conditions that distinctively involve some epistemic evaluation. We argue that this view has signif…
Acquittal from Knowledge Laundering
Subject‐sensitive invariantism (SSI), the view that whether a subject knows depends on the practical stakes, has been charged with ‘knowledge laundering’: together with widely held knowledge‐transmission principles, SSI appears to allow improper knowledge acquisition. I argue that this objection fails because it depends on faulty versions of transmission principles that would raise problems for any view. When transmission principles are properly …
Authoritative Knowledge
Alienation or regress
The puzzle of learning by doing and the gradability of knowledge‐how
Much of our know‐how is acquired through practice: we learn how to cook by cooking, how to write by writing, and how to dance by dancing. As Aristotle argues, however, this kind of learning is puzzling, since engaging in it seems to require possession of the very knowledge one seeks to obtain. After showing how a version of the puzzle arises from a set of attractive principles, I argue that the best solution is to hold that knowledge‐how comes in…
Reason in Action in Aristotle
I present a reading of EE 5.12/NE 6.12 according to which Aristotle argues for an executive account of (practical wisdom) to show why it is useful to possess this virtue.On this account, the practically wise person's actions are expressive of his knowledge of the fine, a knowledge that only the practically wise person has.This is why he must not only be a good deliberator, but also cunning (), able to execute his actions well.An important consequ…
The puzzle of learning by doing and the gradability of knowledge‐how
Much of our know‐how is acquired through practice: we learn how to cook by cooking, how to write by writing, and how to dance by dancing. As Aristotle argues, however, this kind of learning is puzzling, since engaging in it seems to require possession of the very knowledge one seeks to obtain. After showing how a version of the puzzle arises from a set of attractive principles, I argue that the best solution is to hold that knowledge‐how comes in…
Reason in Action in Aristotle
I present a reading of EE 5.12/NE 6.12 according to which Aristotle argues for an executive account of (practical wisdom) to show why it is useful to possess this virtue.On this account, the practically wise person's actions are expressive of his knowledge of the fine, a knowledge that only the practically wise person has.This is why he must not only be a good deliberator, but also cunning (), able to execute his actions well.An important consequ…
Alienation or regress
The puzzle of learning by doing and the gradability of knowledge‐how
Much of our know‐how is acquired through practice: we learn how to cook by cooking, how to write by writing, and how to dance by dancing. As Aristotle argues, however, this kind of learning is puzzling, since engaging in it seems to require possession of the very knowledge one seeks to obtain. After showing how a version of the puzzle arises from a set of attractive principles, I argue that the best solution is to hold that knowledge‐how comes in…
Acquittal from Knowledge Laundering
Subject‐sensitive invariantism (SSI), the view that whether a subject knows depends on the practical stakes, has been charged with ‘knowledge laundering’: together with widely held knowledge‐transmission principles, SSI appears to allow improper knowledge acquisition. I argue that this objection fails because it depends on faulty versions of transmission principles that would raise problems for any view. When transmission principles are properly …
Authoritative Knowledge
A Fitting Definition of Epistemic Emotions
Philosophers and psychologists sometimes categorize emotions like surprise and curiosity as specifically epistemic. Is there some reasonably unified and interesting class of emotions here? If so, what unifies it? This paper proposes and defends an evaluative account of epistemic emotions: What it is to be an epistemic emotion is to have fittingness conditions that distinctively involve some epistemic evaluation. We argue that this view has signif…
Epistemology (6 works) · Philosophy (6 works) · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics (5 works) · Computer Science (4 works) · Psychology (3 works) · Law (2 works) · Linguistics (2 works) · Misinformation and Its Impacts (2 works) · Philosophical Ethics and Theory (2 works) · Philosophy and Theoretical Science (2 works)