Rupayan Pal
Biographic Data
| ID | 5918123 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Rupayan Pal |
| GIVEN NAMES | Rupayan |
| FAMILY NAME | Pal |
| SIGNATURE | PAL R |
| AFFILIATIONS | Indira Gandhi Institute of Development Research |
| ORCID | 0000-0002-9475-2179 |
| VERIFIED | Yes |
| TOTAL WORKS | 9 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 7 |
| AUTHOR COUNT | 9 |
| EDITOR COUNT | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2015 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2023 |
| H-INDEX | 2 |
Corruption versus efficiency in water allocation under uncertainty
In the absence of a cooperative solution to the problem of rights over shared water, water allocation through third-party intervention is most commonly used. This paper considers water allocation within a federal set-up with the requisite legal institutions to enforce third-party adjudication and tries to capture the politically charged motivations that often guide such allocations. It compares two mechanisms generally used by central planners to…
Global shocks and international policy coordination
We show as emerging markets (EMs) size crosses a threshold it is in advanced economies (AEs) own interest to reduce negative spillovers to EMs. It follows the potential for international cooperation in macroeconomic and prudential policy increases. But entrenched perceptions and historical advantages are obstacles. These blocks are explored as well as possibilities in macroeconomic policies and in prudential regulation. Export of capital is a maj…
Probabilistic Patents, Alternative Damage Rules, and Optimal Tariffs
This paper analyzes interdependences between optimal trade policy and preferred liability doctrine to assess infringement damages, when intellectual property rights are probabilistic, in a model of import competition between a foreign patentee and a domestic infringer. It shows two reversal results. First, a regime switch from protectionism to free trade reverses stakeholders' preferences over liability doctrines. Second, the optimal trade policy…
Equilibrium Coexistence of Public and Private Firms and the Plausibility of Price Competition
We consider a differentiated product duopoly where a regulated firm competes with a private firm. The instrument of regulation is the level of privatization. First, the regulator determines the level of privatization to maximize social welfare. Thereafter, both firms endogenously choose the mode of competition (thatis, whether to compete in price or quantity). Finally, the two firms compete in the market. Under a very general demand specification…
On the probability ratio index as a measure of electoral competition
This paper deals with the fundamental issue of quantifying the degree of competitiveness underlying an election in a society. That is, given the vote shares of competing political parties in the election one needs to arrive at a representative metric of electoral competition. The vote share of a party represents its influence on the outcome of the election. A summary measure of differences of such influences across parties, aggregated in an unamb…
Network externalities and process R&D
Electoral Outcomes and Provision of Public Goods
This paper analyses the implications of political factors on provision of public goods by state governments in India. Using data on state governments’ expenditure and constituency results of states' Legislative Assembly elections during the period 1971–2005, it demonstrates that the greater the spread of ruling party's strength across legislative constituencies in a state, the higher the share of developmental expenditure in revenue budget. It al…
Cournot vs. Bertrand under relative performance delegation
Entry Threats and Inefficiency in ‘Efficient Bargaining’
We study limit pricing in a model of entry with asymmetric information, where the incumbent firm's wage is endogenously determined through ‘efficient bargaining’ with its union. In the presence of entry threat, the incumbent firm‐union pair may face a conflict between rent sharing and transmitting its cost information. When the wage is not observable to outsiders and employment is the only signalling instrument, over‐employment features in all en…
Cournot vs. Bertrand under relative performance delegation
Entry Threats and Inefficiency in ‘Efficient Bargaining’
We study limit pricing in a model of entry with asymmetric information, where the incumbent firm's wage is endogenously determined through ‘efficient bargaining’ with its union. In the presence of entry threat, the incumbent firm‐union pair may face a conflict between rent sharing and transmitting its cost information. When the wage is not observable to outsiders and employment is the only signalling instrument, over‐employment features in all en…
Electoral Outcomes and Provision of Public Goods
This paper analyses the implications of political factors on provision of public goods by state governments in India. Using data on state governments’ expenditure and constituency results of states' Legislative Assembly elections during the period 1971–2005, it demonstrates that the greater the spread of ruling party's strength across legislative constituencies in a state, the higher the share of developmental expenditure in revenue budget. It al…
Probabilistic Patents, Alternative Damage Rules, and Optimal Tariffs
This paper analyzes interdependences between optimal trade policy and preferred liability doctrine to assess infringement damages, when intellectual property rights are probabilistic, in a model of import competition between a foreign patentee and a domestic infringer. It shows two reversal results. First, a regime switch from protectionism to free trade reverses stakeholders' preferences over liability doctrines. Second, the optimal trade policy…
Equilibrium Coexistence of Public and Private Firms and the Plausibility of Price Competition
We consider a differentiated product duopoly where a regulated firm competes with a private firm. The instrument of regulation is the level of privatization. First, the regulator determines the level of privatization to maximize social welfare. Thereafter, both firms endogenously choose the mode of competition (thatis, whether to compete in price or quantity). Finally, the two firms compete in the market. Under a very general demand specification…
On the probability ratio index as a measure of electoral competition
This paper deals with the fundamental issue of quantifying the degree of competitiveness underlying an election in a society. That is, given the vote shares of competing political parties in the election one needs to arrive at a representative metric of electoral competition. The vote share of a party represents its influence on the outcome of the election. A summary measure of differences of such influences across parties, aggregated in an unamb…
Network externalities and process R&D
Global shocks and international policy coordination
We show as emerging markets (EMs) size crosses a threshold it is in advanced economies (AEs) own interest to reduce negative spillovers to EMs. It follows the potential for international cooperation in macroeconomic and prudential policy increases. But entrenched perceptions and historical advantages are obstacles. These blocks are explored as well as possibilities in macroeconomic policies and in prudential regulation. Export of capital is a maj…
Corruption versus efficiency in water allocation under uncertainty
In the absence of a cooperative solution to the problem of rights over shared water, water allocation through third-party intervention is most commonly used. This paper considers water allocation within a federal set-up with the requisite legal institutions to enforce third-party adjudication and tries to capture the politically charged motivations that often guide such allocations. It compares two mechanisms generally used by central planners to…
Economics (9 works) · Microeconomics (7 works) · Market economy (4 works) · Merger and Competition Analysis (4 works) · Business (3 works) · Computer Science (3 works) · Cournot competition (3 works) · Digital Platforms and Economics (3 works) · Bertrand competition (2 works) · Bertrand paradox (economics) (2 works)