James M Joyce
Biographic Data
| ID | 5911945 |
|---|---|
| NAME | James M Joyce |
| GIVEN NAMES | James M |
| FAMILY NAME | Joyce |
| SIGNATURE | JOYCE J M |
| AFFILIATIONS | University of Michigan |
| ORCID | 0000-0001-8537-3137 |
| VERIFIED | Yes |
| TOTAL WORKS | 13 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 254 |
| WORKS AS AUTHOR | 13 |
| WORKS AS EDITOR | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 1957 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2021 |
| H-INDEX | 5 |
Conditional desirability
Remarks on Richard Pettigrew's Accuracy and the Laws of Credence
Accuracy and the Laws of Credence is a marvelous book.I agree with most of it, but I will raise a few worries about some of its claims.In particular, will take issue with:(1) Pettigrew's handling of Bronfman's objection; (2) his rejection of dominance reasoning when the dominant option fails to satisfy certain requirements of rationality, and (3) his commitment to an accuracy-only epistemology on which, "the only constraints evidence can place on…
Regret and instability in causal decision theory
A Defense of Imprecise Credences in Inference and Decision Making1
Peer Reviewed
Accuracy and Coherence
Are Newcomb problems really decisions
How Probabilities Reflect Evidence
Interpreting Probability
Book Review| July 01 2004 Interpreting Probability: Controversies and Developments in the Early Twentieth Century David Howie, Interpreting Probability: Controversies and Developments in the Early Twentieth Century. New York: Cambridge University Press. 2002. Pp. xi, 262. James M. Joyce James M. Joyce Search for other works by this author on: This Site Google The Philosophical Review (2004) 113 (3): 438–441. https://doi.org/10.1215/00318108-113-3…
The Foundations of Causal Decision Theory
Why We Still Need the Logic of Decision
In The Logic of Decision Richard Jeffrey defends a version of expected utility theory that advises agents to choose acts with an eye to securing evidence for thinking that desirable results will ensue. Proponents of “causal” decision theory have argued that Jeffrey's account is inadequate because it fails to properly discriminate the causal features of acts from their merely evidential properties. Jeffrey's approach has also been criticized on th…
The Foundations of Causal Decision Theory
This book defends the view that any adequate account of rational decision making must take a decision maker's beliefs about causal relations into account. The early chapters of the book introduce the non-specialist to the rudiments of expected utility theory. The major technical advance offered by the book is a 'representation theorem' that shows that both causal decision theory and its main rival, Richard Jeffrey's logic of decision, are both in…
A Nonpragmatic Vindication of Probabilism
The pragmatic character of the Dutch book argument makes it unsuitable as an “epistemic” justification for the fundamental probabilist dogma that rational partial beliefs must conform to the axioms of probability. To secure an appropriately epistemic justification for this conclusion, one must explain what it means for a system of partial beliefs to accurately represent the state of the world, and then show that partial beliefs that violate the l…
Social Work Courses for Psychologists
A Nonpragmatic Vindication of Probabilism
The pragmatic character of the Dutch book argument makes it unsuitable as an “epistemic” justification for the fundamental probabilist dogma that rational partial beliefs must conform to the axioms of probability. To secure an appropriately epistemic justification for this conclusion, one must explain what it means for a system of partial beliefs to accurately represent the state of the world, and then show that partial beliefs that violate the l…
A Defense of Imprecise Credences in Inference and Decision Making1
Peer Reviewed
How Probabilities Reflect Evidence
Regret and instability in causal decision theory
Are Newcomb problems really decisions
Why We Still Need the Logic of Decision
In The Logic of Decision Richard Jeffrey defends a version of expected utility theory that advises agents to choose acts with an eye to securing evidence for thinking that desirable results will ensue. Proponents of “causal” decision theory have argued that Jeffrey's account is inadequate because it fails to properly discriminate the causal features of acts from their merely evidential properties. Jeffrey's approach has also been criticized on th…
Social Work Courses for Psychologists
A Nonpragmatic Vindication of Probabilism
The pragmatic character of the Dutch book argument makes it unsuitable as an “epistemic” justification for the fundamental probabilist dogma that rational partial beliefs must conform to the axioms of probability. To secure an appropriately epistemic justification for this conclusion, one must explain what it means for a system of partial beliefs to accurately represent the state of the world, and then show that partial beliefs that violate the l…
The Foundations of Causal Decision Theory
This book defends the view that any adequate account of rational decision making must take a decision maker's beliefs about causal relations into account. The early chapters of the book introduce the non-specialist to the rudiments of expected utility theory. The major technical advance offered by the book is a 'representation theorem' that shows that both causal decision theory and its main rival, Richard Jeffrey's logic of decision, are both in…
Why We Still Need the Logic of Decision
In The Logic of Decision Richard Jeffrey defends a version of expected utility theory that advises agents to choose acts with an eye to securing evidence for thinking that desirable results will ensue. Proponents of “causal” decision theory have argued that Jeffrey's account is inadequate because it fails to properly discriminate the causal features of acts from their merely evidential properties. Jeffrey's approach has also been criticized on th…
The Foundations of Causal Decision Theory
Interpreting Probability
Book Review| July 01 2004 Interpreting Probability: Controversies and Developments in the Early Twentieth Century David Howie, Interpreting Probability: Controversies and Developments in the Early Twentieth Century. New York: Cambridge University Press. 2002. Pp. xi, 262. James M. Joyce James M. Joyce Search for other works by this author on: This Site Google The Philosophical Review (2004) 113 (3): 438–441. https://doi.org/10.1215/00318108-113-3…
How Probabilities Reflect Evidence
Are Newcomb problems really decisions
Accuracy and Coherence
A Defense of Imprecise Credences in Inference and Decision Making1
Peer Reviewed
Regret and instability in causal decision theory
Remarks on Richard Pettigrew's Accuracy and the Laws of Credence
Accuracy and the Laws of Credence is a marvelous book.I agree with most of it, but I will raise a few worries about some of its claims.In particular, will take issue with:(1) Pettigrew's handling of Bronfman's objection; (2) his rejection of dominance reasoning when the dominant option fails to satisfy certain requirements of rationality, and (3) his commitment to an accuracy-only epistemology on which, "the only constraints evidence can place on…
Conditional desirability
Philosophy (10 works) · Epistemology (9 works) · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics (9 works) · Computer Science (8 works) · Mathematical economics (8 works) · Mathematics (8 works) · Causal decision theory (6 works) · Decision analysis (6 works) · Business decision mapping (5 works) · Decision theory (5 works)