Ian C McCready-Flora
Biographic Data
| ID | 5911662 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Ian C McCready-Flora |
| GIVEN NAMES | Ian C |
| FAMILY NAME | McCready-Flora |
| SIGNATURE | MCCREADY-FLORA I C |
| AFFILIATIONS | University of Virginia |
| VERIFIED | No |
| TOTAL WORKS | 5 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 3 |
| WORKS AS AUTHOR | 5 |
| WORKS AS EDITOR | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2013 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2023 |
| H-INDEX | 1 |
Aristotle on Reasoning and Rational Animals
This paper articulates and defends a novel view of the strict distinction that Aristotle makes between human and non-human mental life. We examine two crucially relevant but overlooked arguments that turn on the human capacity for reasoning and inference (syl/logismos) to reconstruct his view of what makes some cognitive processes rational and how they differ from non-rational counterparts. A creature is rational just in case its occurrent cognit…
Speech and the Rational Soul
Aristotle embeds humans in the natural order, while also affirming human specialness. We differ much more from non-humans than they do from each other, and the difference lies in our cognitive capacities. Humans understand, deliberate, deduce ... the list goes on. These are not brute facts, but obtain in virtue of some feature of the human soul. What soul-feature, then, explains our cognitive specialness? Call it 'rationality'. Whatever it turns …
Affect and Sensation
I argue that Plato, in the Timaeus , draws deep theoretical distinctions between sensation and affect, which comprises pleasure, pain, desire and emotion. Sensation (but not affect) is both ‘fine-grained’ (having orderly causal connections with its fundamental explanatory items) and ‘immediate’ (being provoked absent any mediating psychological state). Emotions, by contrast, are mediated and coarse-grained. Pleasure and pain are coarse-grained bu…
Aristotle and the Normativity of Belief
Aristotle's Cognitive Science
I offer a novel interpretation of Aristotle's psychology and notion of rationality, which draws the line between animal and specifically human cognition. Aristotle distinguishes belief ( doxa ), a form of rational cognition, from imagining ( phantasia ), which is shared with non‐rational animals. We are, he says, “immediately affected” by beliefs, but respond to imagining “as if we were looking at a picture.” Aristotle's argument has been misunde…
Aristotle's Cognitive Science
I offer a novel interpretation of Aristotle's psychology and notion of rationality, which draws the line between animal and specifically human cognition. Aristotle distinguishes belief ( doxa ), a form of rational cognition, from imagining ( phantasia ), which is shared with non‐rational animals. We are, he says, “immediately affected” by beliefs, but respond to imagining “as if we were looking at a picture.” Aristotle's argument has been misunde…
Aristotle and the Normativity of Belief
Aristotle's Cognitive Science
I offer a novel interpretation of Aristotle's psychology and notion of rationality, which draws the line between animal and specifically human cognition. Aristotle distinguishes belief ( doxa ), a form of rational cognition, from imagining ( phantasia ), which is shared with non‐rational animals. We are, he says, “immediately affected” by beliefs, but respond to imagining “as if we were looking at a picture.” Aristotle's argument has been misunde…
Affect and Sensation
I argue that Plato, in the Timaeus , draws deep theoretical distinctions between sensation and affect, which comprises pleasure, pain, desire and emotion. Sensation (but not affect) is both ‘fine-grained’ (having orderly causal connections with its fundamental explanatory items) and ‘immediate’ (being provoked absent any mediating psychological state). Emotions, by contrast, are mediated and coarse-grained. Pleasure and pain are coarse-grained bu…
Speech and the Rational Soul
Aristotle embeds humans in the natural order, while also affirming human specialness. We differ much more from non-humans than they do from each other, and the difference lies in our cognitive capacities. Humans understand, deliberate, deduce ... the list goes on. These are not brute facts, but obtain in virtue of some feature of the human soul. What soul-feature, then, explains our cognitive specialness? Call it 'rationality'. Whatever it turns …
Aristotle on Reasoning and Rational Animals
This paper articulates and defends a novel view of the strict distinction that Aristotle makes between human and non-human mental life. We examine two crucially relevant but overlooked arguments that turn on the human capacity for reasoning and inference (syl/logismos) to reconstruct his view of what makes some cognitive processes rational and how they differ from non-rational counterparts. A creature is rational just in case its occurrent cognit…
Classical Philosophy and Thought (5 works) · Epistemology (5 works) · Philosophy (5 works) · Psychology (5 works) · Cognition (4 works) · Cognitive psychology (4 works) · Cognitive science (3 works) · Affect (linguistics (2 works) · Classical Antiquity Studies (2 works) · Communication (2 works)