Justis Koon
Biographic Data
| ID | 5911820 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Justis Koon |
| GIVEN NAMES | Justis |
| FAMILY NAME | Koon |
| SIGNATURE | KOON J |
| AFFILIATIONS | Trinity College |
| ORCID | 0000-0002-4174-4845 |
| VERIFIED | Yes |
| TOTAL WORKS | 3 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 3 |
| WORKS AS AUTHOR | 3 |
| WORKS AS EDITOR | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2021 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2023 |
| H-INDEX | 1 |
Recalibrating evolutionary debunking
Evolutionary debunking arguments purport to show that, if moral realism is true, all of our moral beliefs are unjustified. In this paper, I respond to two of the most enduring objections that have been raised against these arguments. The first objection claims that evolutionary debunking arguments are self‐undermining, because they cannot be formulated without invoking epistemic principles, and epistemic principles are just as vulnerable to debun…
The medical model, with a human face
The epistemology of evolutionary debunking
The epistemology of evolutionary debunking
Recalibrating evolutionary debunking
Evolutionary debunking arguments purport to show that, if moral realism is true, all of our moral beliefs are unjustified. In this paper, I respond to two of the most enduring objections that have been raised against these arguments. The first objection claims that evolutionary debunking arguments are self‐undermining, because they cannot be formulated without invoking epistemic principles, and epistemic principles are just as vulnerable to debun…
The epistemology of evolutionary debunking
The medical model, with a human face
Recalibrating evolutionary debunking
Evolutionary debunking arguments purport to show that, if moral realism is true, all of our moral beliefs are unjustified. In this paper, I respond to two of the most enduring objections that have been raised against these arguments. The first objection claims that evolutionary debunking arguments are self‐undermining, because they cannot be formulated without invoking epistemic principles, and epistemic principles are just as vulnerable to debun…
Epistemology (3 works) · Philosophy (3 works) · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics (2 works) · Metaphysics (2 works) · Moral psychology (2 works) · Moral realism (2 works) · Morality (2 works) · Philosophical Ethics and Theory (2 works) · Philosophy of language (2 works) · Philosophy of mind (2 works)