Tristan Grøtvedt Haze
Biographic Data
| ID | 5912162 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Tristan Grøtvedt Haze |
| GIVEN NAMES | Tristan Grøtvedt |
| FAMILY NAME | Haze |
| SIGNATURE | HAZE T G |
| AFFILIATIONS | The University of Melbourne |
| ORCID | 0000-0002-2098-1892 |
| VERIFIED | Yes |
| TOTAL WORKS | 5 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 3 |
| AUTHOR COUNT | 5 |
| EDITOR COUNT | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2021 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2025 |
| H-INDEX | 1 |
Against transition state dialetheism
Graham Priest, in various places, has argued that when you are halfway through walking out of a room, you are both in and not in the room. I argue against this view. ‘In the room’ is open textured and latently ambiguous, admitting of an in-favouring and a not-in-favouring interpretation. Unlike with ordinary ambiguity, where a word or phrase gets used sometimes with one meaning, sometimes with another, a latently ambiguous expression is used with…
Essence, Intrinsicality and Place‐Relativity
Can we, in keeping with Fine's celebrated distinction between essential and merely necessary properties, account for essence in terms of necessity plus something else? One appealing idea is that essence can be accounted for in terms of necessity plus intrinsicality. However, as brought out recently by Zylstra, if intrinsicality is treated as a feature which properties and relations possess tout court , a necessity‐plus‐intrinsicality account will…
Sakes exist
Contemporary ontologists, almost unanimously, dismiss the idea that sakes (as in ‘I did it for her sake’) exist. Likewise with the kibosh, snooks, behalves, dints, and so on. In this essay, I argue that there is no good reason for this near consensus, I begin to make a case that sakes and the like do exist, and I consider what this means more broadly for ontology
Reversing logical nihilism
Gillian Russell has recently proposed counterexamples to such elementary argument forms as Conjunction Introduction (e.g. ‘Snow is white. Grass is green. Therefore, snow is white and grass is green’) and Identity (e.g. ‘Snow is white. Therefore, snow is white’). These purported counterexamples involve expressions that are sensitive to linguistic context—for example, a sentence which is true when it appears alone but false when embedded in a large…
A simple theory of rigidity
Reversing logical nihilism
Gillian Russell has recently proposed counterexamples to such elementary argument forms as Conjunction Introduction (e.g. ‘Snow is white. Grass is green. Therefore, snow is white and grass is green’) and Identity (e.g. ‘Snow is white. Therefore, snow is white’). These purported counterexamples involve expressions that are sensitive to linguistic context—for example, a sentence which is true when it appears alone but false when embedded in a large…
A simple theory of rigidity
Reversing logical nihilism
Gillian Russell has recently proposed counterexamples to such elementary argument forms as Conjunction Introduction (e.g. ‘Snow is white. Grass is green. Therefore, snow is white and grass is green’) and Identity (e.g. ‘Snow is white. Therefore, snow is white’). These purported counterexamples involve expressions that are sensitive to linguistic context—for example, a sentence which is true when it appears alone but false when embedded in a large…
Against transition state dialetheism
Graham Priest, in various places, has argued that when you are halfway through walking out of a room, you are both in and not in the room. I argue against this view. ‘In the room’ is open textured and latently ambiguous, admitting of an in-favouring and a not-in-favouring interpretation. Unlike with ordinary ambiguity, where a word or phrase gets used sometimes with one meaning, sometimes with another, a latently ambiguous expression is used with…
Essence, Intrinsicality and Place‐Relativity
Can we, in keeping with Fine's celebrated distinction between essential and merely necessary properties, account for essence in terms of necessity plus something else? One appealing idea is that essence can be accounted for in terms of necessity plus intrinsicality. However, as brought out recently by Zylstra, if intrinsicality is treated as a feature which properties and relations possess tout court , a necessity‐plus‐intrinsicality account will…
Sakes exist
Contemporary ontologists, almost unanimously, dismiss the idea that sakes (as in ‘I did it for her sake’) exist. Likewise with the kibosh, snooks, behalves, dints, and so on. In this essay, I argue that there is no good reason for this near consensus, I begin to make a case that sakes and the like do exist, and I consider what this means more broadly for ontology
Philosophy and Theoretical Science (4 works) · Philosophy (3 works) · Epistemology (2 works) · Linguistics (2 works) · Mathematics (2 works) · Simple (philosophy) (2 works) · Advanced Algebra and Logic (1 work) · Advanced Materials and Mechanics (1 work) · Ambiguity (1 work) · Argument (complex analysis) (1 work)