Anna‐Maria A Eder
Biographic Data
| ID | 5911933 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Anna‐Maria A Eder |
| GIVEN NAMES | Anna‐Maria A |
| FAMILY NAME | Eder |
| SIGNATURE | EDER A M A |
| AFFILIATIONS | University of Cologne |
| ORCID | 0000-0002-4803-9786 |
| VERIFIED | Yes |
| TOTAL WORKS | 7 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 13 |
| WORKS AS AUTHOR | 7 |
| WORKS AS EDITOR | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2012 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2025 |
| H-INDEX | 2 |
Learning from Others’ Evidence
We simplify our lives by learning from others. I focus on instances where we learn from our peers by receiving evidence that they have evidence for a hypothesis. I refer to this type of learning as learning from others’ evidence . I exclusively consider cases where we do not learn what the other agent’s evidence is; we only receive evidence that such evidence exists. I approach learning from others’ evidence by exploring the following slogan, pop…
Evidential Probabilities and Credences
Enjoying great popularity in decision theory, epistemology, and philosophy of science, Bayesianism as understood here is fundamentally concerned with epistemically ideal rationality. It assumes a tight connection between evidential probability and ideally rational credence, and usually interprets evidential probability in terms of such credence. Williamson challenges Bayesianism by arguing that evidential probabilities cannot be adequately interp…
No commitment to the truth
On an evidentialist position, it is epistemically rational for us to believe propositions that are (stably) supported by our total evidence. We are epistemically permitted to believe such propositions, and perhaps even ought to do so. Epistemic rationality is normative. One popular way to explain the normativity appeals to epistemic teleology. The primary aim of this article is to argue that appeals to epistemic teleology do not support that we o…
Explicating the concept of epistemic rationality
A characterization of epistemic rationality, or epistemic justification, is typically taken to require a process of conceptual clarification, and is seen as comprising the core of a theory of (epistemic) rationality. I propose to explicate the concept of rationality. It is essential, I argue, that the normativity of rationality, and the purpose, or goal, for which the particular theory of rationality is being proposed, is taken into account when …
Philosophical methods under scrutiny
How to resolve doxastic disagreement
Evidential Support and Instrumental Rationality
How to resolve doxastic disagreement
Evidential Support and Instrumental Rationality
Evidential Probabilities and Credences
Enjoying great popularity in decision theory, epistemology, and philosophy of science, Bayesianism as understood here is fundamentally concerned with epistemically ideal rationality. It assumes a tight connection between evidential probability and ideally rational credence, and usually interprets evidential probability in terms of such credence. Williamson challenges Bayesianism by arguing that evidential probabilities cannot be adequately interp…
No commitment to the truth
On an evidentialist position, it is epistemically rational for us to believe propositions that are (stably) supported by our total evidence. We are epistemically permitted to believe such propositions, and perhaps even ought to do so. Epistemic rationality is normative. One popular way to explain the normativity appeals to epistemic teleology. The primary aim of this article is to argue that appeals to epistemic teleology do not support that we o…
Philosophical methods under scrutiny
Evidential Support and Instrumental Rationality
How to resolve doxastic disagreement
Philosophical methods under scrutiny
No commitment to the truth
On an evidentialist position, it is epistemically rational for us to believe propositions that are (stably) supported by our total evidence. We are epistemically permitted to believe such propositions, and perhaps even ought to do so. Epistemic rationality is normative. One popular way to explain the normativity appeals to epistemic teleology. The primary aim of this article is to argue that appeals to epistemic teleology do not support that we o…
Explicating the concept of epistemic rationality
A characterization of epistemic rationality, or epistemic justification, is typically taken to require a process of conceptual clarification, and is seen as comprising the core of a theory of (epistemic) rationality. I propose to explicate the concept of rationality. It is essential, I argue, that the normativity of rationality, and the purpose, or goal, for which the particular theory of rationality is being proposed, is taken into account when …
Evidential Probabilities and Credences
Enjoying great popularity in decision theory, epistemology, and philosophy of science, Bayesianism as understood here is fundamentally concerned with epistemically ideal rationality. It assumes a tight connection between evidential probability and ideally rational credence, and usually interprets evidential probability in terms of such credence. Williamson challenges Bayesianism by arguing that evidential probabilities cannot be adequately interp…
Learning from Others’ Evidence
We simplify our lives by learning from others. I focus on instances where we learn from our peers by receiving evidence that they have evidence for a hypothesis. I refer to this type of learning as learning from others’ evidence . I exclusively consider cases where we do not learn what the other agent’s evidence is; we only receive evidence that such evidence exists. I approach learning from others’ evidence by exploring the following slogan, pop…
Epistemology (6 works) · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics (6 works) · Philosophy (6 works) · Philosophy and Theoretical Science (5 works) · Philosophy of science (5 works) · Metaphysics (4 works) · Philosophy of language (4 works) · Rationality (4 works) · Doxastic logic (2 works) · Explication (2 works)