Eva Heims
Biographic Data
| ID | 5916256 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Eva Heims |
| GIVEN NAMES | Eva |
| FAMILY NAME | Heims |
| SIGNATURE | HEIMS E |
| AFFILIATIONS | University of York |
| ORCID | 0000-0003-0696-4970 |
| VERIFIED | Yes |
| TOTAL WORKS | 10 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 50 |
| AUTHOR COUNT | 10 |
| EDITOR COUNT | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2013 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2025 |
| H-INDEX | 4 |
The Limits of Regulatory Capture: Explaining the UK Payment Protection Insurance Mis‐Selling Scandal
To what extent does regulatory agencies' failure to protect the public from harm result from undue industry influence? We argue that “regulatory capture” is invoked too easily to explain regulatory failure. To re‐examine the relationship between regulatory capture and regulatory failure, we use process‐tracing to study UK regulatory decision‐making about payment protection insurance (PPI), a product synonymous with one of the largest financial mi…
The Board of Trade and the regulatory state in the long 19th century, 1815–1914
How does regulatory statehood develop from the regulatory work which governments have always done? This article challenges conventional views that regulatory statehood is achieved by transition to arm's length agencies and that it replaces court‐based enforcement or displaces legislatures in favor of less accountable executive power. To do so, we examine the major 19th‐century surge in development of micro‐economic regulatory statehood in Britain…
How did international economic regulation survive the last period of deglobalization
As trade wars and protectionism again present severe challenges and obstructions to international economic regulatory organizations (IEROs), it is timely to ask how their predecessors survived the last deep deglobalization of the interwar years. This article presents a fresh neo‐Durkheimian institutional explanation. It highlights contrasting pathways to survival and bequest of IEROs in three fields of regulation – international infrastructure, c…
Why do states in conflict with each other also sustain resilient cooperation in international regulation? Britain and telegraphy, 1860s–1914
This article compares the explanatory power of five mainstream theories from International Relations, political science and public management in understanding why – when they are engaged in deepening conflict and tension and even preparations for wars – states might simultaneously sustain deepening cooperation in global regulatory bodies. Analysis of explanatory power focuses on trade-offs among five key methodological virtues, and on buffering a…
Regulating with the masses? Mapping the spread of participatory regulation
Stakeholder participation in regulatory processes has become increasingly common. The literature on citizen, customer and consumer participation in regulation shows a rise in these types of engagement, based primarily on individual case studies. However, we lack a solid empirical base for the discussion of this trend. This paper asks to what extent and why this rise in participation in regulatory policy-making occurs, creating a cross-sector, cro…
The state and civil society: Regulating interest groups, parties and public benefit organizations in contemporary democracies
Customer engagement in UK water regulation: Towards a Collaborative Regulatory State
Little is known about how processes of ‘expert’ control interact with or move towards collaborative models of regulation. This paper focuses on a critical example of such an apparent shift: customer engagement in price-setting in water regulation in Scotland and England/Wales. By drawing on original interview and documentary analysis, the paper demonstrates a neglected rationale for and usage of ‘collaborative regulation’: regulators introduced c…
Regulatory co-ordination in the EU: A Cross-Sector Comparison
The article examines what drives national regulators' attitudes towards and engagement with EU regulatory co-ordination as facilitated by EU agencies and offices. It suggests that a bureaucratic politics perspective can counteract shortcomings of explanations conventionally advanced in the EU governance literature by showing that national regulators' attitudes towards co-ordination are driven by the aim to protect their turf. This is empirically …
Explaining Coordination Between National Regulators in Eu Agencies: The Role of Formal and Informal Social Organization
Coordination between national regulators in EU agencies is based on a variety of mechanisms – such as mutual exchange and hierarchy – which the existing literature has extensively documented. However, it has paid less attention to explaining such variation. This article suggests that cultural theory can systematically integrate the observation of varied coordination mechanisms into one framework. More crucially, cultural theory also provides a co…
The Role of ‘Bureaucrats’ in the Executive Order of the EU: Re-examining the Practices of the Commission, EU Agencies and Council Working Groups
Busuioc, M., Groenleer, M., and Trondal, J., eds. 2012. The agency phenomenon in the European Union: emergence, institutionalisation and everyday decision-making. Manchester: Manchester University
Regulating with the masses? Mapping the spread of participatory regulation
Stakeholder participation in regulatory processes has become increasingly common. The literature on citizen, customer and consumer participation in regulation shows a rise in these types of engagement, based primarily on individual case studies. However, we lack a solid empirical base for the discussion of this trend. This paper asks to what extent and why this rise in participation in regulatory policy-making occurs, creating a cross-sector, cro…
Explaining Coordination Between National Regulators in Eu Agencies: The Role of Formal and Informal Social Organization
Coordination between national regulators in EU agencies is based on a variety of mechanisms – such as mutual exchange and hierarchy – which the existing literature has extensively documented. However, it has paid less attention to explaining such variation. This article suggests that cultural theory can systematically integrate the observation of varied coordination mechanisms into one framework. More crucially, cultural theory also provides a co…
Customer engagement in UK water regulation: Towards a Collaborative Regulatory State
Little is known about how processes of ‘expert’ control interact with or move towards collaborative models of regulation. This paper focuses on a critical example of such an apparent shift: customer engagement in price-setting in water regulation in Scotland and England/Wales. By drawing on original interview and documentary analysis, the paper demonstrates a neglected rationale for and usage of ‘collaborative regulation’: regulators introduced c…
