Dion Scott‐Kakures
Biographic Data
| ID | 5912055 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Dion Scott‐Kakures |
| GIVEN NAMES | Dion |
| FAMILY NAME | Scott‐Kakures |
| SIGNATURE | KAKURES D S |
| AFFILIATIONS | Scripps College |
| VERIFIED | No |
| TOTAL WORKS | 7 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 17 |
| WORKS AS AUTHOR | 7 |
| WORKS AS EDITOR | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 1994 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2021 |
| H-INDEX | 3 |
Self-Deceptive Inquiry
I develop the claim that paradigmatic cases of self-deceptive inquiry and belief-formation result from cognitive disorientation. In cognitive disorientation, the data, experiences, and practices we make use of in typical inquiry lead us awry in systematic fashion. The self-deceiver encounters a puzzle or a threat to her picture of the world; this doubt or uncertainty gives rise to questions she struggles to settle. Drawing on the theory of cognit…
How Irrelevant Influences Bias Belief
Unsettling Questions
At “Permanent Risk”
In this essay, I defend the following two claims: (1) reflective, critical reasoning is essential to the process of self‐deception; and (2), the process of self‐deception involves a certain characteristic error of self‐knowledge. By appeal to (1) and (2). I hope to show that we can adjudicate the current dispute about the nature of self‐deception between those we might term “traditionalists,” and those we might term “deflationists.”
Seeing through Self-Deception
Self-Deception and Internal Irrationality
There are a number of answers that I have either explicitly or implicitly rejected. One is David Pears' suggestion that the self-deceiver must 'forget' or otherwise conceal from himself how he came to believe what he does. I agree that the self-deceiver would like to do this, and if he does, he has in a clear sense succeeded in deceiving himself. But this degree and kind of success makes self-deception a process and not a state, and it is unclear…
On Belief and the Captivity of the Will
On Belief and the Captivity of the Will
How Irrelevant Influences Bias Belief
Unsettling Questions
Self-Deception and Internal Irrationality
There are a number of answers that I have either explicitly or implicitly rejected. One is David Pears' suggestion that the self-deceiver must 'forget' or otherwise conceal from himself how he came to believe what he does. I agree that the self-deceiver would like to do this, and if he does, he has in a clear sense succeeded in deceiving himself. But this degree and kind of success makes self-deception a process and not a state, and it is unclear…
At “Permanent Risk”
In this essay, I defend the following two claims: (1) reflective, critical reasoning is essential to the process of self‐deception; and (2), the process of self‐deception involves a certain characteristic error of self‐knowledge. By appeal to (1) and (2). I hope to show that we can adjudicate the current dispute about the nature of self‐deception between those we might term “traditionalists,” and those we might term “deflationists.”
On Belief and the Captivity of the Will
Self-Deception and Internal Irrationality
There are a number of answers that I have either explicitly or implicitly rejected. One is David Pears' suggestion that the self-deceiver must 'forget' or otherwise conceal from himself how he came to believe what he does. I agree that the self-deceiver would like to do this, and if he does, he has in a clear sense succeeded in deceiving himself. But this degree and kind of success makes self-deception a process and not a state, and it is unclear…
Seeing through Self-Deception
At “Permanent Risk”
In this essay, I defend the following two claims: (1) reflective, critical reasoning is essential to the process of self‐deception; and (2), the process of self‐deception involves a certain characteristic error of self‐knowledge. By appeal to (1) and (2). I hope to show that we can adjudicate the current dispute about the nature of self‐deception between those we might term “traditionalists,” and those we might term “deflationists.”
Unsettling Questions
How Irrelevant Influences Bias Belief
Self-Deceptive Inquiry
I develop the claim that paradigmatic cases of self-deceptive inquiry and belief-formation result from cognitive disorientation. In cognitive disorientation, the data, experiences, and practices we make use of in typical inquiry lead us awry in systematic fashion. The self-deceiver encounters a puzzle or a threat to her picture of the world; this doubt or uncertainty gives rise to questions she struggles to settle. Drawing on the theory of cognit…
Psychology (6 works) · Epistemology (5 works) · Philosophy (5 works) · Social Psychology (5 works) · Philosophy (4 works) · Social Psychology (4 works) · Deception (3 works) · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics (3 works) · Self-deception (3 works) · Appeal (2 works)