Lucas Rosenblatt
Biographic Data
| ID | 5912098 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Lucas Rosenblatt |
| GIVEN NAMES | Lucas |
| FAMILY NAME | Rosenblatt |
| SIGNATURE | ROSENBLATT L |
| AFFILIATIONS | Universidad de Buenos Aires |
| ORCID | 0000-0001-6952-4361 |
| VERIFIED | Yes |
| TOTAL WORKS | 8 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 6 |
| AUTHOR COUNT | 8 |
| EDITOR COUNT | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2015 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2023 |
| H-INDEX | 1 |
Paradoxicality Without Paradox
Paradoxicality in Kripke’s theory of truth
Classical recapture and maximality
Capturing naive validity in the Cut-free approach
On structural contraction and why it fails
Should the Non‐Classical Logician be Embarrassed
Non‐classical logicians do not typically reject classically valid logical principles across the board. In fact, they sometimes suggest that their preferred logic recovers classical reasoning in most circumstances. This idea has come to be known in the literature as ‘classical recapture’. Recently, classical logicians have raised various doubts about it. The main problem is said to be that no rigorous explanation has been given of how is it exactl…
Maximal Non-trivial Sets of Instances of Your Least Favorite Logical Principle
The paper generalizes Van McGee's well-known result that there are many maximal consistent sets of instances of Tarski's schema to a number of non-classical theories of truth. It is shown that if a non-classical theory rejects some classically valid principle in order to avoid the truth-theoretic paradoxes, then there will be many maximal non-trivial sets of instances of that principle that the non-classical theorist could in principle endorse. O…
Solving Multimodal Paradoxes
Recently, it has been observed that the usual type‐theoretic restrictions are not enough to block certain paradoxes involving two or more predicates. In particular, when we have a self‐referential language containing modal predicates, new paradoxes might appear even if there are type restrictions for the principles governing those predicates. In this article we consider two type‐theoretic solutions to multimodal paradoxes. The first one adds type…
Capturing naive validity in the Cut-free approach
Paradoxicality in Kripke’s theory of truth
On structural contraction and why it fails
Should the Non‐Classical Logician be Embarrassed
Non‐classical logicians do not typically reject classically valid logical principles across the board. In fact, they sometimes suggest that their preferred logic recovers classical reasoning in most circumstances. This idea has come to be known in the literature as ‘classical recapture’. Recently, classical logicians have raised various doubts about it. The main problem is said to be that no rigorous explanation has been given of how is it exactl…
Solving Multimodal Paradoxes
Recently, it has been observed that the usual type‐theoretic restrictions are not enough to block certain paradoxes involving two or more predicates. In particular, when we have a self‐referential language containing modal predicates, new paradoxes might appear even if there are type restrictions for the principles governing those predicates. In this article we consider two type‐theoretic solutions to multimodal paradoxes. The first one adds type…
Maximal Non-trivial Sets of Instances of Your Least Favorite Logical Principle
The paper generalizes Van McGee's well-known result that there are many maximal consistent sets of instances of Tarski's schema to a number of non-classical theories of truth. It is shown that if a non-classical theory rejects some classically valid principle in order to avoid the truth-theoretic paradoxes, then there will be many maximal non-trivial sets of instances of that principle that the non-classical theorist could in principle endorse. O…
Classical recapture and maximality
Capturing naive validity in the Cut-free approach
On structural contraction and why it fails
Should the Non‐Classical Logician be Embarrassed
Non‐classical logicians do not typically reject classically valid logical principles across the board. In fact, they sometimes suggest that their preferred logic recovers classical reasoning in most circumstances. This idea has come to be known in the literature as ‘classical recapture’. Recently, classical logicians have raised various doubts about it. The main problem is said to be that no rigorous explanation has been given of how is it exactl…
Paradoxicality in Kripke’s theory of truth
Paradoxicality Without Paradox
Epistemology (8 works) · Philosophy (8 works) · Logic, Reasoning, and Knowledge (7 works) · Computer Science (6 works) · Mathematics (6 works) · Philosophy and Theoretical Science (6 works) · Linguistics (5 works) · Metaphysics (5 works) · Philosophy of language (5 works) · Mathematical economics (4 works)