Skip to main content

ETHNOS_APP

Home • Search • Journals • List 0

Anna Folland

Biographic Data

ID5916155
NAMEAnna Folland
GIVEN NAMESAnna
FAMILY NAMEFolland
SIGNATUREFOLLAND A
AFFILIATIONSUppsala University
ORCID0000-0002-7350-4010
VERIFIEDYes
TOTAL WORKS6
TOTAL CITATIONS4
WORKS AS AUTHOR6
WORKS AS EDITOR0
FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR2021
LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR2026
H-INDEX1
  • Misfortune and Missing Out

    Open Access•Anna Folland•ARTICLE•The Journal of Ethics•2026

    The badness of death is often understood in counterfactual terms: a person’s death is bad for her to the extent that it deprives her of the benefits of life, which she otherwise would have enjoyed. However, things that are bad in this sense do not always seem to be misfortunes or worthy of negative emotional responses . Kaila Draper (1999) raises a challenge for proponents of this counterfactual understanding of badness: given that both death and…

  • Doing Away with Skepticism about Harm

    Open Access•Anna Folland•ARTICLE•Ethical Theory and Moral Practice•2025

    The concept of harm plays a central role in many philosophical discussions. There are numerous ethical theories, claims, and arguments that appeal to the concept of harm. However, some philosophers think that the concept of harm is not fit to play this role in philosophical theorizing. Bradley (2012) argues that the concept is problematic to such an extent that we should do away with it. Bradley is not the only philosopher who doubts this concept…

  • Redefining ‘sustainability’

    Open Access•Karl De Fine Licht, Anna Folland•ARTICLE•Theoria•2025

    In recent years, the pursuit of social sustainability has intensified, especially in urban development. This has resulted in numerous definitions of ‘social sustainability’ from stakeholders including researchers, non‐governmental organizations (NGOs) and both private and public sector entities. These definitions vary widely, encompassing values such as well‐being, good governance, equality, trust, diversity, and accessibility. Despite extensive …

  • AI in Public Decision‐Making

    Open Access•Karl De Fine Licht, Anna Folland•ARTICLE•Public Administration•2025•Cited by: 1•References: 6

    Artificial intelligence (AI) is increasingly used in public decision‐making; yet existing governance tools often lack clear definitions of harm and benefit, practical methods for weighing competing values, and guidance for resolving value conflicts. This paper presents a five‐step framework that integrates moral philosophy, trustworthy AI principles, and procedural justice into a coherent decision process for public administrators. The framework …

  • Feit on the normative importance of harm

    Open Access•Anna Folland•ARTICLE•Theoria•2023

    An important objection to the Counterfactual Comparative Account (CCA) of harm is that the account fails to cohere with standard views about the normative significance of harm. In response, some proponents of CCA suggest that the concept of harm should play a more limited role in normative theorising than philosophers might usually think. This paper addresses the most elaborate defence of CCA of this sort, namely that by Neil Feit (2019) Ethical …

  • The Harm Principle and the Nature of Harm

    Open Access•Anna Folland•ARTICLE•Utilitas•2021•Cited by: 3•References: 6

    This article defends the Harm Principle, commonly attributed to John Stuart Mill, against recent criticism. Some philosophers think that this principle should be rejected, because of severe difficulties with finding an account of harm to plug into it. I examine the criticism and find it unforceful. Finally, I identify a faulty assumption behind this type of criticism, namely that the Harm Principle is plausible only if there is a full-blown, and …

  • The Harm Principle and the Nature of Harm

    Open Access•Anna Folland•ARTICLE•Utilitas•2021•Cited by: 3•References: 6

    This article defends the Harm Principle, commonly attributed to John Stuart Mill, against recent criticism. Some philosophers think that this principle should be rejected, because of severe difficulties with finding an account of harm to plug into it. I examine the criticism and find it unforceful. Finally, I identify a faulty assumption behind this type of criticism, namely that the Harm Principle is plausible only if there is a full-blown, and …

