Parisa Moosavi
Biographic Data
| ID | 5911946 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Parisa Moosavi |
| GIVEN NAMES | Parisa |
| FAMILY NAME | Moosavi |
| SIGNATURE | MOOSAVI P |
| AFFILIATIONS | York University |
| VERIFIED | No |
| TOTAL WORKS | 3 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 6 |
| WORKS AS AUTHOR | 3 |
| WORKS AS EDITOR | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2020 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2024 |
| H-INDEX | 1 |
The function argument for ascribing interests
Will intelligent machines become moral patients
This paper addresses a question about the moral status of Artificial Intelligence (AI): will AIs ever become moral patients? I argue that, while it is in principle possible for an intelligent machine to be a moral patient, there is no good reason to believe this will in fact happen. I start from the plausible assumption that traditional artifacts do not meet a minimal necessary condition of moral patiency: having a good of one's own. I then argue…
Natural goodness without natural history
Neo‐Aristotelian ethical naturalism purports to show that moral evaluation of human action and character is an of evaluation of natural goodness —a kind of evaluation that applies to living things in virtue of their nature and based on their form of life. The standard neo‐Aristotelian view defines natural goodness by way of generic statements describing the natural history , or the ‘characteristic’ life, of a species. In this paper, I argue that …
Will intelligent machines become moral patients
This paper addresses a question about the moral status of Artificial Intelligence (AI): will AIs ever become moral patients? I argue that, while it is in principle possible for an intelligent machine to be a moral patient, there is no good reason to believe this will in fact happen. I start from the plausible assumption that traditional artifacts do not meet a minimal necessary condition of moral patiency: having a good of one's own. I then argue…
Natural goodness without natural history
Neo‐Aristotelian ethical naturalism purports to show that moral evaluation of human action and character is an of evaluation of natural goodness —a kind of evaluation that applies to living things in virtue of their nature and based on their form of life. The standard neo‐Aristotelian view defines natural goodness by way of generic statements describing the natural history , or the ‘characteristic’ life, of a species. In this paper, I argue that …
Natural goodness without natural history
Neo‐Aristotelian ethical naturalism purports to show that moral evaluation of human action and character is an of evaluation of natural goodness —a kind of evaluation that applies to living things in virtue of their nature and based on their form of life. The standard neo‐Aristotelian view defines natural goodness by way of generic statements describing the natural history , or the ‘characteristic’ life, of a species. In this paper, I argue that …
Will intelligent machines become moral patients
This paper addresses a question about the moral status of Artificial Intelligence (AI): will AIs ever become moral patients? I argue that, while it is in principle possible for an intelligent machine to be a moral patient, there is no good reason to believe this will in fact happen. I start from the plausible assumption that traditional artifacts do not meet a minimal necessary condition of moral patiency: having a good of one's own. I then argue…
The function argument for ascribing interests
Epistemology (3 works) · Philosophy (3 works) · Computer Science (2 works) · Neuroethics, Human Enhancement, Biomedical Innovations (2 works) · Philosophy (2 works) · Psychology of Moral and Emotional Judgment (2 works) · Argument (complex analysis (1 work) · Argument (complex analysis) (1 work) · Artificial Intelligence (1 work) · Artificial Intelligence (1 work)