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Jules Salomone‐Sehr

Biographic Data

ID5911708
NAMEJules Salomone‐Sehr
GIVEN NAMESJules
FAMILY NAMESalomone‐Sehr
SIGNATURESEHR J S
AFFILIATIONSCentre for Research in Astrophysics of Québec
ORCID0009-0009-3588-6124
VERIFIEDYes
TOTAL WORKS3
TOTAL CITATIONS1
WORKS AS AUTHOR3
WORKS AS EDITOR0
FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR2022
LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR2023
H-INDEX1
  • How to be minimalist about shared agency

    Open Access•Jules Salomone‐Sehr•ARTICLE•Philosophy and Phenomenological…•2023•Cited by: 1•References: 2

    What is involved in acting together with others? Most shared agency theorists endorse the Shared Intention Thesis, i.e., the claim that shared agency necessarily involves shared intentions. This article dissents from this orthodoxy and offers a minimalist account of shared agency—one where parties to shared activities need not form rich webs of interrelated psychological states. My account has two main components: a conceptual analysis of shared …

  • Shared Agency and Mutual Obligations

    Open Access•Jules Salomone-Sehr, Jules Salomone‐Sehr•ARTICLE•The Philosophical Quarterly•2023•References: 20

    Do participants in shared activity have mutual obligations to do their bit? This article shows this question has no one-size-fits-all answer and offers a pluralist account of the normativity of shared agency. The first part argues obligations to do one's bit have three degrees of involvement in shared activity. Such obligations might, obviously, bolster co-participants' resolve to act as planned (degree 1). Less obviously, there also are higher a…

  • Cooperation

    Jules Salomone-Sehr, Jules Salomone‐Sehr•ARTICLE•Ethics•2022

    This article articulates our everyday notion of cooperation. First, I topple an orthodoxy of shared agency theory by arguing that shared intentions to φ are neither necessary nor sufficient for φ to be cooperative. I refute the necessity claim by providing examples of shared intention-free cooperation (in institutional contexts and beyond). I refute the sufficiency claim by observing that coercion and exploitation need not preclude shared intenti…

  • How to be minimalist about shared agency

    Open Access•Jules Salomone‐Sehr•ARTICLE•Philosophy and Phenomenological…•2023•Cited by: 1•References: 2

    What is involved in acting together with others? Most shared agency theorists endorse the Shared Intention Thesis, i.e., the claim that shared agency necessarily involves shared intentions. This article dissents from this orthodoxy and offers a minimalist account of shared agency—one where parties to shared activities need not form rich webs of interrelated psychological states. My account has two main components: a conceptual analysis of shared …

  • Cooperation

    Jules Salomone-Sehr, Jules Salomone‐Sehr•ARTICLE•Ethics•2022

    This article articulates our everyday notion of cooperation. First, I topple an orthodoxy of shared agency theory by arguing that shared intentions to φ are neither necessary nor sufficient for φ to be cooperative. I refute the necessity claim by providing examples of shared intention-free cooperation (in institutional contexts and beyond). I refute the sufficiency claim by observing that coercion and exploitation need not preclude shared intenti…

  • How to be minimalist about shared agency

    Open Access•Jules Salomone‐Sehr•ARTICLE•Philosophy and Phenomenological…•2023•Cited by: 1•References: 2

    What is involved in acting together with others? Most shared agency theorists endorse the Shared Intention Thesis, i.e., the claim that shared agency necessarily involves shared intentions. This article dissents from this orthodoxy and offers a minimalist account of shared agency—one where parties to shared activities need not form rich webs of interrelated psychological states. My account has two main components: a conceptual analysis of shared …

  • Shared Agency and Mutual Obligations

    Open Access•Jules Salomone-Sehr, Jules Salomone‐Sehr•ARTICLE•The Philosophical Quarterly•2023•References: 20

    Do participants in shared activity have mutual obligations to do their bit? This article shows this question has no one-size-fits-all answer and offers a pluralist account of the normativity of shared agency. The first part argues obligations to do one's bit have three degrees of involvement in shared activity. Such obligations might, obviously, bolster co-participants' resolve to act as planned (degree 1). Less obviously, there also are higher a…

Political science (3 works) · Psychology (3 works) · Social Psychology (3 works) · Sociology (3 works) · Agency (philosophy) (2 works) · Computer Science (2 works) · Epistemology (2 works) · Evolutionary Game Theory and Cooperation (2 works) · Law and economics (2 works) · Orthodoxy (2 works)

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