Brigham Daniels
Biographic Data
| ID | 5912721 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Brigham Daniels |
| GIVEN NAMES | Brigham |
| FAMILY NAME | Daniels |
| SIGNATURE | DANIELS B |
| AFFILIATIONS | Brigham Young University |
| VERIFIED | No |
| TOTAL WORKS | 5 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 10 |
| WORKS AS AUTHOR | 5 |
| WORKS AS EDITOR | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2008 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2024 |
| H-INDEX | 1 |
Why Stop Grazing the Climate Commons
Many have argued that climate change is the textbook example of a tragedy of the commons. Assuming that is correct, to make headway on climate change, we would expect an enforceable agreement that provides for global collective action. The tragedy of the commons assumes that those who cut back when others do not are—to use the formal language of game theorists—suckers. So, the last thing we would expect is a surge of unilateral action. Contrary t…
The limits of awards for anti‐corruption
Conventional anti‐corruption approaches focus on detecting and punishing the misuse of public office. These approaches are often ineffective in settings where social norms do not support reporting and punishing corruption. Attempting to build anti‐corruption norms, we conducted a field experiment in Uganda that offered elected, local leaders the chance to earn awards for overseeing development projects according to legal guidelines. We then condu…
Combining bottom-up monitoring and top-down accountability
Citizen monitoring of government performance is often ineffective at improving performance, perhaps because information from monitoring does not make it far enough up in the chain of bureaucracy where the authority to punish public mismanagement rests. In a field experiment, we test whether delivering regular, officially certified reports derived from citizen monitoring and describing specific problems with the implementation of public projects t…
Can information outreach increase participation in community-driven development? A field experiment near Bwindi National Park, Uganda
Is an exemption from US groundwater regulations a loophole or a noose
Can information outreach increase participation in community-driven development? A field experiment near Bwindi National Park, Uganda
The limits of awards for anti‐corruption
Conventional anti‐corruption approaches focus on detecting and punishing the misuse of public office. These approaches are often ineffective in settings where social norms do not support reporting and punishing corruption. Attempting to build anti‐corruption norms, we conducted a field experiment in Uganda that offered elected, local leaders the chance to earn awards for overseeing development projects according to legal guidelines. We then condu…
Is an exemption from US groundwater regulations a loophole or a noose
Can information outreach increase participation in community-driven development? A field experiment near Bwindi National Park, Uganda
Combining bottom-up monitoring and top-down accountability
Citizen monitoring of government performance is often ineffective at improving performance, perhaps because information from monitoring does not make it far enough up in the chain of bureaucracy where the authority to punish public mismanagement rests. In a field experiment, we test whether delivering regular, officially certified reports derived from citizen monitoring and describing specific problems with the implementation of public projects t…
The limits of awards for anti‐corruption
Conventional anti‐corruption approaches focus on detecting and punishing the misuse of public office. These approaches are often ineffective in settings where social norms do not support reporting and punishing corruption. Attempting to build anti‐corruption norms, we conducted a field experiment in Uganda that offered elected, local leaders the chance to earn awards for overseeing development projects according to legal guidelines. We then condu…
Why Stop Grazing the Climate Commons
Many have argued that climate change is the textbook example of a tragedy of the commons. Assuming that is correct, to make headway on climate change, we would expect an enforceable agreement that provides for global collective action. The tragedy of the commons assumes that those who cut back when others do not are—to use the formal language of game theorists—suckers. So, the last thing we would expect is a surge of unilateral action. Contrary t…
Political science (4 works) · Business (3 works) · Experimental Behavioral Economics Studies (3 works) · Public relations (3 works) · Auction Theory and Applications (2 works) · Corruption and Economic Development (2 works) · Economics (2 works) · Field (mathematics (2 works) · Language change (2 works) · Law (2 works)