  • AI in Public Decision‐Making

    Open Access•Karl De Fine Licht, Anna Folland•ARTICLE•Public Administration•2025•Cited by: 1•References: 6

    Artificial intelligence (AI) is increasingly used in public decision‐making; yet existing governance tools often lack clear definitions of harm and benefit, practical methods for weighing competing values, and guidance for resolving value conflicts. This paper presents a five‐step framework that integrates moral philosophy, trustworthy AI principles, and procedural justice into a coherent decision process for public administrators. The framework …

  • The Harm Principle and the Nature of Harm

    Open Access•Anna Folland•ARTICLE•Utilitas•2021•Cited by: 3•References: 6

    This article defends the Harm Principle, commonly attributed to John Stuart Mill, against recent criticism. Some philosophers think that this principle should be rejected, because of severe difficulties with finding an account of harm to plug into it. I examine the criticism and find it unforceful. Finally, I identify a faulty assumption behind this type of criticism, namely that the Harm Principle is plausible only if there is a full-blown, and …

  • Feit on the normative importance of harm

    Open Access•Anna Folland•ARTICLE•Theoria•2023

    An important objection to the Counterfactual Comparative Account (CCA) of harm is that the account fails to cohere with standard views about the normative significance of harm. In response, some proponents of CCA suggest that the concept of harm should play a more limited role in normative theorising than philosophers might usually think. This paper addresses the most elaborate defence of CCA of this sort, namely that by Neil Feit (2019) Ethical …

  • Doing Away with Skepticism about Harm

    Open Access•Anna Folland•ARTICLE•Ethical Theory and Moral Practice•2025

    The concept of harm plays a central role in many philosophical discussions. There are numerous ethical theories, claims, and arguments that appeal to the concept of harm. However, some philosophers think that the concept of harm is not fit to play this role in philosophical theorizing. Bradley (2012) argues that the concept is problematic to such an extent that we should do away with it. Bradley is not the only philosopher who doubts this concept…

  • Redefining ‘sustainability’

    Open Access•Karl De Fine Licht, Anna Folland•ARTICLE•Theoria•2025

    In recent years, the pursuit of social sustainability has intensified, especially in urban development. This has resulted in numerous definitions of ‘social sustainability’ from stakeholders including researchers, non‐governmental organizations (NGOs) and both private and public sector entities. These definitions vary widely, encompassing values such as well‐being, good governance, equality, trust, diversity, and accessibility. Despite extensive …

  • AI in Public Decision‐Making

    Open Access•Karl De Fine Licht, Anna Folland•ARTICLE•Public Administration•2025•Cited by: 1•References: 6

    Artificial intelligence (AI) is increasingly used in public decision‐making; yet existing governance tools often lack clear definitions of harm and benefit, practical methods for weighing competing values, and guidance for resolving value conflicts. This paper presents a five‐step framework that integrates moral philosophy, trustworthy AI principles, and procedural justice into a coherent decision process for public administrators. The framework …

  • Misfortune and Missing Out

    Open Access•Anna Folland•ARTICLE•The Journal of Ethics•2026

    The badness of death is often understood in counterfactual terms: a person’s death is bad for her to the extent that it deprives her of the benefits of life, which she otherwise would have enjoyed. However, things that are bad in this sense do not always seem to be misfortunes or worthy of negative emotional responses . Kaila Draper (1999) raises a challenge for proponents of this counterfactual understanding of badness: given that both death and…

Harm (5 works) · Philosophy (4 works) · Epistemology (3 works) · Free Will and Agency (3 works) · Law (3 works) · Political science (3 works) · Psychology (3 works) · Psychology of Moral and Emotional Judgment (3 works) · Sociology (3 works) · Counterfactual thinking (2 works)

Ethnos_APP • Open Source Project • MIT License • Frontend v2.0.0 • Privacy and Cookies • API Documentation: api.ethnos.app/docs • API Source Code: GitHub • DOI: 10.5281/zenodo.17049435 • Frontend Source Code: GitHub • DOI: 10.5281/zenodo.17050053 • cruz.rio.br • Expectantes Misericordiae