Hemdat Lerman
Biographic Data
| ID | 5912244 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Hemdat Lerman |
| GIVEN NAMES | Hemdat |
| FAMILY NAME | Lerman |
| SIGNATURE | LERMAN H |
| AFFILIATIONS | University of Warwick |
| VERIFIED | No |
| TOTAL WORKS | 2 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 2 |
| WORKS AS AUTHOR | 1 |
| WORKS AS EDITOR | 1 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2010 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2011 |
| H-INDEX | 1 |
Perception, Causation, and Objectivity
"To be a 'commonsense realist' is to hold that perceptual experience is (in general) an immediate awareness of mind-independent objects, and a source of direct knowledge of what such objects are like. Over the past few centuries this view has faced formidable challenges from epistemology, metaphysics, and, more recently, cognitive science. However, in recent years there has been renewed interest in it, due to new work on perceptual consciousness,…
Non‐conceptual Experiential Content and Reason‐giving
According to John McDowell and Bill Brewer, our experiences have the type of content which can be the content of judgements ‐ content which is the result of the actualization of specific conceptual abilities. They defend this view by arguing that our experiences must have such content in order for us to be able to think about our environment. In this paper I show that they do not provide a conclusive argument for this view. Focusing on Brewer’s v…
Non‐conceptual Experiential Content and Reason‐giving
According to John McDowell and Bill Brewer, our experiences have the type of content which can be the content of judgements ‐ content which is the result of the actualization of specific conceptual abilities. They defend this view by arguing that our experiences must have such content in order for us to be able to think about our environment. In this paper I show that they do not provide a conclusive argument for this view. Focusing on Brewer’s v…
Non‐conceptual Experiential Content and Reason‐giving
According to John McDowell and Bill Brewer, our experiences have the type of content which can be the content of judgements ‐ content which is the result of the actualization of specific conceptual abilities. They defend this view by arguing that our experiences must have such content in order for us to be able to think about our environment. In this paper I show that they do not provide a conclusive argument for this view. Focusing on Brewer’s v…
Perception, Causation, and Objectivity
"To be a 'commonsense realist' is to hold that perceptual experience is (in general) an immediate awareness of mind-independent objects, and a source of direct knowledge of what such objects are like. Over the past few centuries this view has faced formidable challenges from epistemology, metaphysics, and, more recently, cognitive science. However, in recent years there has been renewed interest in it, due to new work on perceptual consciousness,…
Epistemology (2 works) · Philosophy (2 works) · Philosophy and Theoretical Science (2 works) · Psychology (2 works) · Argument (complex analysis (1 work) · Causation (1 work) · Causation (1 work) · Classical Philosophy and Thought (1 work) · Cognitive psychology (1 work) · Computer Science (1 work)