Regulatory co-ordination in the EU: A Cross-Sector Comparison
The article examines what drives national regulators' attitudes towards and engagement with EU regulatory co-ordination as facilitated by EU agencies and offices. It suggests that a bureaucratic politics perspective can counteract shortcomings of explanations conventionally advanced in the EU governance literature by showing that national regulators' attitudes towards co-ordination are driven by the aim to protect their turf. This is empirically …
The Limits of Regulatory Capture: Explaining the UK Payment Protection Insurance Mis‐Selling Scandal
To what extent does regulatory agencies' failure to protect the public from harm result from undue industry influence? We argue that “regulatory capture” is invoked too easily to explain regulatory failure. To re‐examine the relationship between regulatory capture and regulatory failure, we use process‐tracing to study UK regulatory decision‐making about payment protection insurance (PPI), a product synonymous with one of the largest financial mi…
How did international economic regulation survive the last period of deglobalization
As trade wars and protectionism again present severe challenges and obstructions to international economic regulatory organizations (IEROs), it is timely to ask how their predecessors survived the last deep deglobalization of the interwar years. This article presents a fresh neo‐Durkheimian institutional explanation. It highlights contrasting pathways to survival and bequest of IEROs in three fields of regulation – international infrastructure, c…
The Role of ‘Bureaucrats’ in the Executive Order of the EU: Re-examining the Practices of the Commission, EU Agencies and Council Working Groups
Busuioc, M., Groenleer, M., and Trondal, J., eds. 2012. The agency phenomenon in the European Union: emergence, institutionalisation and everyday decision-making. Manchester: Manchester University
Explaining Coordination Between National Regulators in Eu Agencies: The Role of Formal and Informal Social Organization
Coordination between national regulators in EU agencies is based on a variety of mechanisms – such as mutual exchange and hierarchy – which the existing literature has extensively documented. However, it has paid less attention to explaining such variation. This article suggests that cultural theory can systematically integrate the observation of varied coordination mechanisms into one framework. More crucially, cultural theory also provides a co…
Regulatory co-ordination in the EU: A Cross-Sector Comparison
The article examines what drives national regulators' attitudes towards and engagement with EU regulatory co-ordination as facilitated by EU agencies and offices. It suggests that a bureaucratic politics perspective can counteract shortcomings of explanations conventionally advanced in the EU governance literature by showing that national regulators' attitudes towards co-ordination are driven by the aim to protect their turf. This is empirically …
Customer engagement in UK water regulation: Towards a Collaborative Regulatory State
Little is known about how processes of ‘expert’ control interact with or move towards collaborative models of regulation. This paper focuses on a critical example of such an apparent shift: customer engagement in price-setting in water regulation in Scotland and England/Wales. By drawing on original interview and documentary analysis, the paper demonstrates a neglected rationale for and usage of ‘collaborative regulation’: regulators introduced c…
The state and civil society: Regulating interest groups, parties and public benefit organizations in contemporary democracies
Regulating with the masses? Mapping the spread of participatory regulation
Stakeholder participation in regulatory processes has become increasingly common. The literature on citizen, customer and consumer participation in regulation shows a rise in these types of engagement, based primarily on individual case studies. However, we lack a solid empirical base for the discussion of this trend. This paper asks to what extent and why this rise in participation in regulatory policy-making occurs, creating a cross-sector, cro…
How did international economic regulation survive the last period of deglobalization
As trade wars and protectionism again present severe challenges and obstructions to international economic regulatory organizations (IEROs), it is timely to ask how their predecessors survived the last deep deglobalization of the interwar years. This article presents a fresh neo‐Durkheimian institutional explanation. It highlights contrasting pathways to survival and bequest of IEROs in three fields of regulation – international infrastructure, c…
Why do states in conflict with each other also sustain resilient cooperation in international regulation? Britain and telegraphy, 1860s–1914
This article compares the explanatory power of five mainstream theories from International Relations, political science and public management in understanding why – when they are engaged in deepening conflict and tension and even preparations for wars – states might simultaneously sustain deepening cooperation in global regulatory bodies. Analysis of explanatory power focuses on trade-offs among five key methodological virtues, and on buffering a…
The Board of Trade and the regulatory state in the long 19th century, 1815–1914
How does regulatory statehood develop from the regulatory work which governments have always done? This article challenges conventional views that regulatory statehood is achieved by transition to arm's length agencies and that it replaces court‐based enforcement or displaces legislatures in favor of less accountable executive power. To do so, we examine the major 19th‐century surge in development of micro‐economic regulatory statehood in Britain…
The Limits of Regulatory Capture: Explaining the UK Payment Protection Insurance Mis‐Selling Scandal
To what extent does regulatory agencies' failure to protect the public from harm result from undue industry influence? We argue that “regulatory capture” is invoked too easily to explain regulatory failure. To re‐examine the relationship between regulatory capture and regulatory failure, we use process‐tracing to study UK regulatory decision‐making about payment protection insurance (PPI), a product synonymous with one of the largest financial mi…
Economics (8 works) · Law (8 works) · Political science (8 works) · Law (7 works) · Regulation and Compliance Studies (7 works) · Political Influence and Corporate Strategies (5 works) · Politics (5 works) · Sociology (5 works) · Business (4 works) · Computer Science (4 works)