M Oreste Fiocco
Biographic Data
| ID | 5911825 |
|---|---|
| NAME | M Oreste Fiocco |
| GIVEN NAMES | M Oreste |
| FAMILY NAME | Fiocco |
| SIGNATURE | FIOCCO M O |
| AFFILIATIONS | American University of Sharjah |
| VERIFIED | No |
| TOTAL WORKS | 3 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 12 |
| WORKS AS AUTHOR | 3 |
| WORKS AS EDITOR | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2007 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2021 |
| H-INDEX | 2 |
There is nothing to identity
Several have denied that there is, specifically, a criterion of identity for persons and some deny that there are, for any kind, diachronic criteria of identity. I argue, however, that there are no criteria of identity, either synchronic or diachronic, for any kind whatsoever (and could be none). I begin by elaborating the notion of a criterion of identity in order to clarify what exactly is being denied when I maintain there are none. I examine …
Is There a Right to Respect
Many moral philosophers assume that a person is entitled to respect; this suggests that there is a right to respect . I argue, however, that there is no such right. There can be no right to respect because of what respect is, in conjunction with what a right demands and certain limitations of human agency. In this article, I first examine the nature and ontological basis of rights. I next consider the notion of respect in general; I adduce severa…
Conceivability, Imagination and Modal Knowledge
The notion of conceivability has traditionally been regarded as crucial to an account of modal knowledge. Despite its importance to modal epistemology, there is no received explication of conceivability . One purpose of this paper is to argue that the notion is not fruitfully explicated in terms of the imagination. The most natural way of presenting a notion of conceivability qua imaginability is open to cogent criticism. In order to avoid such c…
Conceivability, Imagination and Modal Knowledge
The notion of conceivability has traditionally been regarded as crucial to an account of modal knowledge. Despite its importance to modal epistemology, there is no received explication of conceivability . One purpose of this paper is to argue that the notion is not fruitfully explicated in terms of the imagination. The most natural way of presenting a notion of conceivability qua imaginability is open to cogent criticism. In order to avoid such c…
There is nothing to identity
Several have denied that there is, specifically, a criterion of identity for persons and some deny that there are, for any kind, diachronic criteria of identity. I argue, however, that there are no criteria of identity, either synchronic or diachronic, for any kind whatsoever (and could be none). I begin by elaborating the notion of a criterion of identity in order to clarify what exactly is being denied when I maintain there are none. I examine …
Conceivability, Imagination and Modal Knowledge
The notion of conceivability has traditionally been regarded as crucial to an account of modal knowledge. Despite its importance to modal epistemology, there is no received explication of conceivability . One purpose of this paper is to argue that the notion is not fruitfully explicated in terms of the imagination. The most natural way of presenting a notion of conceivability qua imaginability is open to cogent criticism. In order to avoid such c…
Is There a Right to Respect
Many moral philosophers assume that a person is entitled to respect; this suggests that there is a right to respect . I argue, however, that there is no such right. There can be no right to respect because of what respect is, in conjunction with what a right demands and certain limitations of human agency. In this article, I first examine the nature and ontological basis of rights. I next consider the notion of respect in general; I adduce severa…
There is nothing to identity
Several have denied that there is, specifically, a criterion of identity for persons and some deny that there are, for any kind, diachronic criteria of identity. I argue, however, that there are no criteria of identity, either synchronic or diachronic, for any kind whatsoever (and could be none). I begin by elaborating the notion of a criterion of identity in order to clarify what exactly is being denied when I maintain there are none. I examine …
Epistemology (3 works) · Philosophy (3 works) · Argument (complex analysis (2 works) · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics (2 works) · Philosophy (2 works) · Philosophy and Theoretical Science (2 works) · Sociology (2 works) · Aesthetics (1 work) · Agency (philosophy (1 work) · Argument (complex analysis) (1 work)