Haicheng Zhao
Biographic Data
| ID | 5912206 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Haicheng Zhao |
| GIVEN NAMES | Haicheng |
| FAMILY NAME | Zhao |
| SIGNATURE | ZHAO H |
| AFFILIATIONS | Xiamen University |
| ORCID | 0000-0002-4766-861X |
| VERIFIED | Yes |
| TOTAL WORKS | 8 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 4 |
| AUTHOR COUNT | 8 |
| EDITOR COUNT | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2020 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2026 |
| H-INDEX | 2 |
Against Knowledge as Justified True Belief
Solving the Lottery Problem: From Modal Accounts to Explanationism
Proponents of modal knowledge accounts (safety and sensitivity) concur that one crucial advantage of their accounts is that they solve the so-called lottery problem—the problem of explaining why “lottery beliefs” based merely on statistical evidence do not constitute knowledge. Contra this claim, I argue that epistemic judgments about lottery beliefs do not consistently track what occurs in a specified set of nonactual possibilities. Thus, modal …
Revisiting epistemic sensitivity and evidence
One influential approach to distinguishing individual evidence from statistical evidence in legal epistemology is the sensitivity account, proposed by Enoch, Spectre, and Fisher (2012. “Statistical Evidence, Sensitivity, and the Legal Value of Knowledge.” Philosophy & Public Affairs 40 (3): 197–224. https://doi.org/10.1111/papa.12000). More recently, Günther (2024. “Epistemic Sensitivity and Evidence.” Inquiry 67 (6): 1348–1366. https://doi.org/1…
Why better safe than sensitive
One interesting and potentially attractive feature of the sensitivity account of knowledge is that it not only preserves knowledge of ordinary propositions, but also concedes the skeptic's intuition that we do not know skeptical hypotheses do not obtain. This paper challenges the sensitivity‐based reply to the skeptic, advocated by Robert Nozick, among others. Sensitivity generates an implausibly bizarre result that although we do not know we are…
Safety and Unawareness of Error-Possibility
In this paper, I first seek a relatively plausible formulation of the safety principle. To this end, I refute a recent form of safety by Duncan Pritchard and then defend another weaker form of safety as a necessary condition for knowledge. Second, and more importantly, I point out that this weaker safety is still insufficient, in that it neglects one’s belief regarding nearby error-possibilities—a factor that is largely omitted in the literature …
Inductive knowledge and lotteries: Could one explain both ‘safely’
Safety accounts of knowledge claim, roughly, that knowledge that p requires that one's belief that p could not have easily been false. Such accounts have been very popular in recent epistemology. However, one serious problem safety accounts have to confront is to explain why certain lottery‐related beliefs are not knowledge, without excluding obvious instances of inductive knowledge. We argue that the significance of this objection has hitherto b…
Better virtuous than safe
Knowledge without safety
Knowledge without safety
Safety and Unawareness of Error-Possibility
In this paper, I first seek a relatively plausible formulation of the safety principle. To this end, I refute a recent form of safety by Duncan Pritchard and then defend another weaker form of safety as a necessary condition for knowledge. Second, and more importantly, I point out that this weaker safety is still insufficient, in that it neglects one’s belief regarding nearby error-possibilities—a factor that is largely omitted in the literature …
Inductive knowledge and lotteries: Could one explain both ‘safely’
Safety accounts of knowledge claim, roughly, that knowledge that p requires that one's belief that p could not have easily been false. Such accounts have been very popular in recent epistemology. However, one serious problem safety accounts have to confront is to explain why certain lottery‐related beliefs are not knowledge, without excluding obvious instances of inductive knowledge. We argue that the significance of this objection has hitherto b…
Better virtuous than safe
Why better safe than sensitive
One interesting and potentially attractive feature of the sensitivity account of knowledge is that it not only preserves knowledge of ordinary propositions, but also concedes the skeptic's intuition that we do not know skeptical hypotheses do not obtain. This paper challenges the sensitivity‐based reply to the skeptic, advocated by Robert Nozick, among others. Sensitivity generates an implausibly bizarre result that although we do not know we are…
Against Knowledge as Justified True Belief
Solving the Lottery Problem: From Modal Accounts to Explanationism
Proponents of modal knowledge accounts (safety and sensitivity) concur that one crucial advantage of their accounts is that they solve the so-called lottery problem—the problem of explaining why “lottery beliefs” based merely on statistical evidence do not constitute knowledge. Contra this claim, I argue that epistemic judgments about lottery beliefs do not consistently track what occurs in a specified set of nonactual possibilities. Thus, modal …
Revisiting epistemic sensitivity and evidence
One influential approach to distinguishing individual evidence from statistical evidence in legal epistemology is the sensitivity account, proposed by Enoch, Spectre, and Fisher (2012. “Statistical Evidence, Sensitivity, and the Legal Value of Knowledge.” Philosophy & Public Affairs 40 (3): 197–224. https://doi.org/10.1111/papa.12000). More recently, Günther (2024. “Epistemic Sensitivity and Evidence.” Inquiry 67 (6): 1348–1366. https://doi.org/1…
Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics (8 works) · Epistemology (6 works) · Philosophy (6 works) · Computer Science (4 works) · Psychology (4 works) · Philosophy of science (3 works) · Clinical Reasoning and Diagnostic Skills (2 works) · Deception detection and forensic psychology (2 works) · Economics (2 works) · Ethics in medical practice (2 works)